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ABSTRACT 
Throughout history, small nation-states have generally organized their militaries and 
based their homeland-defense strategies on at least one of four conventional models. 
They have from time to time chosen to imitate large states` militaries, have joined 
alliances, assumed neutrality, obtained weapons of mass destruction in more modern 
times, or implemented some combination of these. A deeper analysis of history, however, 
unearths other possibilities for defensive postures. The use of irregular strategies and 
forces, when small nations have faced much bigger and stronger adversaries, has been 
successful quite a few times. While countries with traditional, orthodox, military 
mindsets and organizations have spent the last few decades trying to counter irregular 
forces and strategies, and learning to fight them effectively, the other side of the coin—
the adoption of irregular warfare techniques—has been poorly explored. This research 
was conducted to fill this gap. What can be learned and used at the state level from the 
strength and historical successes of irregular strategies and forces? Through the analysis 
of six irregular conflicts, including successful and failed examples, this thesis examines 
the possible utility and exportability of an irregular strategy as a preferred homeland-
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During the Cold War, deterrence was based on the conventional military power of 
the two large alliances and their offsetting nuclear capabilities. Their example provided a 
baseline for small nations to think about their own self-defense. The fall of the Soviet 
Union changed the longstanding polarized world order, and the emergence of new 
international and local powers has changed the way certain countries look at the issue of 
self-defense now. No doubt the central concept of defensive action remains the ability to 
deter future enemies from aggression. The theory of deterrence has been a focus of 
researchers for decades. Thomas Schelling, for example, explains that “there is a 
difference between taking what you want and making someone give it to you, between 
fending off assault and making someone afraid to assault you, between holding what 
people are trying to take and making them afraid to take it, between losing what someone 
can forcibly take and giving it up to avoid risk or damage. It is the difference between 
defense and deterrence.”1 Schelling’s deterrence theory is based in a state’s diplomacy 
and military-strategy development. He argues that in the development of a state’s military 
strategy—its capacity to hurt its enemy—lies a key motivating element in deterring its 
adversaries and avoiding conflict. To successfully deter another state, the use of force 
must be anticipated, but should be avoidable by means of compliance. In Schelling’s 
view, the foundation of successful deterrence is the use of power to inflict damage as 
bargaining power, to influence another party’s behavior.2  Paul K. Huth explains it 
similarly when he states that deterrence is the application of threats by one side in order 
to convince the other side to abandon its intention of initiating some type of action.3 
Lawrence Freedman categorizes deterrence as punishment and denial. According to him, 
                                                 
1 Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), 2. 
2 Schelling, Arms and Influence, 1–20. 
3 Paul K. Huth, “Deterrence and International Conflict: Empirical Findings and Theoretical 
Debate,” Annual Review of Political Science 2 (1999): 25–48. 
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the essence of punishment is the manipulation of the “behavior of others through 
conditional threats,”4 while denial is the implementation of guerrilla strategy.5 However, 
while the theory of how to deter an enemy looks well established, the question of what 
happens if the threats are not enough and an actual “aggression phase” starts is not well 
explored. 
History suggests that small nation–states have four general choices, based on their 
geographical location, available natural resources, and foreign-policy goals, to sustain 
effective deterrence and defensive capabilities. First, they may try to provide their own 
security by imitating the military power of larger states through sustainment of a 
traditional military force (army, air force, navy, etc.). But many of these small nations are 
struggling with financial issues and have limited resources to allocate for the sustainment 
of a large military. They live under the illusion of having a capable defense force, but 
when it comes to a test, the results can be very painful.6 Second, small countries with 
restricted military capability may join an alliance and rely on the collective-security 
notion of defense. As history shows, alliances have always struggled with the issue of 
“entrapment” and “abandonment.” In some cases, when it has come to actual aggression, 
no doubt alliances have worked; but in other cases, they have failed miserably.7  
Third, small nations can adopt neutrality as a solution for homeland defense. 
Although neutrality might allow the country to retain its sovereignty, it has always been a 
sensitive issue, since it can work only if it is accepted by the potential aggressor as well. 
Finally, small countries can try to obtain weapons of mass destruction. Since many small 
nations have signed nonproliferation treaties, even a sign of the intention to obtain 
                                                 
4 Lawrence Freedman, Deterrence (New York: Polity Press, 2004), 6.  
5 Freedman, Deterrence, 14–17.  
6 The Georgian-Russian conflict in 2008 is an example of how a small nation that had tried to imitate 
big ones failed against a larger enemy. 
7 The invasion of Poland in September 1939 by Germany and a few weeks later, Russia is an example 
of alliance failure. On the 25
th
 of August, Poland signed the Polish-British Common Defense Pact as an 
annex to the already existing Franco-Polish Military Alliance. In those France and Great Britain committed 
themselves to the defense of Poland, guaranteeing to preserve Polish independence. The invasion of Poland 
led Britain and France to declare war on Germany on 3 September. However, they did little to affect the 
outcome of the September campaign. This lack of direct help led many Poles to believe that they had 
been betrayed by their Western allies. 
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WMDs can cause very serious international-relations problems, not only politically, but 
economically as well. The other disadvantage of a nuclear-deterrence-based self-defense 
strategy is that, when it fails, the country has to have the will to use WMDs against the 
aggressor to have any real meaning.8 
All the above-mentioned ideas are based on traditional ways of thinking about 
war and defending a country, but a detailed analysis of history provides other possibilities 
worth considering. For example, history shows that irregular strategies have been 
successful quite a few times when a small force faced a much bigger and stronger enemy. 
Recent counter insurgency operations (COIN), as in Vietnam, Chechnya, Lebanon, Iraq, 
and Afghanistan, teaches us again the painful lessons of fighting against irregulars. 
Countries with a traditional, orthodox military mindset and organizations have spent the 
last couple of decades trying to figure out the weaknesses of irregulars and how to fight 
against them effectively. However, the other side of COIN has been poorly explored. 
What can be learned and used from the strength of irregular strategies? Can an irregular-
warfare strategy be incorporated into the homeland defense of smaller nations? 
1. Research Question 
How should small countries defend themselves?  
2. Implied Research Question 
What is a possible alternative method for defense for small nations beyond the 
above-mentioned four traditional models? 
3. Hypotheses 
1. During an invasion of its territory, a small state has a better chance to 
defeat a numerically and technologically superior enemy when utilizing 
irregular-warfare techniques instead of traditional military approaches. 
  
                                                 
8 The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea provides an example of successful WMD acquisition as 
enhancing security and defense capability. 
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2. Irregular-warfare strategy is more effective when the irregular defense 
force contains and is led by professional military members.  
 
3. Irregular-warfare strategy is more effective when the irregular defense 
force is organized, trained, and equipped for irregular war before the 
conflict, rather than when it arises ad hoc, in the wake of conventional 
defeat.  
B. RESEARCH DESIGN  
In 1975, the American Army Colonel Harry Summers traveled to Hanoi as a 
member of a negotiating party. He got into a conversation with a North Vietnamese 
colonel named Tu, and told him that the North Vietnamese forces had never defeated the 
American troops on the battlefield. The North Vietnamese colonel responded: “That may 
be so, but it is also irrelevant.”9 The main goal of this thesis is to analyze the theory that 
is it possible to use irregular warfare as a national military strategy and to adopt a 
“professional, irregular defense force” concept as a country’s homeland-defense force; 
and, if these are indeed valid possibilities, to explore the conditions under which they are 
preferable to conventional defense. 
It is not the goal of this research to identify single countries as possible subjects of 
the theory or to provide a general framework for how to organize, train, equip, or sustain 
a professional, irregular defense force. It is also beyond the scope of this investigation to 
determine whether it is cheaper to sustain an irregular-type military organization than a 
conventional force, but the likelihood is that an irregular force will cost much less. If the 
theory is proven valid, these questions should become the subject of further research. 
The first part of this thesis will clarify the definition of small states to establish a 
conceptual basis for analyzing the four defense possibilities noted above. The basic 
assumption of this research is that the assessment of the traditional ways of defense will 
present an opportunity for a different, more self-reliant approach to provide small 
countries with their own defenses. To try to fill this gap, this thesis will introduce and 
                                                 
9 Harry G. Summers Jr., On Strategy: a Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War (Novato: Presidio Press, 
1982), 1. 
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investigate the “professional, irregular defense force” theory as a possible homeland-
defense solution. The second part of this project will focus on historical case studies, in 
which state and non-state actors (and their military or paramilitary forces) either 
combined regular with irregular warfare or abandoned conventional operations 
altogether, using only irregular warfare to engage their enemies. Analyzing and assessing 
both successful and failed cases will help identify the key conditions under which the 
suggested irregular warfare approach is preferable to conventional warfare. The final part 
of this thesis will summarize findings and, based on the results, will support or deny the 
validity and exportability of the proffered theory on irregular warfare strategy and the 
“professional” force that might wage such conflicts. 
C. RESEARCH METHOLODGY  
To explore the concept of a professional, irregular defense force and related 
strategies, this thesis will present six historical case studies and provide a detailed 
analysis of each, focusing on the side that used irregular warfare. To narrow the scope of 
the investigation, this thesis will analyze historical cases when military or paramilitary 
forces defending a homeland either combined conventional strategy with irregular 
warfare techniques or avoided the conventional, orthodox way of waging war and 
conducted irregular warfare only, against a numerically and technologically superior 
conventional enemy. To test the hypothesis effectively, this research will introduce 
longitudinal and cross-sectional analysis of successful and failed historical cases.  
First, this thesis will introduce two cases with similar backgrounds: former 
colonies fighting for freedom and independence against a major empire. Both colonies 
started the conflict without a previously existing conventional military force, while their 
enemies possessed large and technologically superior military capabilities. In these cases, 
the weak side had to rely on irregular, militia-type forces at the beginning of the conflict 
to gain time for building a conventional defense force. These irregular forces continued to 
play a key role during the entire conflict, even after a conventional military was 
established. The first two cases will consist of the American Revolutionary War, which  
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will be presented as a successful case, and the Second Boer War, an example of failure. 
These cases will investigate why certain characteristics led to success in one case and 
failure in the other.  
To further investigate those conditions, a third case study will focus on the events 
of the First World War in German East Africa. In this case, an already existing, 
conventionally organized and trained, colonial-defense force, after realizing that 
conventional defense held no chance of success against an inexhaustible enemy, waged 
an entire war by following irregular strategy.  The fourth case study analyzes the 
operations of the Yugoslav partisans during the Second World War. In this case, a small 
state, with its conventional military forces defeated and territories occupied, organized 
guerrilla forces on an ad-hoc basis and launched an irregular campaign to engage the 
occupying military.  
Finally, two contemporary cases challenge the validity of the hypotheses and 
exportability of the proposed homeland-defense strategy. The First Russo–Chechen War 
and the Second Lebanese War are useful examples how the use of ancient and modern 
elements of irregular warfare can dramatically increase the weaker side’s chance of 
defeating a conventional adversary. In all cases studies, this research will employ at least 
three different sources to confirm findings and make sure sources agree.  
To identify the common fundamentals and characteristics of the case studies and 
help in their analysis and assessment, it is important to establish a research model.  Since 
the basic pillar of the proposed irregular-warfare strategy is guerrilla warfare, this 
research will use a model that adopts the principles of the most significant irregular- and 
guerrilla-warfare theorists, including Carl von Clausewitz, Mao Zedong, Ernesto “Che” 
Guevara, and General Vo Nguyen Giap. A summary explanation of their warfighting 
principles is necessary before moving on to a detailed description of the research model.  
The first contributor is Carl von Clausewitz. It might be surprising that this thesis 
considers him a significant irregular-warfare theorist, since his name is identified with the 
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definitions of conventional war as “a continuation of policy by other means,”10 and of 
war in general as “the application of armed forces by a state to destroy the enemy army to 
compel another state to follow the attacker’s will.”11 Many scholars dispute his relevance 
in studying the dynamics of today’s irregular conflicts. For example, Martin van Creveld, 
supported by Edward Luttwak and Steven Metz, states that because low-intensity 
conflicts are today’s primary way of war, Clausewitz’s ideas are no longer valid, or 
possibly wrong.12 On the other hand, several researchers, including Werner Hahlweg and 
Christopher Daase, have gone beyond Clausewitz’s famous book, On War, and, by 
analysis of his other works such as “Lectures on Small War,” given at the Allgemeine 
Kriegsschule in c. 1811, and “Bekenntnisdenkschrift” (“Memorandum of Confession”) of 
1812, find that Clausewitz studied guerrilla warfare and its principles extensively.13   
Clausewitz’s guerrilla-warfare theory was based on his analysis of the rebellion in 
the Vendée between 1793 and 1796, the Tyrolean conflict of 1809, and the Spanish 
guerrilla war against the French from 1808 to 1814.14 He was also influenced by 
Scharnhorst and Gneisenau’s Landsturm idea, which proposed “the establishment of a 
national militia in Prussia”15 to “hinder the enemy’s advance and bar his retreat, to keep 
him continually on the move, to capture his ammunition, food, supplies, couriers and 
recruits, to seize his hospitals, and to attack him by night, in short, harassing, tormenting, 
tiring and destroying him either individually or his units wherever possible.”16 Based on 
these influences and his case studies, Clausewitz’s theory of “small war” evolved over 
time. During his initial lectures, addressing the lieutenants and captains of the Prussian 
                                                 
10 Carl von Clausewitz, On War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 210.  
11 Hew Strachan, and Andreas Herberg-Rothe, Clausewitz in the Twenty First Century, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2007), 186. 
12 Martin Van Creveld , The Transformation of War (New York: The Free Press, 1991), ix. 
13 Strachan and Herberg-Rothe, Clausewitz in the Twenty First Century, 183. 
14 Werner Hahlweg, “Clausewitz and Guerrilla Warfare,” Journal of Strategic Studies 9 (1986): 127.  
15 Walter Laqueur, Guerrilla Warfare. A Historical and Critical Study (New Brunswick: Transaction 
Publishers, 1998), 112. 
16 Laqueur, Guerrilla Warfare, 112. 
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army,17 he considered guerrilla operations as a “specific form of military operation by 
small units to reconnoiter the enemy’s positions and harass his lines of communication”18 
and did not consider them an independent form of war. However, in the 
“Bekenntnisdenkschrift,” he changed his view. Experiencing the superior power of 
France and the weakness of the conventional Prussian army, he saw small war in a 
revolutionary way. Clausewitz considered the mobilization of the masses and irregular 
warfare as a crucial element of war with the aim “to harass and exhaust the enemy’s army 
in order to change his policy. Small war gained a rather distinct form in Clausewitz’s 
thinking.”19 He suggested such a war to liberate Prussia from Napoleon’s army in 1812. 
He concluded that Prussia was too weak and could not fight the French in open battle. 
“The alternative, however, should neither be surrender nor an unholy alliance with 
France, but the strongest possible defense through a Spanish civil war in Germany.”20 In 
developing his theory of small wars, Clausewitz identified several key principles of 
guerrilla warfare that are useful in this thesis’ research model. 
According to Clausewitz, during small war, the guerrillas, who should fight “by 
units of between twenty and four-hundred men,”21 are normally facing a superior enemy 
whom they must avoid to make their forces last. He states that the crucial element of 
small war as a defensive strategy is time, which works against the occupying army while 
not affecting, or affecting to a smaller extent, the defender.22  Small wars, waged by a 
population in its own country, can be fought for a long time. Thus, for the occupying 
force and the defending party, different criteria apply for success. Clausewitz stated that 
the way a small war is fought differs greatly from large conventional battles, since they 
require more “courage and temerity but also demanded the utmost caution.”23  
                                                 
17 Laqueur, Guerrilla Warfare, 110. 
18 Strachan and Herberg-Rothe, Clausewitz in the Twenty First Century, 187. 
19 Strachan and Herberg-Rothe, Clausewitz in the Twenty First Century, 187. 
20 Strachan and Herberg-Rothe, Clausewitz in the Twenty First Century, 190. 
21 Laqueur, Guerrilla Warfare, 110. 
22 Strachan and Herberg-Rothe, Clausewitz in the Twenty First Century, 190. 
23 Laqueur, Guerrilla Warfare, 110. 
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Clausewitz lists several conditions that can enhance the effectiveness of 
guerrillas. First, he suggests that defensive war be waged within a country’s own 
territory. “The greater the surface area of the country the greater will be the contact with 
enemy forces, and, thus, the greater the potential effect of a guerrilla war. This could, in 
time, destroy the basic foundations of the enemy forces”24 Second, guerrillas must 
prevent the enemy from being able to deliver a single, decisive stroke. Clausewitz states 
that “resistance should never materialize as a concrete body, otherwise the enemy can 
direct sufficient force at its core, crush it, and take many prisoners,”25 and if it happens, 
“the people will lose heart and, believing that the issue has been decided and further 
efforts would be useless, drop their weapons.”26 Fourth, “the national character must be 
suited to this type of armed confrontation.”27 Fifth, the terrain for operations must be 
rough and impassable, because of wilderness, swamps, and mountains. Although terrain 
is important, guerrillas should not turn to a fixed defense. They have to remain flexible 
and only defend certain features, including “points of access to a mountain area, or the 
dikes across a marsh, or points at which a river can be crossed, as long as this appears 
possible.”28 Finally, Clausewitz emphasized the importance of secrecy and the power of 
having informational advantage over the enemy.29 These principles and conditions, and 
Clausewitz’s “people’s war” theory in general, provide several key foundations for the 
research model used in this thesis.  
The next contributor is Mao Zedong and his main work, Yu Chi Chan (On 
Guerrilla Warfare). Mao provided important insights on the relationship of conventional 
and guerrilla forces, and the training, support, and operations of unconventional units. He 
introduced some key principles about guerrilla warfare that remain timeless. According to 
Mao, guerrilla operations are not independent from the conventional form of warfare, but 
                                                 
24 Hahlweg , “Clausewitz and Guerrilla Warfare,” 131. 
25 Hahlweg, “Clausewitz and Guerrilla Warfare,” 131. 
26 Hahlweg, “Clausewitz and Guerrilla Warfare,” 132. 
27 Hahlweg, “Clausewitz and Guerrilla Warfare,” 131. 
28 Hahlweg, “Clausewitz and Guerrilla Warfare,” 132. 
29 Laqueur, Guerrilla Warfare, 110. 
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a part of it.  He explains the direct relationship between conventional and guerrilla forces 
by stating, “during the progress of hostilities, guerrillas gradually develop into orthodox  
forces that operate in conjunction with other units of the regular army.”30 Mao considers  
guerrilla warfare as “a weapon that a nation inferior in arms and military equipment may 
employ against a more powerful aggressor nation.”31 To explain his concept, Mao 
established some basic principles. 
One of Mao’s characteristics of guerrilla warfare was that it follows in three 
phases, which are sometimes barely distinguishable and many times overlap. The first 
phase of guerrilla warfare is the establishment and development of the organization. The 
next phase is the conduct of guerrilla operations, such as direct attacks on vulnerable 
military and police targets, sabotage, and assassinations. The third phase is the period for 
destroying the enemy.  According to Mao, during this phase the guerrilla force transforms 
into a conventional, orthodox military and engages the enemy in conventional fighting. 
This part is important for this research, since the basic idea of this thesis advocates the 
opposite: keeping the force irregular through the entire conflict.  
Another principle identified by Mao is the need for the cooperation and support of 
the population. This support is necessary to establish operational bases and to train, 
equip, and sustain guerrilla units. The other important characteristic in Mao’s strategy is 
the ability to adapt. The guerrilla strategy “must be adjusted based on the enemy 
situation, the terrain, the existing lines of communication, the relative strengths, the 
weather, and the situation of the people.”32 Mao emphasizes that guerrilla units need 
decentralized control, due to their organization and tactics, but with close coordination 
with conventional forces. “In guerrilla strategy, the enemy’s rear, flanks, and other 
vulnerable spots are his vital points, and there he must be harassed, attacked, dispersed, 
exhausted, and annihilated. Only in this way can guerrillas carry out their mission of 
                                                 
30 Mao Tse-tung, On Guerrilla Warfare translated by Samuel B. Griffith (Urbana:University of 
Illinois Press, 2000), 42. 
31 Mao, On Guerrilla Warfare, 42. 
32 Mao, On Guerrilla Warfare, 46. 
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independent guerrilla action and coordination with the effort of the regular armies.”33  
Mao referred to organization as a fundamental characteristic. He explained that the 
origins of the guerrilla forces may stem from five roots: the “civilian” population, 
conventional military units, local militias, turncoat enemy soldiers, and criminal groups. 
Mao also discusses the importance of equipment, emphasizing that guerrillas need light 
weapons and that there is no need for standardization. Equipping the guerrilla units must 
be a combined product of the population, the regular army, and the use of captured 
weapons. 
Mao summarizes, “we must promote guerrilla warfare as a necessary strategical 
auxiliary to orthodox operations; we must neither assign it the primary position in our 
war strategy nor substitute it for mobile and positional warfare as conducted by orthodox 
forces.”34 This conclusion on guerrilla strategy will be an important part of this 
investigation and contributes significant points to the establishment of the research 
model. 
The third key contributor is Ernesto “Che” Guevara and his book, Guerrilla 
Warfare, in which he introduces his theory about guerrilla warfare, called the “Foco.” 
The basic element of Guevara’s theory is small and mobile groups of guerrilla cadres, 
which travel around rural areas to ignite rebellion among the peasants against the ruling 
regime. These “fighter teachers” provide training and general leadership for locals in 
order to mobilize and launch guerrilla attacks from rural areas.35 Guevara’s theory agrees 
with Mao’s on several questions. First, he emphasizes the importance of popular support 
for guerrilla forces. Second, Guevara explains that “the countryside is the basic area for 
armed fighting.”36 Third, he agrees that the guerrilla force has to be transformed into a 
conventional army to fulfill the overall goal, the destruction of the enemy. Fourth, 
                                                 
33 Mao, On Guerrilla Warfare, 46. 
34 Mao, On Guerrilla Warfare, 57. 
35 Gordon H. McCormick, “Seminar on Guerrilla Warfare,” (Lecture notes, DA Department, Naval 
Postgraduate School, 2011). 
36 Joshua Johnson, “From Cuba to Bolivia: Guevara’s Foco Theory in Practice,” Innovations: a 
Journal of Politics, Volume 6 (2006): 27. 
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Guevara emphasizes the ability to adapt to the conditions of the operational environment 
and adjust guerrilla tactics as the situation changes, in order to hold the initiative and the 
ability to surprise the enemy. Nevertheless, while Mao emphasizes the importance of 
prior establishment of the proper conditions for guerrilla war, Guevara states “it is not 
necessary to wait until all the conditions for making revolution exist; the insurrection can 
create them.”37 Guevara explains several other important factors of guerrilla warfare. He 
emphasizes the importance of knowing the terrain and thoroughly understanding guerrilla 
tactics. According to Guevara, guerrilla forces need a special strategy to achieve their 
goals while also preserving their units, calling for “the analysis of the objectives to be 
achieved in the light of the total military situation and the overall ways of reaching these 
objectives.”38 Guevara believed that special tactics characterize guerrilla warfare, 
especially mobility, sabotage, night operations, treatment of the civilian population, and 
any “practical methods of achieving the grand strategic objectives.”39 For example, “One 
of the weakest points of the enemy is transportation by road and railroad. It is virtually 
impossible to maintain a vigil yard by yard over a transport line, a road, or railroad.”40 
Guerrilla operations have to focus on the enemy’s lines of communications and its 
resupply system to effectively undermine conventional operations and inflict significant 
casualties.  
The last strategist whose principles influenced this thesis’s research model is 
General Vo Nguyen Giap and his book, The Military Art of People’s War. General Giap 
was appointed commander of Viet Minh forces in 1945, when the Indochinese 
Communist Party decided to fight the Japanese and French forces in China. General Giap 
was not a pure Maoist; but he tested Mao’s guerrilla strategy in combat situations during 
the early years of his command and analyzed the reasons behind Mao’s successes and 
failures. Based on his experiences and observations, General Giap developed a new kind 
of guerrilla-strategy model.  
                                                 
37 Johnson, “From Cuba to Bolivia: Guevara’s Foco Theory in Practice,” 27. 
38 Ernesto Che Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare (New York: Classic House Books, 2009), 10. 
39 Che Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare, 15. 
40 Che Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare, 15. 
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General Giap’s “new guerrilla-warfare model” follows the main line of Mao’s 
principles, but introduces the need for more will and the ability to switch back and forth 
between the different types of warfare. He modified Mao’s principles to fit the time and 
space where a war is fought. Like Mao, General Giap divides guerrilla warfare into three 
phases, but with significant differences. The first phase is the “stage of contention,” 
which covers the organization of the movement and the conduct of guerrilla-type 
operations. This period serves for building up the organization and limited guerrilla 
activity, to target the enemy’s morale and start attrition. According to General Giap, 
during this phase, military operations are to be conducted only when success is 
guaranteed.  The next phase is the “period of equilibrium,” a combination of guerrilla 
operations and conventional mobile warfare. This period is designed to establish the 
balance between the two opposing forces, and for the conventional forces to exploit 
guerrilla successes by occupying and holding significant locations. General Giap’s final 
phase is the “stage of counteroffensive,” a combination of mobile and positional warfare, 
in which the switch from guerrilla war to conventional war is completed and large 
conventional forces dominate the fighting; however, guerrilla-type operations do not 
cease to exist. 41  General Giap emphasizes the use of conventional forces during a much 
earlier phase than Mao, but at the same time, sustains the guerrilla character during all 
three phases. 
Another significant difference in General Giap’s model is the suggestion of 
fighting simultaneously in both rural and urban areas and using positional warfare. 
According to Mao’s theory, guerrillas have to avoid being pinned down and must retreat 
to base areas. As Mao explains, “the enemy advances, we retreat; the enemy camps, we 
harass; the enemy tires, we attack; the enemy retreats, we pursue.”42 On the other hand, 
General Giap suggested the use of positional defense in the cities. The introduction of 
significant geographical locations and the need to hold them is a significant change to 
Mao’s theory.  
                                                 
41 Vo Nguyen Giap, The Military Art of People's War: Selected Writings of General Vo Nguyen Giap, 
edited by Russel Stetler (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1970), 62.  
42 Giap, The Military Art of People's War, 46. 
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In sum, one can observe that the three theorists cited above recognize several 
common principles and characteristics for guerrilla warfare. These principles are 
reflected in the research model of this thesis, which incorporates historical perspectives to 
help find contemporary relevance. The research model consists of five components: 
background, strategy, organization and leadership, internal factors, and external factors.  
Background, as the first component of the model, indicates that a historical 
overview will be provided in every case study. This part of the assessment will establish 
the reader’s basic situational awareness and provide the detailed information necessary to 
understand the assessment process. This component will introduce the road to the 
conflict, the opposing parties and their goals, the main events, and an overview of the 
outcome. 
The second component of the research model is strategy: how irregular warfare 
was employed by the weaker party in a conflict. This component will answer questions 
such as, What were the strategic goals, and how did irregular warfare support those 
goals? Was irregular warfare integrated into a conventional strategy, or was it the only 
way for the smaller side to engage the enemy? Through these questions, this thesis 
intends to discover the strategic conditions under which irregular warfare is preferable to 
conventional strategy. 
The third part of the research model is an assessment of organization and 
leadership. Through analysis of irregular unit’s organization and operational structure, 
one can answer the question, What effects did organization have on the engagements and 
final results of the conflict? By introducing the focal irregular leaders and assessing their 
personal and professional capabilities, this component also will discover the viability and 
exportability of any profile for successful irregular operations. 
Internal factors are the fourth part of the assessment model. This component will 
investigate the importance of the types of tactics, the level of training given to irregulars, 
and the role of intelligence, raising such questions as, Why are irregular tactics so 
effective? Why can the enemy not counter them easily? How do these tactics take away 
the enemy’s numerical or weapons superiority? When and how are irregulars trained? 
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What level of training is necessary to fight effectively? Do irregulars have an intelligence 
advantage over their enemies? If so, is it significant? 
The last component of the model is external factors.  This part will first analyze 
the role of physical terrain in certain conflicts. Did it favor any side, and how did it 
influence the war? Is there a certain physical terrain required to fight irregular warfare? 
This component of the model will also investigate the importance of the social terrain, or 
in other words, the role of the population. Is popular support always needed for 
irregular`s success? If so, to what level? This component will also explore the role of 
havens and redoubts in irregular warfare and the significance of the international 
environment. Was there any outside support available for the irregulars?  How did the 
international situation influence the end results of the conflict? 
The following investigation of the above-described components intends to 
discover, through historical cases, possible conditions under which a small state might 
consider changing its traditional, orthodox understanding of military defense and 
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II. DEFINITION OF KEY TERMS 
A. DEFINING THE SMALL STATE 
To establish a well-supported basic framework for this research, it is necessary to 
examine the various definitions of “small states.” Martin Wight, in his book Power 
Politics, explains that “the smallness we are talking about when we speak of small 
powers is smallness relative to the international society they belong to.”43 According to 
Hakan Wiberg, author of the The Security of Small Nations: Challenges and Defences, 
the definitions of small states can be absolute or relational.44 In case of an absolute 
definition, Wiberg suggests that “indicators of ‘size’ are sought, such as population, area, 
GNP, military capability, etc., and attempts are then made to correlate other variables 
with the size indicators.” 45  On the other hand, Wiberg’s relational definition asserts that 
“the essence of ‘smallness’ is either lack of influence on the environment or high 
sensitivity to the environment and lack of immunity against influences from it, or both.”46 
In his book, Alliances and Small Powers, Robert Rothstein writes “a small power is a 
state that recognizes it cannot obtain security primarily by use of its own capabilities, and 
that it must rely fundamentally on the aid of other states, institutions, processes, or 
developments to do so; the small power’s belief in its inability to rely on its own means 
must also be recognized by the other states involved in international politics.”47 Although 
all these definitions are valuable, Michael I. Handel’s definition is most useful for the 
purposes of this research. He states that a small state “is a state which is unable to 
                                                 
43 Martin Wight, Power Politics (Penguin Books Ltd, 1979), 61.  
44 Hakan Wiberg, “The Security of Small Nations: Challenges and Defences,” Journal of Peace 
Research, volume 24, number 4 (1987): 339. 
45 Wiberg, “The Security of Small Nations,” 339. 
46 Wiberg, “The Security of Small Nations,” 339. 
47 Robert L. Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), 
29. 
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contend in war with the great powers on anything like equal terms.”48 This thesis will use 
this definition in answering the question, How should small states defend themselves? 
The notion of smallness is always relative in a conflict, and depends on the 
situation—and can change in the aftermath of a particular conflict. The United States was 
a small state when it fought the Revolutionary War against the British Empire, but was 
generally the bigger power in many following wars. Germany was the major power at the 
beginning of the Second World War, but became a small state in the wake of its defeat. 
Iraq was a regional power when it occupied Kuwait in 1990, but became a small state 
afterward and again in 2003 when the U.S. and its allies attacked. Smallness can be 
applied to any country that faces a numerically bigger, better equipped and trained, more 
effectively organized military force than its own.  
B. TRADITIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGIES 
Every state has to tailor its defense capabilities to its national interests and the 
possible adversaries it may face in future conflicts. Every state’s paramount national goal 
is to survive.49 The best way to survive is to stay out of conflicts. In general, every state 
tries to avoid hostilities by creating some type of deterrence capability, which, in 
different shapes or forms, threatens an adversary with out-of-proportion losses in case of 
attack.50 Every deterrence strategy is closely linked to a state’s actual ability to defend 
itself, since after the possible failure of the deterrence phase, the state has to exercise the 
capability on which its deterrence was based.  
States have historically tried to build their homeland-defense capabilities around 
four major strategies: imitating a major power’s military capability; joining an alliance; 
assuming neutrality; or acquiring weapons of mass destruction. To discover the 
                                                 
48 Michael I. Handel, Weak States in the International System (Gainsborough: Frank Cass and Co Ltd, 
1990), 36. 
49 Wiberg, “The Security of Small Nations,” 340. 
50Michael Richardson,“Deterrence, Coercion and Crisis Management,”(Lecture Notes, DA 
Department, Naval Postgraduate School, 2011). 
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advantages and disadvantages of these defense strategies and form a possible new way of 
thinking about homeland defense, it is necessary to assess these methods. 
1. Imitating Major Powers 
The first traditional way to approach homeland defense is to imitate a major 
power’s military capabilities. The basic question is always, from whom does a state want 
to defend itself—for in the contemporary world, the list of possible adversaries can 
change quickly, and every state needs a solution that can be applied against the widest 
range of possible foes. Small states usually try to imitate in two ways. First, they sustain a 
relatively large military force with multiple services, including army, air force, navy, and 
in some cases marine corps, in order to match their possible adversaries. In many cases, 
the cost of this approach is so high that their equipment is unavoidably old and obsolete. 
This strategy is based on the idea that a large number of troops and weapons might 
possibly compensate for the adversary’s more sophisticated weapons. One of the major 
disadvantages of this approach is that a large number of troops and the resource 
requirements for maintaining old weapons systems can be a devastating financial 
challenge for small states in peacetime. Moreover, the probable effectiveness of the 
military force during a conflict is highly questionable.51 History shows many catastrophic 
failures due to belief in this approach. In 1939, Poland, which had an army of close to a 
million and based its defensive strategy on a large number of mobile cavalry brigades, 
was defeated within a month by mechanized German forces and Soviet troops who joined 
in the attack.52 During the Six-Day War, in 1967, Israel destroyed the entire Egyptian air 
force within two hours.53 During the Russo—Georgian War, in 2008, “Georgia’s army 
fled ahead of the Russian army’s advance, turning its back and leaving Georgian civilians 
                                                 
51 The Russo-Georgian conflict in 2008 is an example of how a small nation that had tried to imitate 
the military of a large state failed against an even larger enemy. 
52 Stanley S. Seidner, Marshal Edward Śmigły-Rydz and the Defense of Poland (New York: Michigan 
University Press, 1978), 135–138. 
53 Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11 (New York: Vintage 
Books, 2006), 45. 
 20 
in the enemy’s path. Its planes did not fly after the first few hours of contact. Its navy was 
sunk in the harbor, and its patrol boats were hauled away by Russian trucks on trailers.”54  
The other way for small states to try to imitate larger states’ military capabilities 
is to sustain a significant military force with old weapon systems while, at the same time, 
getting into the competition of military research and development.  The gap between the 
small and the large states in new weaponry has widened recently, to the disadvantage of 
the small states.55 The resource requirements and costs of new major military systems 
have reached a level where even major states have serious issues in developing and 
sustaining them.56 Thus it has become “more and more hopeless for small states to try to 
‘keep up’ by developing similar systems for themselves.”57 Of course, another solution 
comes to mind: namely, to procure these modern systems from the major states. This 
solution favors big states, but creates many disadvantages for the small states. One of 
these is the increased dependence on the major power and its will, especially during 
conflict, to resupply necessary “software updates” and other vital components, including 
spare parts and ammunition. The procurement solution does not serve small states’ 
interests, since they should instead create more self-reliance to be able to provide their  
own defense.58 The disadvantages of imitation usually inspire decision makers to look for 
alternative solutions. Another potential solution is to join an alliance.  
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56 Wiberg, “The Security of Small Nations,” 350. 
57 Wiberg, “The Security of Small Nations,” 350. 
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2. Joining Alliances 
Some states that either realizes that they cannot sustain a large military force, or 
just believe that their military capabilities are not enough to provide the desired level of 
security, seek to join an alliance as an alternative solution. According to security expert 
Heinz Gaertner, “Alliances can be defined as formal associations of states bound by the 
mutual commitment to use military force against non-member states to defend member  
states’ integrity.”59 When joining an alliance, small states are looking for extended 
deterrent effects, increased military capability, and, in a multilateral alliance, less 
dependence on a single power.  Scholars agree there are two basic ways to seek alliances. 
As Stephen Walt notes, “When confronted by a significant external threat, states may 
either balance or bandwagon. Balancing is defined as allying with others against the 
prevailing threat: bandwagoning refers to alignment with the source of danger.”60 To do 
so, small states may establish a bilateral alliance with another small state or a major 
power, or may join a multilateral alliance. 
Bilateral alliances are usually based on regional threats rather than global ones. 
Small states seek a more powerful ally to enhance their capabilities to defend against 
these regional threats. This approach carries two major disadvantages. First, small states 
must rely on a single ally to come to their aid when the need arises. An example of a 
successful bilateral alliance is the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and 
South Korea, signed in 1953 as a direct result of the Korean War. “The Mutual Defense 
Treaty is an institutional guarantee for the USFK to be stationed in Korea to deter another 
war on the Korean peninsula, and a legal ground for the Combined Defense System. It 
also serves as the foundation for other affiliated security arrangements and military 
agreements between the ROK and US governments and militaries.”61 On the other hand, 
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the Franco—Polish Kasprzycki–Gamelin Convention,62 signed May 19, 1939, is an 
example of a complete failure.  The second disadvantage of a bilateral alliance is the risk 
of the small state’s being drawn into its partner’s conflicts. This danger is called 
“entrapment” and usually requires an out-of-proportion effort from the small countries, as 
compared to their gains from the alliance.  
Multilateral alliances are more favorable for small states than bilateral, because 
the multiple members of these alliances carry more deterrent power, greater defensive 
capability, and less dependence on a single state. On the other hand, these alliances, 
because of the many different interests involved, are hard to achieve and sustain as a 
functioning system. NATO, the world’s largest and most powerful military alliance, 
struggles to make decisions to take actions, because in many cases its members cannot 
agree on the proper level of response, or in some cases, even on the existence of a 
conflict. The disadvantages of bilateral alliances are also still present. However strongly 
multilateral alliances may require members to use military force in case of aggression 
against a member, nothing guarantees that the other members will perceive the threat to a 
small state as worthy of collective military action, and it is possible that the small state 
will be abandoned. This possibility is even greater when a conflict arises between two 
member states; the conflict between Turkey and Greece over Cyprus in 197463 is an 
example of the weakness of multilateral alliances. The other disadvantage is the increased 
chance for being “entrapped,” being “obligated to participate in a conflict in which they 
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had no direct interest.”64 As history was shown, many times, “Alliances turn small wars 
into big wars.”65 The more small states depend on the alliance, the higher the risk of 
being dragged into another’s conflicts. And the less the dependency among members, the 
higher the risk of mutual abandonment is during a war. To mitigate the risk of these 
disadvantages, small states can choose to adopt neutrality.66 
3. Assuming Neutrality 
Some small states see neutrality as the best way of defending their independence 
and sovereignty.  Michael Waltzer defines neutrality as “a collective and voluntary form 
of noncombatancy.”67 Efraim Karsh states that neutrality is “the status of a state during a 
specific war in which it has decided not to intervene.”68 Robert L. Rothstein explains the 
reasons a small state might choose to assume neutrality: “One reason is that small powers 
tend to rely on the hope that they can be protected by their own insignificance. If they can 
appear detached enough, and disinterested enough, and if they can convincingly indicate 
that they are too powerless to affect the issue, they hope the storm will pass them by.”69 
Like Rothstein, Martin Wright writes of small states that “their hope is to lie low and 
escape notice.”70 To be effective, however, a small state’s assumed neutrality requires the 
combatants’ agreement and approval. These arrangements are usually based on the 
common interests of the belligerents.  When these interests cease to exist, it usually 
brings an end to the viability of small-state neutrality. History provides many cases when 
neutrality was either honored or disregarded by major powers. For example, during the 
Peloponnesian War, Melos, a small merchant island, assumed neutrality. Athens viewed 
Melos as strategically important, and when it refused to join the Athenian alliance, it was 
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attacked.71 During the Second World War, Nazi Germany, based on its temporary 
interests, honored the neutrality of Switzerland and Sweden and disregarded that of 
Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands.72  
As these examples show, neutrality as a homeland-defense strategy can work only 
in two situations. First, if the small state manages to sustain its unimportance and 
impartiality during a conflict. Second, as in the case of Switzerland and Sweden, if it 
combines geographical advantages with a significant, but not necessarily great, military 
power—which raises the cost of attack to an unacceptable level. Although this second 
scenario seems ideal, the same problems surface as in the case of imitation. That is the 
reason neutrality has remained primarily a European phenomenon, in countries, including 
Sweden and Switzerland, with significant terrain advantages and the financial ability to 
exploit this alternative.73 On the other hand, if a small state does not possess these 
resources, it still can choose the fourth type of homeland-defense strategy, which is to 
acquire weapons of mass destruction. 
4. Acquiring Weapons of Mass Destruction 
The last traditional homeland-defense strategy for small states is based on the 
possession of weapons of mass destructions, or WMDs, as a deterrent. Although this 
strategy could stand alone, it is usually combined with one of the above-mentioned 
strategies. When states believe that they cannot compete with the conventional, or in 
some cases, nuclear capabilities of their enemy, they can try to acquire some type of 
WMD.74 The most important advantage of these weapon systems is that they 
significantly increase any state’s deterrent power and, in case of conflict, provide “the 
ability to inflict damage that is wholly disproportionate to their conventional military 
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capabilities.”75 These seem significant and achievable capabilities for small states that 
cannot sustain large armies, cannot join an alliance, and do not want to assume neutrality. 
However the biggest challenge of WMDs is the acquisition of materiel and the 
establishment of necessary infrastructure.76 
Since the fall of the Soviet Union, the proliferation of WMDs has become a 
prominent national-security concern of the major powers. Iran and North Korea’s nuclear 
programs, the Pakistani–Indian nuclear arms race, Israel’s secret program, and the 
politically instable and economically wracked former Soviet Union members have 
brought increased attention to the issue.77 International cooperation on the issue of 
proliferation is at a high never seen before. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which 
dates back to 5 March 1970, has been signed by 189 states that have renounced nuclear 
weapons.78 A hundred and twenty-five countries have even stepped forward and given up 
chemical weapons completely by joining the Biological Weapons Convention,79 and 
140 states have signed the Chemical Weapons Convention.80 These agreements 
established a strong international norm for cooperation against WMDs, which makes it 
very difficult for a small state to acquire all the necessary elements of an effective WMD 
capability. The difficulty of buying materiel, hiring the proper subject-matter experts, 
building the necessary infrastructure, and buying or developing the proper delivery  
means81 are financial challenges for a small state, and, because of the international 
environment, even the effort to acquire WMDs can bring disproportionate disadvantages 
                                                 
75 U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: 
Assessing the Rish, OTA-ISC-559 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, August 1993), 2. 
76 U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, 9. 
77 U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, 1. 
78 United States Information Pertaining to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 
2010, 2-7. accessed October 06, 2011. http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/141928.pdf 
79 U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, 2. 
80 U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, 2. 
81 The overall cost of overtly producing one nuclear bomb a year is about $200 million, biological 
weapons, enough for a large arsenal may cost less than $10 million, while chemical arsenal for substantial 
military capability (hundreds of tons of agent) likely to cost tens ofmillions of dollars.  
U.S. Congress, Office of “Technology Assessment, Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, 11. 
 26 
that trump the possible advantages of possessing such a capability. These international 
agreements contain numerous provisions that make even the intent of acquisition painful 
for any state or, conversely, beneficial for those who abandon WMDs. Preventive 
measures can include economic sanctions, diplomatic isolation, or even preventive 
military attack,82 while the rewards for giving up WMD programs can range from 
economic to military-development assistance and significant financial support.83 
While the possession of WMDs gives great power to small states, as in the case of 
North Korea, the road is highly risky and full of obstacles. Because of the contemporary 
international environment, small states have to risk all the value they wanted to protect in 
the first place by acquiring WMDs. For those states who believe they have no other 
choice than to compete with their adversaries and would lose against them anyway, this 
path may be the one; but for those who do not want to risk economic sanctions and 
“preventive” military intervention, there may be yet another way to protect their 
homeland.   
C. PROFESSIONAL IRREGULAR FORCE THEORY  
In his book, Theory of International Politics, Kenneth Waltz argues that in the 
current competitive international environment, states “socialize” to similar strategies. He 
states that “The fate of each state depends on its responses to what other states do. The 
possibility that conflict will be conducted by force leads to competition in the arts and the 
instruments of force. Competition produces a tendency toward the sameness of the 
competitors.”84 His thoughts on the idea of “competition in the arts and the instruments 
of force” and the reconsideration of the importance of “sameness” can give a starting 
point for small states to rethink their understanding about defensive strategy.  
                                                 
82 U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: 
Assessing the Rish, OTA-ISC-559 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, August 1993), 5-6. 
83 U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: 
Assessing the Rish, OTA-ISC-559 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, August 1993), 5-6. 
84 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), 127. 
 27 
Since the end of the Cold War, the gap between states’ military capabilities has 
been opening with increased speed, to the disadvantage of the smaller states, whose 
financial and technical capabilities do not allow them to compete effectively. Since this 
process has created a huge asymmetry between the military capabilities of small and 
large states, the weaker side’s answer to this challenge should not be “sameness,” but 
perhaps “asymmetry.”   
This thesis suggests that if a small state faces an enemy with superior military 
capabilities, the only way for the small state to win during a conflict is to take away its 
opponent’s advantages, or make them irrelevant. For those small states that understand 
how inadequate the imitation of large-state militaries is in the contemporary environment 
and how much risk the acquisition of WMDs contains, or who want to find a solution 
more self reliant than the notion of collective security, an analysis of Ivan Arreguín-
Toft’s theory on asymmetric conflicts may usefully answer how a small state should 
defend itself. 
Ivan Arreguín-Toft, in How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric 
Conflict, presents some valuable starting points for small states to consider.  Arreguín-
Toft states that the final outcome of any conflict is the result of the interaction of the 
adversaries’ strategies. He argues that the confronting strategies can be reduced to two 
distinctive forms: direct and indirect approaches.85 Direct strategies focus on the 
destruction of the enemy’s armed forces and through this, its capacity to continue 
fighting. The indirect strategy aims for the destruction of the enemy’s will to fight.86 This 
concept was introduced by B. H. Liddell Hart in his book, Strategy, the Indirect 
Approach. Liddell Hart states that “in war, as in wrestling, the attempt to throw the 
opponent without loosening his foothold and balance can only result in self-
exhaustion.”87 He further explains that “victory by such a method can only be possible 
through an immense margin of superior strength in some form, and, even so, tends to lose 
                                                 
85 Ivan Arreguín-Toft, How the weak win wars: The Theory of Asymmetric Conflict (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005), 105. 
86 Arreguín-Toft, How the weak win wars: The Theory of Asymmetric Conflict, 105. 
87 Basil H. Liddell Hart, Strategy, The Indirect Approach (New York: Natraj Publisher, 2003), 5. 
 28 
decisiveness.”88 Through his studies of history, Liddell Hart finds that “in almost all the 
decisive campaigns the dislocation of the enemy’s psychological and physical balance 
has been the vital prelude to a successful attempt at his overthrow. This dislocation has 
been produced by a strategic indirect approach.”89 Arreguín-Toft found that when in an 
asymmetric conflict both sides use the same strategic approach, either direct against 
direct or indirect against indirect, the stronger actor almost always wins, since “there is 
nothing to mediate or deflect a strong actor’s power advantage.”90 Decades earlier, Mao 
Zedong came to the same conclusion when he stated that “defeat is the invariable 
outcome where native forces fight with inferior weapons against modernized forces on 
the latter’s terms.”91 By contrast, Arreguín-Toft states that when opposite strategic 
approaches interact, it implies the victory of the weaker actor, since the stronger party’s 
advantages are deflected.  
To further understand the strength and possible implications of the above points, 
one needs to see the patterns of military development that are influencing the 
contemporary world. After the Second World War, two strategic mindsets emerged. The 
first was the “blitzkrieg pattern,” which was based on the deployment of large 
conventional, mechanized forces to destroy the enemy’s military and capture its territory 
without huge “battles of annihilation.”92 This pattern was introduced by the world’s 
leading militaries, including the United States, the Soviet Union, and most of the 
European states. The way post-Second World War conflicts have been handled by these 
militaries, including the Korean, Vietnam, Afghan, and Iraq wars, suggest that this 
pattern still has overwhelming influence on the military doctrine of those states. Another 
proof of the effects of this pattern is the research and development competition among 
those states, which still pursue better airplanes, tanks, boats, missiles, etc. The other 
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pattern was guerrilla warfare, which emphasized protracted war against a superior enemy. 
The model was imitated in countries like China, Algeria, Vietnam, Cuba, and recently, 
successfully in Iraq and Afghanistan. Arreguín-Toft found that when the blitzkrieg and  
guerrilla warfare “interact systematically; strong actors should lose more often.”93 To 
support this statement, he presented two important historical data sets regarding the 
outcome of asymmetric wars between 1800 and 1998. The first result was that the weaker 
side won 30 percent of the time. The second result showed that the frequency of the 
weaker-side victory increased over time. After the Second World War, between 1950 and 
1998, 55 percent of asymmetric conflicts were won by the weak side.94 If one 
understands the theory of Arreguín-Toft and accepts what the historical data suggest, then 
it may be worthwhile for small states to consider turning their attention away from the 
idea of “sameness.” They should look for a less usual, less generally accepted, but 
possibly more effective solution, which should include the integration of guerrilla warfare 
and other irregular-warfare methods into their homeland-defense strategy. 
As a starting point, small states should remember the exchange recounted earlier 
between Colonel Harry Summers and Colonel Tu, on how North Vietnamese forces had 
never defeated the American troops on the battlefield, but that this fact was irrelevant to 
the end results of the war. This and many other historical examples encourage the 
discovery of the possible conditions under which a “professional irregular force” 
approach should be considered by a small state.  To do so, it is necessary to understand 
the suggested approach in detail.  
The “professional” part of the suggested approach means that the actual defense 
force, like most countries’ conventional forces, has to be organized, trained, equipped, 
and sustained as an active-duty military organization in peacetime. Its members have to 
be fulltime soldiers and need to be continuously trained for irregular warfare.  
Background organizations such as schools and training centers need to be established, 
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supportive infrastructure needs to be built, and necessary resources have to be allocated 
towards one single goal: to serve the irregular homeland-defense strategy. The closest 
successful example is the strategy followed by Hezbollah in south Lebanon between 2000 
and 2006 as a preparation for the Second Lebanese War in 2006.95  
Continuing with definitions, one needs to understand the meaning of irregular 
warfare. According to the United States’ Army’s irregular-warfare (IW) joint operating 
concept, irregular warfare is “a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for 
legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. IW favors indirect and 
asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other 
capabilities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will.”96 It also 
suggests that irregular warfare “includes a wide variety of indirect operations and 
activities that occur in isolation or within “traditional” inter-state combat operations.”97 
Although these definitions are very recent, the use of “nontraditional” ways to defeat an 
enemy “is as old as the history of warfare.”98 The use of irregular tactics was probably 
first recorded in the 15th century B.C., when the Hittite king Mursilis wrote in a letter 
that “the irregulars did not dare to attack me in the daylight and preferred to fall on me by 
night.”99 Since this ancient moment, numerous written reports suggest the extensive use 
of irregular methods during wars, across time and place. History also suggests that  
irregular warfare does not belong to any “particular ideology, century, or culture.”100 
Irregular fighters have had many names, such as guerrillas, insurgents, partisans, 
paramilitary, freedom fighters, and the like, and despite their many differences, they have 
fought similarly. The common ground for those who capitalize on irregular methods is 
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confrontation with numerically larger, usually more modern and professional, 
conventional armies. Despite its numerous appearances, irregular warfare was not of 
much interest in modern military studies for a long time. Lewis H. Gann may provide a 
hint about the reasons when he states about partisan warfare that “it is based essentially 
on the precepts of common sense, and requires no particular mystique for its 
elucidation.”101 Although the extended use of irregular warfare tactics in wars in North 
America, Russia, and Spain102 caught the attention of some military theorists, including 
Antoine-Henri Jomini, they nevertheless concluded that it was only a secondary 
technique and not a decisive form of warfare.  
This view started to change with Carl von Clausewitz’s “people’s war” theory and 
was further developed at the beginning of the 20th century when the use of irregular 
warfare became more and more successful in conflicts, especially in the colonial era. 
Conflicts like the Boer, the Algerian, and Vietnam wars are examples of the integrated 
use of irregular methods. Since then, the use of irregular warfare has become more 
common, and numerous conflicts, such as the First Russo-Chechen War, the Afghan 
mujahideen resistance against the Soviet Union, and the Second Lebanese War, provide 
examples of the success of irregular warfare and irregular forces. These historical events 
are crucial for small states, since they can reveal the dynamics of irregular warfare and 
provide directions about how to develop them even further. 
What follows is a series of six historical case studies focusing on military 
conflicts in which irregular warfare methods played a major part in the defensive strategy 
against an aggressor state using a conventional, orthodox military approach. The analysis 
of these six conflicts will identify the key reasons for the success or failure of the 
irregular forces and will highlight the conditions under which it is preferable for a small 
state to consider the introduction of the proposed “professional irregular force” strategy.  
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III. THE AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY WAR  
A. BACKGROUND 
Britain’s 1763 victory over France in the Seven Years’ War ended the 
competition for the rule of North America, but set the stage for a new conflict with the 
British colonies. Tension had been rising between the British government and the 
American colonists for more than ten years before the actual start of the American 
Revolution in 1775. To finance the British troops stationed in North America, the 
imperial authorities took steps to raise taxes in the colonies. These attempts, including the 
Stamp Act103 in 1765 and the Tea Act104 in 1773, caused many protests among the 
colonists, who responded by demanding representation in the British parliament and 
extended rights, like those of other British subjects. In response to violent events in 
Massachusetts, including the Boston Massacre in 1770105 and the Boston Tea Party in 
December 1773,106 Parliament introduced a series of measures to reassert the empire’s 
authority. In response to these events, in September 1774, some colonial delegates 
gathered in Philadelphia to discuss their grievances against the British. This meeting, 
known as the First Continental Congress, did not demand independence yet, but refused 
to accept any taxation without proper parliamentary representation and created a 
declaration of rights due every citizen, including those of liberty, assembly, property, and 
trial by jury. The members of this congress decided to meet again in May 1775 to discuss 
any additional necessary actions, but by that time, events have sped up dramatically. On 
April 19, 1775, in incidents known as the battles of Lexington and Concord, local militia 
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confronted and routed a British troop column.107 That day’s bloody confrontation led to 
the outbreak of the American Revolutionary War.  
During the Second Continental Congress, which gathered May 10, 1775, the 
delegates supported the establishment of a continental army and appointed George 
Washington as commander. The new military force soon met its first challenge when the 
war’s first major battle took place at Breed’s Hill in Boston. The battle ended in British 
victory; however, the heavy casualties inflicted by the colonials on the British forces 
encouraged the revolutionary cause and resulted in the British being locked down in 
Boston for the rest of the year.108 Afterwards, the British withdrew; so in both a tactical 
and a strategic sense, the American forces did well. 
Any chance of a compromise between the British Crown and the colonists ended 
when on July 4, 1776, the Continental Congress began creating a new nation by issuing 
the Declaration of Independence.109 In response, the outraged British government sent a 
large fleet and more than 34,000 troops to New York to put down the rebellion.  
The following months brought successes and failures for both sides.  In 
September, British redcoats forced Washington to evacuate his units from New York City 
to avoid the loss of his whole army. On Christmas night, by pushing across the Delaware 
River, Washington fought successfully back in Trenton, New Jersey, and also won a 
victory at Princeton before the army made its winter camp at Morristown. The year 1777 
brought the British master plan to “divide the colonies two parts and then subdue one part  
at a time, effectively doubling the power of the available British forces.”110 The goal of 
this strategy was the isolation of New England from Pennsylvania and the south, since it 
was seen by the British as the southern center of the rebellion. General John Burgoyne’s 
army maneuvered from Canada to meet with General William Howe’s army of New 
York to combine forces.  While General Burgoyne defeated the Americans in July by 
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taking Fort Ticonderoga, Howe abandoned the original plan and turned his troops away 
from New York to attack Washington near the Chesapeake Bay. Howe’s decision left 
General Burgoyne’s troops exposed and led to his devastating defeat on September 19, by 
American troops under General Horatio Gates near Saratoga, New York. On October 7, 
General Burgoyne’s army suffered another defeat at Bemis Heights, known as the Second 
Battle of Saratoga. Burgoyne surrendered his army on October 17.111  
The victory at Saratoga was a turning point of the war. Following this battle, 
France, which had secretly provided support to the rebels since 1776, joined the war 
openly on the American side, though not officially declaring war on Great Britain till 
June 1778. With this alliance, the previously internal conflict for the British Empire 
became a world war.112 
Having replaced General Howe as supreme commander, Sir Henry Clinton 
wanted to withdraw his troops from Philadelphia to New York, on June 28, 1778. 
Washington’s army confronted them at Monmouth, New Jersey. The fight ended in a 
draw, but Clinton got his army to New York. On July 8, a French fleet arrived off the 
Atlantic coast, ready to fight the British. In late July, a colonial and French attack on 
Newport, Rhode Island, failed, and the war more or less settled into a stalemate phase in 
the north.113  
In 1778, London decided to shift its main effort to the south with an attempt to 
conquer the southern colonies. “There was a widespread view in London that the 
southern colonies were full of loyal subjects just waiting for assistance to free themselves 
from the oppression of the disloyal minority.”114 The British first occupied Georgia in 
1779, then captured Charleston, South Carolina, in May 1780. The main British army, led 
by Lord Charles Cornwallis, crushed General Horatio Gates’s command at Camden in 
                                                 
111 Richard M Ketchum, Saratoga: Turning Point of America's Revolutionary War, (New York: 
Henry Holt, 1997), 67. 
112 Don Higginbotham,  The War of American Independence: Military Attitudes, Policies, and 
Practice, 1763–1789, (Bloomington: Northeastern University Press, 1983), 188–198. 
113 Higginbotham, The War of American Independence, 175–188. 
114 Joes, America and Guerrilla Warfare, 13. 
 36 
August. Soon after Camden, General Nathaniel Greene replaced Gates as supreme 
commander of the colonies’ southern forces. General Greene’s understanding of the 
situation, his knowledge of the strength and weaknesses of his own troops and the 
enemy’s, and his masterly combination of regulars and irregular forces, turned the fight 
around.115 By the fall of 1781, Greene’s strategy forced Cornwallis to withdraw 
to Virginia‘s Yorktown peninsula. Washington, supported by a French army, marched to 
Yorktown with around 14,000 soldiers. At the same time, a fleet of 36 French warships 
sailed to the shores of Yorktown to prevent British reinforcement or evacuation. The trap, 
and the overwhelming Franco-American force advantage, forced Cornwallis to surrender 
on October 19.116 
Although British forces remained in Charleston and the main British army held 
New York City, the victory at Yorktown meant triumph for the American colonies. 
Neither side took decisive action for the next two years. The British withdrawal from 
Charleston and Savannah in 1782 marked the end of the armed conflict. Representatives 
from the American colonies and the British Empire signed a peace treaty in Paris on 
September 3, 1783, which officially recognized the United States as an independent 
country.117 
B. IRREGULAR STRATEGY  
The American colonies started the war without a standing military force, allies, or 
significant outside support and faced an enemy that had the best army and navy of its 
time.118 To defeat this enemy, the colonies needed to take away the adversary’s 
advantages.  Knowing their own weaknesses and the strength of the British forces, the 
rebels did not have the option of fighting conventionally. 
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Earlier history, such as in the Seven Years’ War, showed that the Americans had 
considerable irregular knowledge and experience. The citizen soldiers “were also among 
the pioneers of accurate, aimed shooting, a practice that was not yet widely accepted in 
the military manuals of the period.”119 They also had the ability to conduct military 
operations by living in the field and hiding in swamps and wilderness.120 Although these 
capabilities could be observed as early as the first clash in Lexington and surfaced during 
many engagements throughout the war, the proper strategic use of these citizen soldiers 
and their irregular tactics was a challenging issue for most of the colonial leaders through 
the entire conflict.  At the beginning of the war, the newly appointed commander-in-
chief, George Washington, was advised by Major General Charles Lee121 that “a war 
fought to attain revolutionary purposes ought to be waged revolutionary manner, calling 
on an armed populace to rise in what a later generation would call guerrilla war.”122  But 
Washington completely rejected the idea of irregular war and was in favor of 
conventionalizing the Continental military to create a European-type force.123 
Washington addressed his opinion about the militia at the beginning of the conflict, “All 
General Officers agree that no Dependence can be put on the Militia for a Continuance in  
Camp, or Regularity and Discipline during the short Time they may stay.”124  Although 
his conventional mindset did not change too much during the war, the militia and their 
irregular warfare successes, especially in the southern colonies, forced Washington to 
change his opinion. “The Militia of this Country must be considered as the Palladium of 
our security, and the first effectual resort in case of hostility.”125 Washington’s second in 
command, General Nathaniel Greene, had a different view about the strategic 
applicability of the militia and their irregular tactics. When he succeeded General Horatio 
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Gates, on December 2, 1780, as the commander of the southern army,126 General Greene 
implemented a strategy that integrated irregular and conventional operations and created 
a symbiotic relationship in the southern theater.  
For Greene, the task of defeating General Cornwallis and reconquering the three 
southern colonies seemed impossible. When he arrived, the southern army consisted of 
2,300 men, with only 800 fit to fight. The army also had only three days’ supplies of 
rations. The camps were dirty, the army was short on supplies, and morale was low.127 
Facing Greene was the strategically most competent British commander in North 
America, General Cornwallis, with his numerically superior, conventionally trained, 
professional army. General Greene realized that he needed something unexpected and 
different from the normal “bookish” military strategy to turn the odds around. He decided 
to create a combined irregular and conventional strategy. The goal was not to go for a 
swift, decisive victory over General Cornwallis, but to fight to buy time and keep the 
revolutionary cause alive. General Greene understood Washington’s theory that “the war 
must be defensive in character that the colonists—even with the help of the French—
were not capable of facing the British in open warfare.”128 General Greene’s famous 
quote, “We fight, get beat, rise and fight again,”129 describes the essence of this theory.  
 General Greene understood that the southern army in its current condition could 
not fight conventional battles as one single force. He decided to go against common 
military logic and divided his already weak force into two parts. At the same time, he 
contacted guerrilla leaders such as Francis Marion, known as the Swamp Fox, and 
Thomas Sumter, the Gamecock,130 to coordinate their operations with his conventional 
main forces. The idea of Greene’s strategy was to integrate irregular actions and 
conventional operations to impose as many casualties and as much loss of materiel as 
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possible, to make the price of the British operations so high as to become impossible to 
sustain. The following abstract from a letter from General Greene to Francis Marion is a 
clear depiction of his intentions. 
Gen. Sumter is desired to call out all the militia of South Carolina and 
employ them in destroying the enemy’s stores and perplexing their affairs 
in the state. Please to communicate and concert with him your future 
operations until we have a better opportunity to have more free 
intercourse. Great activity is necessary to keep the spirits of the people 
from sinking, as well as to alarm the enemy respecting the safety of their 
posts.131 
The irregulars also collected valuable information behind enemy lines and 
suppressed Tories from supporting the British.  Through harassment of the British forces 
with quick raids against outposts and lines of communications, the irregulars created the 
feeling in the British forces that they could be attacked anytime and anywhere. At the 
same time, the colonial conventional forces maneuvered across the region to pose enough 
of a threat to Cornwallis to prevent him from turning all his power against the rebel 
irregulars.  
General Greene hoped that Cornwallis was going to divide his own army and by 
that means make his forces more vulnerable to raids and harassment. To increase the 
effectiveness of guerrilla operations, Lieutenant Colonel Henry “Light Horse Harry” Lee 
and his cavalry from the main southern army joined Francis Marion. To support the 
irregulars’ actions, the conventional forces kept maneuvering on the battlefield and 
engaging the British only when favorable. Even in opportunities for potential victory, 
such as Hobkirk’s Hill or Eutaw Springs in 1781, Greene never took the risk of fully 
committing his forces.132  
Greene’s strategy paid off in a very short time. The British had great difficulties 
in countering this strategy. Cornwallis and his army paid so great a price for trying to 
destroy the southern colonial army and the irregular forces that it became impossible to 
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sustain any further effective military operations in the southern states. Despite never 
winning a clear tactical victory, General Greene won the campaign in the south 
strategically by an effective combination of conventional and irregular strategy. 
C. ORGANIZATION AND LEADERSHIP 
The organization of the irregular forces never followed a definite pattern. Marion 
and Sumter’s forces remained fluid and flexible during the entire war. Throughout the 
campaign, the men of the irregular forces were supposedly enlisted for the duration of the 
war, but in many cases, after they subdued the enemy or chased away the local British 
loyalists, these rebels returned to their homes. Francis Marion usually led a small, mobile 
force of 20 to 70 men.133 He rarely led exactly the same men for more than two weeks.134 
Thomas Sumter, on the other hand, usually commanded a couple hundred men at a time; 
but even his forces were very flexible. In August 1780, his camp was almost completely 
destroyed by the British, yet within a week he reorganized and was back in action.135 
Temporary task forces, organized from conventional and irregular units, were also 
frequently used, such as in Lee, Marion, and Sumter’s joint attack on a British supply 
depot at Monck’s Corner, just outside Charleston, in 1781. Other examples included 
Lee’s and Marion’s raids along the Congaree River. 
To achieve success with irregular forces, the leaders needed special personalities 
and adaptation skills that were uncommon at the time. General Greene started his 
campaign with an extraordinary ability to understand the situation and to see strength 
where others could see only weakness. As one of his officers explained after Greene took 
command: “by the following morning [Greene] understood better than Gates [had] done 
in the whole period of his command.”136 He had the ability to adapt to a challenging 
situation and exploit the possibilities. He threw away conventional military thinking and 
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implemented an unexpected, and, for the times, illogical, but effective strategy. To 
succeed, General Greene also needed capable guerrilla commanders. “The leaders of the 
southern irregulars were almost all veterans of the Cherokee campaign of 1761.”137 In 
that war they learned several key principles, which proved vital during the Revolutionary 
War, including the importance of cover, silent movement, and accurate, aimed shooting. 
The two most significant guerrilla leaders were Francis Marion and Thomas Sumter, 
controversial personalities who fought very effectively to support the revolutionary 
cause.  
Francis Marion served in the provincial forces as an officer and fought the first 
years of the war as a conventional leader. After the British retook Charleston in May, 
1780, ending the formal American resistance in South Carolina, Marion refused to 
surrender, took to the swamps, and started a guerrilla war against the British. He “ kept 
the flame of resistance to tyranny alight in the south during the darkest days of the 
Revolution.”138 One of the key components of his success was his ability to understand 
British tactics. With this knowledge, he exploited their weaknesses while avoiding their 
strengths. He and his men moved like phantoms. Mobility was the basic foundation of 
their tactics. Marion was quick in planning and execution, and was impossible to catch. 
Marion shared hardship with his men; “since his men had no tents, he slept also in the 
open.”139 General Greene admired his achievements by writing the following about 
Marion: 
History affords no instance wherein an officer has kept possession of a 
country under so many disadvantages as you have. Surrounded on every 
side with superior force, hunted from every quarter by veteran troops, you 
have found means to elude all their attempts, and to keep alive the 
expiring hopes of an oppressed militia, when all succor seemed to be cut 
off. To fight the enemy bravely with a prospect of victory is nothing; but 
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to fight with intrepidity under the constant impression of defeat, and 
inspire irregular troops to do it, is a talent peculiar to yourself.140 
With his previous conventional officer’s background, Marion had no problem 
with authority and following the orders of General Greene. This ability resulted in the 
effective coordination and integration of his forces with General Greene’s conventional 
units.  
The other significant irregular leader in the southern campaign was Thomas 
Sumter. Although he held a rank of a colonel in the Continental Army from 1775 to 1776, 
he was frustrated in his military activities and returned to his plantation. After the fall of 
Charleston in 1780, the British burned his house to the ground. Sumter was then elected 
general by the South Carolina militia in June 1780 and immediately launched a guerrilla 
campaign against the British forces. He was famous for keeping his men busy. When they 
were not fighting, General Sumter continuously trained them “through swimming and 
running, leaping and wrestling.”141 His unit won the “hearts and minds” of the locals by 
distributing food to the civilian population. General Sumter and his irregulars provided 
vital intelligence to General Greene, handed over large amounts of confiscated supplies, 
and sometimes served as a screening force to cover the maneuvers of the main forces.142 
However General Sumter, unlike Francis Marion, had problems accepting the authority 
of the conventional commanders. Although his occasional subordination created some 
frictions between Greene’s forces and his own irregulars, as the following letter abstract 
from General Greene to Francis Marion indicates, they could count on General Sumter 
whenever he was needed. “The army will march tomorrow, and I hope you will be 
prepared to support its operations with a considerable force; Gen. Sumter is written to, 
and I doubt not will be prepared to cooperate with us.”143 
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D. INTERNAL FACTORS 
Irregular forces conducted their operations in three distinguishable ways during 
the American Revolutionary War. First, they operated independently from conventional 
units, but still in support of larger strategic purposes, like almost all the irregular units in 
the south had before General Greene contacted them and suggested an integration of 
efforts. Second, they operated in coordination with conventional commanders to support 
conventional forces, as in Marion, Sumter, and Lee’s attack on the British supply depot  
at Monck’s Corner, outside Charleston.144 Finally, irregular forces operated under the 
direct control of a conventional commander as part of a conventional force, like  
Francis Marion’s joining General Greene at Eutaw Springs.145 When irregulars joined the 
conventional forces, they were often placed in the front line146 and fought as 
conventional soldiers, but it was when they operated independently that they proved their 
real effectiveness. 
The first of the significant internal factors was the type of tactics used. The 
American rebels, unlike their British conventional counterparts, were trained hunters. 
They had the ability to sustain themselves in the field and had extensive knowledge of the 
local terrain in which they operated. Since the British used conventional military tactics 
at every level of engagement, the unconventional mindset of the guerrillas created, in 
many cases, great advantages for the colonial units. Their tactics included the application 
of small, horse-mounted, hit-and-run parties and the conduct of night attacks and 
operations during extreme weather. Some of the British soldiers, including Banastre 
Tarleton, were skilled in these types of tactics, but for the average, conventionally trained 
British soldier and leaders, they were unfamiliar. Lt. Col. John W. T. Watson explained 
his failure to catch Francis Marion in March 1781 by claiming, “he would not fight like a 
gentleman or a Christian.”147 
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One of the most important irregular tactics was directly linked to the British 
strategy of controlling the interior areas by establishing outposts. General Cornwallis 
constructed a line of small forts that primarily depended on supplies from Charleston. 
This provided a great opportunity for attacks on smaller British forces and their lines of 
communications. These harassing operations created fear among the British and led to an 
increase of forces devoted to searching those areas and securing the outposts. The attacks 
on the lines of communications resulted in large quantities of seized enemy materiel and 
denied the British the ability to properly resupply their troops. Two examples of this 
method were the inability to transport materials on the Santee River from the coast to the 
interior by the end of October 1780148 and the rescue of 150 American prisoners during 
an attack on a British patrol.149  
The effectiveness of irregular tactics was further increased by conducting 
operations at night and in severe weather. One of Francis Marion’s favorite tactics was to 
approach the encamped enemy at night and attack them from the middle while closing 
down any escape route on the sides, then retreating swiftly.150 Fighting at night and 
attacking an encamped enemy were both unexpected and very unconventional at the time. 
Regarding this type of operation, General Henry Lee wrote about Francis Marion, “he 
struck unperceived; and retiring to those hidden retreats selected by himself … he placed 
his corps not only out of the reach of his foe, but often out of the discovery of his 
friends.”151 
To effectively support American strategic goals and deny the British local 
support, the irregulars conducted many operations to suppress the loyalists and the 
Crown’s most reliable Indian allies, the Tories. Both Marion and Sumter conducted raids 
on British loyalists to frighten them out of enlisting, always threatening further 
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punishment. Sumter used Catawba Indians to track loyalists who hid in the swamps or 
forests. Small search parties hunted down and killed many loyalists.152 
The second important internal factor was the role of intelligence. The irregular 
forces’ ability to move around the battlefield quickly and their knowledge of the terrain 
and weather of the country proved vital assets for collecting information on the 
composition and disposition of British forces and maneuvers. The constant attacks on 
outposts and lines of communications provided a large number of prisoners and seized 
material. The exploitation of these often allowed the irregulars to achieve an information 
advantage over the British. This ability was further increased by the brutal behavior of 
the British forces, which “antagonized the local population.”153 Many of those who were 
neutral earlier in the war turned to the cause of the revolution. 
E. EXTERNAL FACTORS 
The terrain and weather of North America were the most significant external 
factors that influenced the way the war was fought. It has been argued that the Americans 
did not win the war, but the British lost it, “owing the terrain rather than to the 
enemy.”154  The British were the best military force of the time, fighting linear European-
style battles in big, open areas.155 The mountainous terrain and large regions of 
wilderness provided an opportunity to offset the main power of the British forces. 
Knowledge of the area, and understanding of the tactical and strategic implications of the 
“impenetrable woods and swamps, with no roads or negotiable rivers,”156 were among 
the main reasons the colonials could fight an effective irregular war.  
Another important external factor was the social terrain. Although there was a 
significant number of British loyalists who fought against the rebels, their suppression by 
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the irregulars and British mismanagement in winning the neutrals’ “hearts and minds” led 
to a significant advantage for the irregulars in popular support.157 The irregulars got their 
human resupply from recruits within the local population loyal to the revolutionary cause. 
The locals often provided food and shelter for the rebel irregulars. Local supporters also 
warned them of enemy movements and provided vital information about British 
maneuvers.158  
Materiel resupply was always a big issue, both for the irregulars and the colonial 
conventional forces as well. The lack of pre-war established ammunition and weapon 
stores and an inability to effectively resupply their forces created significant operational 
difficulties for the rebels. The irregulars got their resupplies mainly from seized British 
equipment. In many cases, they handed part of their seizures to the conventional army. 
The irregulars never had enough ammunition. Marion’s men “shot with bullets of pewter, 
buckshot and swan shot. Their swords had been fashioned from saw blades.”159 General 
Sumter’s men sometimes used homemade swords and squirrel rifles instead of muskets, 
military swords, or bayonets.160 The rifles, however, provided a significant advantage to 
the irregulars, since their range and accuracy were superior to the British muskets.  
The last important external factor was the American Revolution’s alliance with 
France. This key support occasionally interdicted the most important British supply line 
due to the French navy’s ability to deny the British hegemony on the sea.  At key 
moments, the French prevented the uninterrupted flow of British human and material 
resupplies to the port of the southern coastal cities.161 This denial significantly 
contributed to the success of General Greene’s integrated strategy, since, as the irregulars 
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exhausted the British in endless chases and inflicted unsustainable numbers of casualties, 
it became impossible to resupply British troops at the levels needed to continue effective 
military operations.  
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The rebel colonies had no standing army before the conflict. Even after the rebel 
army’s quick establishment, its conventional effectiveness was questionable. Although 
the most significant battles, including Saratoga, Cowpens, Guilford Courthouse and 
Charleston, were largely fought by regular forces, the commander-in-chief, George 
Washington admitted that the colonial conventional army, even with the help of the 
French, was not capable of decisively fighting the British in open, conventional warfare. 
It is obvious that if the colonies had chosen to fight a traditional war against their enemy, 
the British “would have won a complete victory in the summer of 1780.”162 The colonies 
needed a different strategy to increase their chance of victory. They chose an approach 
with the primary objective of keeping the revolutionary cause alive. The goal could only 
be achieved through a strategy that integrated the conventional Continental Army and the 
irregular forces. There were several key elements that contributed to the success of this 
approach. 
First, the existing militia system, with its mandatory military training, provided an 
initial force for the colonies to use against the British until the Continental Army was 
established. Later, the same militia, whose organization, training, and tactics were more 
suited for guerrilla war than conventional battles, provided a great foundation for the 
introduction of an irregular strategy. Those militia members with experience from 
previous Indian wars or service in the British colonial army were usually better fighters 
than those citizens who just signed up to fight for the cause. 
Second, the powerful idea of independence and national identity—the American 
narrative—brought the people of the colonies together and provided strong popular 
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support, which was essential for the success of any irregular forces and operations. This 
support ensured continuous information superiority and human and material resupply for 
the rebels, which was a key advantage over the British, who struggled with serious 
intelligence, manpower, and materiel resupply shortages during the entire war.   
Third, the effective military utilization of the physical terrain of North America 
greatly enhanced the rebels’ ability to resist the British forces. The initial advantages of 
the British were based on their superior numbers, weapons, and training. However, the 
limited usefulness of British tactics, which were suited to the great European plains, and 
the limited ability to capitalize on advanced technology, e.g., the new use of artillery 
units, significantly reduced British superiority. In some cases, their strengths turned into 
weaknesses and vulnerabilities.  
Fourth, the colonials had several leaders who could “think outside of the box” and 
were willing to seek nontraditional military solutions for their special problems. 
Nathanael Greene had no previous operational experience; but he was curious about 
military affairs and had the ability to see things differently. George Washington, Francis 
Marion, and Thomas Sumter all came from a conventional military background and had 
experience from previous wars. They were able to capitalize on those experiences and on 
their knowledge of enemy tactics, techniques and procedures. The mission-oriented task 
organization of the irregulars, their continuous training, their leaders’ ability to turn their 
strategy’s weaknesses to strengths and to ruthlessly exploit the weaknesses of the British, 
played a key part in the final victory. 
Fifth, the symbiotic integration of conventional and irregular forces, which 
generated local “relative superiority”163 for the colonial forces led in the end to a 
strategically overwhelming power. In the south, General Greene took a gamble when he 
divided his forces, but he knew that General Cornwallis, as conventional thinking would 
dictate, was eager to destroy or capture both parts of the colonial army to get his 
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“victory.” But the more dispersed the British army was, the more exposed each part 
became to the operations of the irregulars. The result was that: 
the [British] army was a ship; where it moved in power it commanded, but 
around it was the hostile sea, parting in front but closing in behind, and 
always probing for signs of weakness…Whereas a defeated American 
army could melt back into the countryside from whence it came, a British 
force so circumscribed was likely to be totally lost.164   
Sixth, despite the fact that the British and their Tory allies had some sense of 
irregular tactics from the Seven Years’ War and used some of these during the 
Revolution, they preferred to fight conventionally. As a result, the “not-Christian tactics” 
used by the colonial irregulars created great confusion, fear, and disorder among the 
British forces. The British, because of the continuous harassment and shortages in human 
and material resupply, their inability to effectively tailor their tactics to these challenges, 
and the increasing number of casualties could not sustain effective military operations. 
Seventh, the outside support provided by France was a key element in the rebels’ 
success. The French supply of weapons165 and money played a significant role in 
increasing the colonials’ military capabilities, but the most important support was 
provided by the French navy, which at crucial times denied British resupply by sea and 
blockaded General Cornwallis in Yorktown, preventing his escape and eventually forcing 
the surrender of his army.  
This case serves the purposes of this research well, since analysis of the American 
Revolutionary War provides several key elements in discovering the validity and 
exportability of the “professional irregular force” concept as a homeland-defense 
strategy. At the beginning, there was a not-even-existing, small country, the United States 
of America, without a standing, conventionally defensive capability. This small country 
waged a defensive war against a militarily superior occupying force. Even after its 
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hurried establishment of conventional forces, the small country was incapable of fighting 
on the enemy’s terms with any real chance of ultimate success. This small country 
needed a new approach to take away the foe’s advantages. Based on an existing militia, 
which had training and previous military experience, the small country’s forces had a 
solid irregular organizational and tactical foundation. These abilities were further 
developed by several key leaders, who took their tactical and operational-level irregular 
capabilities and combined them into a strategy.  The effective employment of the 
irregular strategy, in combination with some additional factors including favorable terrain 
and popular and outside support, made it impossible for the superior enemy to effectively 
answer with a conventional strategy. The struggle between the “indirect” and the “direct” 
strategies ended in the victory of the small state. 
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IV. THE BOER WAR  
A. BACKGROUND 
The origins of this South African War were rooted in a century-old conflict over 
the domination of Africa south of the Zambezi River, waged between the descendants of 
mainly Dutch protestant immigrants, called Boers, and the British Empire.166 The Dutch 
settlers arrived first in South Africa in the 17th century, while the British established their 
formal rule in Cape Town in 1806. During the Napoleonic Wars, a British expeditionary 
force landed in Cape Colony and defeated the Dutch defenders, which resulted in the 
extension of British rule to Cape Colony.167 During the following decades, British 
subjects immigrated to the area, slowly matching Boer numbers. With that demographic 
threat, the Dutch settlers became more and more dissatisfied with the British 
administration and decided to move away from British rule. During the so-called “great 
trek,”168 the Boers migrated north towards the interior and established two independent 
republics: “the Transvaal, with an area of 110,000 square miles containing the cities of 
Pretoria and Johannesburg, and the Orange Free State, with 49,000 square miles.”169 
Though the British initially recognized the two states, their attempted annexation of the 
Transvaal in 1877 led to the First Boer War, between the Boers and British from 1880 to 
1881. After several British defeats, especially that of the Battle of Majuba Hill in 1880, 
the independence of the Boer republics was restored, but tension remained high.170 
The discovery of diamonds at Kimberley in 1871 and gold in Transvaal in 1886 
resulted in the arrival of massive waves of foreigners, mainly British mine workers. This 
soon resulted in those British who searched for jobs and fortune, called “Uitlanders” by 
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the Boers, exceeding the numbers of Boers. In Transvaal, the Boer government saw a 
serious existential threat from British expansionism in the region and the number of non-
Boers. To prevent a possible political takeover by the Uitlanders, the Boer government 
restricted their voting rights, limited their representation in the administration, and 
introduced special taxes paid only by them.171  This discrimination created serious 
concerns among the Uitlanders, the British government, and even the press, since the 
London Times requested the British administration to stand up more deliberately in 
support of the Uitlanders.172  
The escalation of tension led to a small-scale conflict in December 1885, when 
under the command of Dr. Leander Starr Jameson, “several hundred armed men from 
British Rhodesia invaded Transvaal”173 with the hope of igniting a rebellion among the 
“Uitlanders” to overthrow the Boer government. The rebellion never happened, and the 
Boer forces quickly defeated the aggressors. Although the conflict ended in Boer victory, 
the British did not give up their desire to bring the two Boer republics under their control. 
This intent and the Uitlander problem caused years of political negotiations to try to reach 
a compromise. The Boers recognized that if they granted voting rights to the continuously 
arriving Uitlanders, they would soon become the majority and take away Boers control 
over the two republics. The negotiation attempts failed, and the British deployed their 
forces along the borders of Transvaal. In October 1899, the Transvaal government issued 
an ultimatum stating that “if in 48 hours the British troops did not retire from the border, 
war existed, and demanded also that the reinforcements already landed, as well as those 
on the way, be sent back.”174 The British answered that “the conditions imposed by the 
Transvaal were such that the British government could no longer discuss the subject.”175  
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After the Transvaal government received the reply, it declared war and with the support 
of its ally, Orange Free State, launched a preemptive invasion against Cape Colony and 
Natal.176  
The war consisted of two distinct phases: the conventional phase, from October 
1899 to June 1900, and the guerrilla phase, from June 1900 to May 1902.177 The first 
phase of the war was based on engagements between conventional armies. The Boers, by 
exploiting their initial numerical178 superiority, launched effective strikes into British 
territory with the operational goal of besieging the British garrisons and isolating 
important towns, including Mafeking and Kimberley.179 Although the early period of the 
war brought numerous victories for the Boers in open battles, including those at 
Stormberg, Colenso, and Magersfontein, in what was called “Black Week” by the British 
media,180 they could not effectively capitalize on these early successes. The Boers wasted 
their time and resources in hopeless sieges and did not devote the proper effort to 
invading Cape Colony. This allowed the British to overcome their initial weaknesses, 
including shortages in reconnaissance and the inability to adjust to local conditions.181 
Furthermore, via sea, the British would eventually send 450,000 troops, “including 
seventeen thousand Australians and fifty-three thousand white South Africans,”182 into 
the conflict within a couple of months. From this moment, the war seemed destined to 
end in British victory. The British forces quickly relieved the besieged towns and 
occupied key Transvaal cities, including “Johannesburg in May and Pretoria in June 
1900.”183 The British believed that the war was close to over with the capture of these 
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two towns, but they were mistaken. The Boer leadership met in March 1900 in Kroonstad 
and, based on the suggestions of General Christian De Wet, agreed to a next phase and an 
irregular campaign.184 
During the second phase of the war, as a response to increasing British strength, 
the Boers abandoned their previous conventional strategy and introduced irregular 
warfare to continue fighting. The Boer forces were reorganized into small, mobile units 
called “commandos” and raided targets such as lines of communications, telegraph 
stations, railways, and British troop columns. “The Boer columns caused greater damage 
to the British in this period of the war than ever before. Their incessant maneuvers and 
frequent attacks exhausted the British forces; their horses died by the thousands.”185 To 
counter the Boers’ strategy, the British introduced two key concepts. First, to isolate the 
commandos from their vital supporters, the population, the British introduced a 
“scorched-earth” policy. This included the destruction of Boer farms and moving 
civilians into concentration camps.186 Second, to curtail the Boer commandos’ freedom 
of movement, the British established the “blockhouse-and-drive system.”187 This concept 
included a “network of blockhouses at a distance of between eighty and eight-hundred 
yards, which were connected by barbed wire entanglements, trenches and stone walls,”188 
and large British mounted troops to sweep the area beyond the blockhouses. Finally, the 
combination of “some hundred-thousand Boer women and children in concentration 
camps,”189 continuous attrition, and a British amnesty offer paralyzed the Boer 
commandos. The Boer forces surrendered 31 May 1902. The peace agreement, known as 
the Treaty of Vereeniging, absorbed the two Boer republics into the British Empire. The 
agreement included a promise of limited self-governance, which was granted in 1910 
with the establishment of the Union of South Africa.  
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B. IRREGULAR STRATEGY 
The Boer republics’ military strategy was originally based on conventional 
positional defense in combination with limited-scale preventive attacks into enemy 
territory. Although this mindset was deeply rooted in the history of both republics and the 
Boer culture, the beginning of the war witnessed a certain level of disagreement among 
political and military leaders about how to fight the British. Some young Boer officers, 
including Christiaan De Wet and Jan Smuts, recommended the abandonment of the 
conventional Boer strategy and the introduction of a new approach based on highly 
mobile “flying commandos.”190 They also suggested taking the engagements deep into 
the British colonies and capturing the coastal ports in order to deny the British resupply. 
On the other hand, the older Boer generals, including the commandant of the Boer forces, 
Piet Joubert, were in favor of a conventional defensive strategy. This was the reason the 
first phase of the war was waged in that manner, which caused great Boer losses in 
materiel, manpower, morale, and, more importantly, opportunities. However this 
approach brought several initial successes, including Dundee, Colenso, Stormberg, and 
Magersfontein, though at the same time, it allowed the British to reinforce their troops 
and launch a large-scale counteroffensive. Jan Smuts explained the reasons behind the 
failure of this initial strategy when he stated: 
However good the Boers were as raw fighting material, their organization 
was too loose and ineffective, and their officers too inexperienced and in 
many glaring cases incompetent, to make a resort to offensive tactics 
possible. The really capable organizers and leaders in the Boer armies 
were only slowly coming to the front and many of them had started from 
the very lowest grades in the organization and were only slowly, and then 
in spite of gross prejudice and conservative stupidity, moving to more 
responsible positions ... One of the cardinal mistakes of the Boer plan of  
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campaign was the concentration of all possible forces from all possible 
parts in defensive positions to stop or delay the advance of the main force 
of the enemy.191 
In the light of the failure of their military strategy and the foreseeable fall of the 
capitals of both countries, the presidents and some senior officers from both republics 
met in Kroonstad on 17 March 1900 to discuss further actions. Despite the overwhelming 
number of British forces approaching their territory, they decided to continue the war, but 
under a fundamentally different strategy. The Boer leaders agreed to abandon the 
extensive use of positional defense along a broad front to prevent the British advance 
and, based on the suggestions of General Christiaan De Wet, turned the war into a 
guerrilla campaign.  The main goal of De Wet’s new strategy was to prolong the war long 
enough to drain British human and material resources, while hoping for a political 
backlash in London, which together could have led to a negotiated settlement.  
As part of the new approach, the Boer forces were reorganized into small, 
mounted units, which had to operate in a manner as mobile and self-sufficient as possible. 
As de Wet explained, “we were of the opinion that we should be able to do better work if 
we divided the Commandos into small parties. We could not risk any great battles, and, if 
we divided our forces, the English would have to divide their forces too.”192 These small 
units focused on attacking and destroying British troop columns and lines of 
communications and harassing the British forces at every possible place and time.193 
Commandos became less concerned with occupying ground and 
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overextending their logistical and communication lines and diverting their 
forces away from the main theatres of operation and the affected civilian 
populations.194  
This tactically offense-based defensive strategy required the Boers to be masters in the art 
of maneuver. As General de Wet noted, “to oppose successfully such bodies of men as 
our burghers had to meet during the war demanded rapidity of action more than anything 
else. We had to become quick at fighting, quick at reconnoitering, quick, if it became 
necessary, at flying.”195 Although by this time the British had an overwhelming 
numerical superiority, they had to face the: 
silent disability of a regular army in contest with a horde of guerrillas 
maneuvering about their own country. Seldom in the course of the whole 
campaign in South Africa was it possible for the British Commander-in-
Chief or any of his lieutenants, to select their own sites for battle or 
ground for maneuver.196 
Although the guerrilla campaign was very successful at the operational and 
tactical level, the Boer generals and politicians had a hard time maintaining strategic 
unity. They kept regular communication and all campaigns were first authorized by the 
political leadership, but “lack of resources, an under-developed politico-military strategy 
and the dispersed nature of Boer forces led to contradictions, strategic gaps and 
inconsistencies in the application of this strategy.”197 
C. ORGANIZATION AND LEADERSHIP 
The South African commando system had many similarities with the North 
American colonial militia. The Boers’ citizen-soldier based military service provided a 
trained defense force in the absence of a regular army. When aggression threatened the 
Boer republics, the militia was called upon and formed a town-based local commando 
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unit. “All males between sixteen and sixty”198 were required to serve in the commandos, 
which usually contained a hundred to a hundred-and-fifty soldiers. The members of the 
commandos were mostly average farmers bringing their own weapons and horses to the 
battle. The leaders of these units were elected by the soldiers, but the command system of 
these units “resembled that of the Boer civilian society, rather loose and uncoordinated, 
which made effective cooperation and concentration against the enemy more 
difficult.”199 The commandos were led by a commandant who was directly responsible to 
a general, who in theory commanded four commandos. The generals were direct 
subordinates of the two commanders-in-chief of the Boer republics.  
This system was fundamentally transformed at the beginning of the guerrilla 
phase of the war. “De Wet’s strategy called for a major organizational change: the 
Kommandos were broken into even smaller units than their usual 100 to 150 riders, and 
were to be widely dispersed.”200 With this new organizational approach, the Boers were 
able to inflict more damage than during the first phase of the war and to escape repeated 
British attempts to capture the commandos. The divided units and their maneuvers 
allowed the Boers “to achieve local superiority long enough to escape”201 and sometimes 
were able to trap their pursuers. The self-sufficient elements of these small units could 
“break into many small groups and travel separately to a new rally point,”202 where they 
regrouped and attacked their enemies. As Alfred Thayer Mahan, a significant American 
strategist observed, “Every Boer organization seems susceptible of immediate dissolution 
into its component units, each of independent vitality, and of subsequent reunion in some 
assigned place.”203 This new strategy and organizational approach would have not 
worked with the old generals who had led the Boer units during the first phase of the war  
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and praised the conventional defensive strategy. The irregular phase “found leaders of 
previously unsuspected guerrilla talents,”204 including Christiaan Rudolf De Wet and Jan 
Christiaan Smuts.  
Although De Wet’s suggestions regarding a new strategic approach were turned 
down by his superiors at the beginning of the war, he started to employ irregular tactics 
even in early engagements.  In 1899, he played a key role in defeating the British in 
Natal, at Nicholson’s Neck, where his unit outmaneuvered a British force five times its 
size. De Wet’s commando “took a thousand prisoners, the largest surrender of British 
troops in a century.”205 On another occasion at Sanna’s Post, he ambushed a British 
column on its flank to draw them in a trap laid by the rest of his forces along the expected 
British retreat line. “The British could not believe that a poorly educated farmer-turned-
soldier of middle years was capable of such sophistication and they soon started to spread 
the false rumor that Captain Carl Reichmann, the American military attaché in the field, 
with De Wet as an observer, had actually conducted the battle.”206 These victories, and 
the British attempts to discredit him, started to build a personal cult around De Wet. He 
soon became a legendary figure, a symbol of Boer resistance.  In his book, The Great 
Boer War, Byron Farwell argues that after the defeat at Paardeberg, it was De Wet’s 
personality and actions that kept the war going.207 De Wet continuously searched for 
solutions to mitigate the British numerical superiority and achieve victory. He developed 
guerrilla warfare and hit-and-run tactics to a level that seemed impossible for the British 
to cope with. However De Wet never understood why the British designated him and the 
Boer fighters as guerrillas during the second phase of the war. He believed that the term 
“guerrilla” could be used only in the case of an occupying force that controls the country 
from border to border—but this was not the case in any of the Boer republics.208 De Wet 
was not just an outstanding strategist and master in the art of maneuvering, but an 
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indefatigable warrior as well, who always fought in the front lines, leading his men by 
example. He stayed committed to the cause of Boer independence throughout the entire 
war, even during a personal crisis when his own brother Piet lost his faith in the Boer 
cause and surrendered to the British. Even after numerous “formal De Wet hunts,” he and 
his men stayed free to fight until the end of the war.209 By 1902, as the British soldiered 
on, De Wet and the Boer forces were “terribly worn hungry and increasingly 
dispirited,”210 finally ready for negotiation. The peace offer made by the British, 
containing a future possibility of self-governance and independence, was good enough 
even for De Wet, who signed the Treaty of Vereeniging “as president of the Free State” 
and who in a few years would actually join the government as minister of agriculture.  
Like De Wet, other young guerrilla commanders rose during the second phase of 
the war. One of them was Jan Christiaan Smuts. He came from a perfectly opposite 
background from De Wet. Smuts was born into a long-established, widely respected 
traditional Afrikaner family. He was highly educated, having graduated from Cambridge 
with academic honors. His achievements were later recognized when Lord Todd, the 
Master of Christ’s College said in 1970 that “in 500 years of the College’s history, of all 
its members, past and present, three had been truly outstanding: John Milton, Charles 
Darwin, and Jan Smuts.”211 In 1895, Smuts became a personal legal advisor for Cecil 
Rhodes and, with that, a target for the Boer press, which saw their archenemy in Rhodes. 
After the Jameson raid, he felt betrayed by his employer and resigned immediately. 
Smuts moved to Pretoria and soon became a committed supporter of the Transvaal 
president, Paul Kruger. As a reward for his services, in June 1898, Kruger appointed 
Smuts as state attorney. At the beginning of the war, Smuts was responsible for handling 
international communication, propaganda, and strategic-level logistics as well. His career 
as a significant irregular leader started during the second phase, when he served as an 
officer under the command of Koos de la Rey. 
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Like De Wet, Smuts proved to have excellent capabilities in adopting and further 
developing hit-and-run tactics and generally outmaneuvering British columns. He proved 
himself not only a master planner, but also a brave soldier and intelligent leader who was 
aware of the capabilities and limitations of his men. During operations, his forces not 
only ambushed British columns and attacked supply lines, but spread Boer propaganda to 
ignite additional revolts against the British and intimidate those who opposed the Boer 
cause. When the British introduced the scorched-earth policy, combined with a network 
of blockhouses and flying sweeps, Smuts himself evaded them at least a dozen times. 
Once he led five-hundred men out of a trap established by twenty-thousand British 
troops.212  
These abilities were the reason why Smuts was chosen by his superiors for a 
mission that they hoped would turn the war in favor of the Boers. Smuts led 340 men on 
a raid into the heart of the British Cape Colony with the overall goal of igniting a general 
uprising against the British. By the time his widely spread and stealthily moving force 
met again after a month on the border, he had only 240 men left.213 Also, when they 
made it to Cape Colony, Smuts and his forces were deep in enemy territory and cut off 
from any resupply. His men, weakened by the continuous evasion, starvation, and 
disease, soon turned against Smuts, but he managed to keep their motivation and belief in 
the cause high. Their luck finally turned when, during a raid on a British cavalry unit, 
they took horses, clothes, food and ammunition, which gave their self-belief back.  
Although Smuts and his commandos were successful at harassing the British in 
their own territory, they initially could not achieve their ultimate goal. After Smuts 
realized that his small-scale raids were not going to ignite the rebellion, he decided to 
establish a command post and start acting as the leader of an entire army to attract the 
local Boers. He implemented his raiding strategy with propaganda and recruiting activity, 
and as a result his force soon numbered 3,000 fighters. Witnessing Smuts’s success, the 
British commander, General Kitchener noted, “the dark days are on us again.” Smuts 
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himself wrote about the results of his operations, “We practically held the whole area 
from the Olifants to the Orange river 400 miles away, save for small garrison towns here 
and there.”214 After assessing the situation, he decided to take the initiative once again 
and launch an attack to bring the British to the negotiating table.  
Using all his forces, he launched an attack against the copper mining of Okiep. 
Although his forces could surround the town, he could not launch a direct attack on the 
fortified British garrison. Once again, Smuts proved his abilities in irregular thinking. 
Instead of a conventional siege, he packed a train with explosives and planned to detonate 
it in the town near the garrison. Although this attempt failed, the British soon offered him 
a peace conference to discuss the conditions of a possible peace agreement.215 Although 
his operation never really achieved its original goal, it still had a significant influence on 
the future military thinking of the British, playing a key role in the concept of the 
establishment of the British commandos and other special forces. 
D. INTERNAL FACTORS 
When not at war, the average Boer fighters were farmers who were working in 
their fields every day. To get meat, they pretty much depended on their weapon and 
horse. Hunting was not only a source of food, but a significant developer of individual 
skills. They learned how to shoot from different positions, including the prone position, 
as well as how to use cover and concealment. As hunters, the Boers also learned the 
importance of aimed shooting, since if they missed the first shot, the game would escape. 
They further developed their marksmanship during social gatherings, when shooting 
competitions were major events. They used smokeless gunpowder, which later made it 
very hard for the British to track them, since they could not identify their positions. 
During hunting, the Boers developed the ability to live in the field and sustain themselves 
for a long time without resupply. Their other significant capability was riding skill. Based 
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on the individual Boer fighters’ riding capabilities and experiences from previous wars 
against the Zulus,216 the commandos became experts in light-cavalry operations. 
Using all these skills, the Boer units could take the classical hit-and-run tactic to 
the next level. The commandos operated behind British lines, penetrating deep into 
enemy territory, where they ambushed convoys, destroyed railroads, cut communication 
lines, and attacked the British forces from the flank and rear. “There was no convoy 
whose safe arrival could be counted on, not a garrison that did not stand continually to 
arms, not a column which even whilst it marched against the enemy had not to move with 
the strictest precautions of the defensive.”217 The commandos’ tactics “relied on mobility 
to repeatedly effectuate surprise, after which they would withdraw again as soon as 
possible to minimize the risk of suffering casualties.”218 The Boers’ “use of mobility and 
maneuver was to impress generations of military officers and to concretely influence the 
development of doctrines for mobile and maneuver warfare in the armed forces of 
Europe.”219At the same time, as Smuts’ operations showed, the Boers were also expert in 
using propaganda to their advantage while suppressing any voice who opposed them. The 
commando success initially was also based on information advantages. The supportive 
local population and the Boer reliance on mounted reconnaissance patrols provided a 
reliable intelligence system for the commandos. Conversely, there was serious British 
negligence regarding intelligence, which added to the existing operational advantages 
held by the Boers. These factors led to victories, such as De Wet’s at Mostert’s Hoek, 
where his commando killed fifty British soldiers and captured the rest of the force.220 
This situation changed when the British overcame their shortages on reconnaissance and 
when around two thousand Boers, who convinced themselves that any further resistance 
was hopeless, joined the British against their own people as National Scouts.221 
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The success of Boer tactics was significant, because like the irregulars of the 
American Revolutionary War, there was no formal doctrine codifying the activities of the 
Boer commandos. No effort other than some initial attempts by the Transvaal artillery 
officers to develop their own doctrine was made to put the Boer way of fighting into 
manuals. As an irregular phenomenon, the tactics used by the Boer fighters were based 
more on their individual skills and previous war experiences than anything else “learned 
in a formal military environment.”222 Paul Johnston captured this point in his article, 
“Doctrine is Not Enough: The Effect of Doctrine on the Behavior of Armies,” 
“ultimately, an army’s behavior in battle will almost certainly be more of a reflection of 
its character or culture than of the contents of its doctrine manuals. And if that culture—
or mind set, if you will—is formed more by experience than by books, then those who 
would attempt to modify an army’s behavior need to think beyond doctrine manuals.”223 
E. EXTERNAL FACTORS 
The commandos were extensively deployed in their own areas where the Boer 
fighters had detailed knowledge of the local terrain. As Anthony James Joes explained, 
the “vast stretches of the Boer republics were level and treeless, excellent territory for 
mounted guerrillas in the pre-aircraft age.”224 The Boer leaders could effectively suit the 
Boers’ traditional mounted warfare to the terrain of the two republics.  Although about 
20,000 Boers remained free to fight towards the end of the conflict, the British 
blockhouse network and the introduction of mounted “quick-reaction forces” managed to 
severely restrict the Boers’ ability to exploit the terrain, taking away their initial 
operational advantage. 
Knowledge of the terrain was not the only advantage the commandos had when 
fighting in their well-known home areas. The other significant advantage was the 
personal relationship of the fighters with the local population. As in any classic guerrilla 
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struggle, the population played a key role in the Second Boer War. They provided food, 
shelter, and information to the commandos, which gave them an initial information 
advantage over the British. They also provided manpower for the Boer cause. It happened 
many times that even those Boers who earlier surrendered or made an agreement with the 
British volunteered again to fight. Examples include De Wet’s victory at Mostert’s Hock, 
where he re-recruited some men from Reddersburg “who had just weeks before accepted 
Roberts’ amnesty offer”225 and Smuts’ raid where he was able to recruit about 3,000 men 
behind enemy lines to fight for the cause. The importance of the civilian population in 
this conflict was quickly recognized by the British. To isolate the commandos from the 
population and to deny them information, food, and manpower the British established 
concentration camps when they introduced the earlier mentioned scorched-earth 
policy.226 In the camps, malaria, pneumonia, bronchitis, and typhoid fever caused 3,165 
civilian deaths within a single month in 1901.227 During the two-year guerrilla phase of 
the war, conditions in the concentration camps killed approximately 25,000 civilians.228 
Although the suffering of mostly women and children in the camps and the ever-
increasing problem of food shortages had a significant effect on the morale of the 
commandos, it also seemed to help Boer propaganda, since British actions created an 
outrage in London. “Henry Campbell-Bannerman, leader of the opposition Liberal party, 
declared that the British forces were employing methods of barbarism.”229 Emily 
Hobhouse, the leader of the South African Women and Children’s Distress Fund and of 
the “Ladies Committee,” brought world attention to the suffering of people in the camps 
and also to the atrocities conducted by the British troops in South Africa. Her activity 
created a widespread public criticism of the government and put great pressure on the 
authorities to relieve the British commander, General Kitchener. 230 These events served 
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well the Boers’ strategy, as it aimed for victory through British exhaustion and internal 
social conflict. To capitalize on this opportunity and extend their “psychological 
operations” abroad, Boer leaders sent out several politicians to gain international support. 
This was important since, other than some moral support from the Netherlands and 
Germany, the Boer republics had no international support against the British. “A. Fischer, 
C.H. Wessels and A.D.W. Wolmarans visited the Netherlands and the United States as 
well as France, Germany, and Russia, but without achieving success”231 and no real 
material support was given to the Boers.  
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Although the Boer republics had no standing army or written doctrine before the 
conflict, the commando members’ individual skills and prior war experiences made them 
an effective fighting force, especially during the guerrilla phase. They possessed tactical 
advantages over the British even towards the end of the conflict. “In tactical engagements 
they continued to hold the advantage in mobility, being all mounted, as well as in 
marksmanship at ranges up to and beyond a mile. The smokeless powder they used made 
it hard for the British to track them, even when they were enclosed in set traps.”232 The 
Boer commandos used numerous irregular warfare elements, including guerrilla warfare 
and psychological operations during the war, but these efforts were not enough to achieve 
a final victory. There are several key conditions that contributed to the failure of the 
Boers’ irregular strategy. 
The initial disagreement among the Boer leaders about how to fight the British led 
to a situation at the beginning of the war where, in Arreguín-Toft’s words, two similar 
strategies met and led to the stronger side’s victory. Although at the beginning of the 
conflict Boer forces held a numerical advantage, they wasted their time, manpower, and 
material resources trying to fight the British conventionally in open battles and siege 
operations. Despite their initial tactical-level successes, this strategy had a major negative 
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impact, since the Boers tried to wage a kind of war for which their forces were not 
designed and their fighters were not trained. They did not have siege equipment and, as 
Thomas Pakenham noted, “indeed, the commando system was best suited not to large-
scale set-piece battles, but to smaller-scale, guerrilla strikes.”233 It is clear that during the 
initial phase of the war, the Boers failed to capitalize on their biggest strength, which 
allowed the British to use their command of the sea to quickly reinforce their forces and 
gain numerical superiority. This changed the course of the war, and the Boers needed to 
change their strategy to continue the fight.  
The new approach would have required a key condition to be successful: national 
integrity. After the catastrophic defeat at Paardeberg, many Boers decided that the 
struggle was hopeless. The number of surrendering Boers continuously increased through 
time, due to the combination of harsh British tactics and amnesty offers. The loss of 
manpower and the difficulty in recruiting new fighters caused a huge setback for the Boer 
irregular strategy—as did the approximately 2,000 Boers who volunteered to fight against 
their own brothers as British scouts. This eroded not just national integrity, but one of the 
most important advantages of the guerrillas, their one-sided exploitation of the terrain.  
Another key condition that led to the failure of the strategy was that the Boer 
decision to wage a guerrilla war was an ad-hoc one in the wake of conventional defeat. 
The lack of a previously existing national-level irregular strategy led to a series of 
military operations without an integrated political–military goal. The Boer forces’ main 
purpose was to harass the British and to inflict as many casualties as possible, with the 
hope that they would become exhausted and be forced to the negotiation table. Although 
the commandos were very effective at the tactical level, their individual unit successes 
were not enough to bring the final victory.  
As part of the ad hoc application of irregular warfare, the Boers also failed to 
establish proper information and resupply networks. Those that existed were based on the 
local populations and their farms. With the introduction of harsh British methods, 
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including concentration camps and scorched earth, these systems were almost entirely 
neutralized. This lack of supporting infrastructure and the British ability to tailor their 
tactics to the special requirements of the conflict, including the blockhouse network and 
sweeping drives, seriously limited the Boer guerrillas’ freedom of movement. This was 
further restricted by the lack of any safe havens abroad.234 
Last, but not least, the new tactics introduced by the British created some 
criticism in London and around the world, but the British political and military strategy 
was never undermined sufficiently to affect the outcome of the conflict. The Boers failed 
not just in convincing the British voters about their cause, but in gaining significant 
outside support from other countries. This failure was reinforced by the fact that, unlike 
the situation during the American Revolutionary War, Great Britain was not engaged in 
any other war and there was no other country yet challenging its sea hegemony.235 The 
Boers were left on their own to fight a superior enemy and could not turn the odds to their 
favor. 
This case was chosen as a subject of analysis because it carries numerous learning 
points for those who are looking at the validity of an irregular warfare-based defensive 
strategy. The organization, equipment, and training of the Boer republics’ defensive 
forces were better tailored to irregular warfare than conventional war and for defensive 
goals than offensive. However, at the beginning of the war, the political and military 
leadership of the countries decided to fight traditionally and to attack the British. During 
the first phase of the war, an already existing irregular force and its resources were 
wasted. When the Boer leadership realized its mistake, it was too late to turn events 
around. The effective tactical-level irregular warfare demonstrated by the Boers during 
the second phase of the war “still resonates loudly among all those today who think about  
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or are called upon to fight irregular wars;”236 but this case shows that some of the key 
requirements for success identified in the previous case study—including high-level 
individual training, knowledge of local terrain, mobility, and expertise in irregular 
warfare—by themselves do not guarantee final victory. The lack of an effective national-
level, integrated irregular strategy, the inability to gain any external support, and the 
enemy’s ability to focus all its effort towards the Boers led to a situation where the 
struggle of the “indirect” and the “direct” strategies ended with the victory of the large 
state. But if the Boers had begun with an irregular warfare approach, and adhered to it, 
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V. THE WAR IN GERMAN EAST AFRICA  
A. BACKGROUND 
Germany, as a late arrival in the “scramble for Africa,” had only four areas left to 
colonize: “Togo, Cameroon, South-West Africa and East Africa.”237 Among these 
colonies, East Africa quickly became “the jewel of the German Colonial Empire.”238 
However Germany’s appearance in Africa further deepened the existing tensions among 
the colonial powers. They seemed to have “a common desire to develop (or exploit) 
rather than fight over (and devastate) their African colonies, and a common determination 
to safeguard racial ‘prestige’, had fostered increasing rapprochement among the colonial 
powers.”239 The basis for this common agreement was provided by the Congo Act, 
signed by the colonial powers in 1885. They agreed not to take war to Africa “in the 
event of an outbreak of conflict in Europe.”240  
At the beginning of the First World War, colonial leaders on both sides believed, 
based on the Congo Act that the conflict would not be taken to Africa. The governor of 
German East Africa, Heinrich Schnee “was not interested in war.”241 He ordered the 
commander-in-chief of German East Africa, Colonel Paul Emil von Lettow-Vorbeck, 
whose plans for defending the colony Schnee was not even willing to hear, not to take 
any hostile actions.242 At the same time, the British colonial governor, Henry Conway 
Belfield, also stated that “this colony had no interest in the present war.”243 But this 
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mindset changed very quickly as the British higher command identified the “wireless 
stations and ports of Germany’s African colonies”244 as a threat to British shipping lanes 
and its strategy called for land war against the German defense forces in Africa.  
Since Dar-es-Salaam, the capital of German East Africa, had a wireless station, 
the war soon arrived there as well. On August 8, 1914, two British cruisers, the Astraea 
and the Pegasus started to shell Dar-es-Salaam with the primary goal of destroying the 
city’s wireless tower. From the same ships, a small unit of British marines landed in the 
city and, with the support of the German governor, a truce was signed with the locals not 
to engage in any hostile act against the British during the war. 245 This agreement further 
undermined the relationship between Governor Schnee and Von Lettow, as the latter saw 
that the war in Africa could play a key role in the success of the fatherland back in 
Europe. In his book, called My Reminiscences of East Africa, Von Lettow explained his 
point of view by saying: 
The question was whether it was possible for us in our subsidiary theatre 
of war to exercise any influence on the great decision at home. Could we, 
with our small forces, prevent considerable numbers of the enemy from 
intervening in Europe, or in other more important theatres, or inflict on our 
enemies any loss of personnel or war material worth mentioning.246 
He understood that he could only achieve this goal by mounting an effective 
defense in the colony. Von Lettow formulated a strategy along this objective, his 
available forces, and the size of his area of operations. 
The German colonial forces, called Schutztruppe, initially consisted of about 250 
German officers and a little more than 2,500 Askari fighters.247 These forces were 
supposed to defend a colony as large as Germany and France combined and encompassed 
                                                 
244 Paice, Tip and Run, 3. 
245 Paul Emil Von Lettow-Vorbeck, My Reminiscences of East Africa (Uckfield: The Naval and 
Military Press ltd.), 28–29. 
246 Von Lettow-Vorbeck, My Reminiscences of East Africa, 3. 
247 Arquilla, Insurgents, Raiders and Bandits, 146. 
 73 
the present-day Tanzania, Rwanda, and Burundi.248 Further, German East Africa “was 
surrounded by colonies of Allied powers: Britain’s East Africa (mostly today’s Kenya), 
Rhodesia, and Nyasaland; the Belgian Congo;”249 and Mozambique.250 However, the 
Allied powers, initially having only seventeen companies of African troops in their 
disposal,251 did not have significant numerical advantages over the German forces. But 
the Royal Navy’s command of the sea allowed the British to introduce more troops to the 
theater swiftly and the navy also “completed the envelopment of the seemingly helpless 
German colony.”252 Based on these facts, the British were certain that the land war in 
Africa “would be little more than a short, sharp affair concluded by Christmas 1914,”253 
but Von Lettow had a different opinion. 
Realizing that any conventional approach to defending the colony was not 
possible, Von Lettow introduced a unique defensive strategy. Instead of massing his 
forces, he broke them into small units and dispersed them along the borders of the colony 
and in the key coastal towns. According to his approach, these small elements could do 
two things. First, starting in the fall of 1914, they could conduct harassing operations 
against British outposts and troop columns. Second, in case of a British offensive, these 
small units could fight a holding action long enough to allow the other closely located 
units to swarm around the enemy and come to their aid. This approach soon proved its 
effectiveness when the British staged an amphibious assault against Tanga in November 
1914. The attacking force, about 8,000 Indian troops with naval support under the 
command of Major General Arthur Edward Aitken, faced just 200 Germans and Askaris, 
whose initial holding allowed Von Lettow to bring in reinforcement and forced the 
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British to retreat. The British Official History of the War describes the events at Tanga as 
one of “the most notable failures in British military history.”254 
Shortly after their failure at Tanga, the British tried to launch an attack again from 
the sea with the goal of occupying Dar-es-Salaam. The Royal Navy bombarded the city, 
but the defenders “returned a fierce and accurate fire, inflicting damage on a number of 
British vessels.”255 The British realized that the invasion of the city would possibly end 
with similar results as the operation at Tanga, and decided to withdraw from the shores of 
the capital. In November 1914, the British cabinet decided that the “control of operations 
in East Africa was to be taken over by the War Office”256 and General Aitken was 
replaced by Major General Richards Wapshare. 
During the last days of 1914, the British launched a land offensive from the north 
and temporarily occupied a town called Jasin; but Von Lettow’s units arrived to help their 
peers and by mid-January, forced the British to withdraw again. “The British casualties 
were nearly 500. Says the official history. “The morale of the British forces undoubtedly 
had again been shaken and they were not likely to be capable of passing to the offensive 
for some time to come.”257 After the battle at Jasin, Von Lettow took over the initiative 
from the British. He ordered his forces to be even more subdivided and start conducting 
near-constant raids against the British, especially targeting the British East Africa 
railroad. The German units conducted so many operations that the British believed that 
Von Lettow’s army was much larger than its actual size. These operations proved to be so 
successful that the War Office ordered the British forces “to stand on the defensive and 
try to hold on to what they already had.”258  At the same time, the British high command 
and the commander-in-chief, General Kitchener, realized that they would have to deal 
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with the German force decisively in Africa. To be able to do so, they reasoned that they 
needed to send in a much larger force to defeat Von Lettow.   
The New Year brought significant changes in the course of the war. Large 
numbers of fresh British units arrived in Africa led by an “energetic new commander: the 
Boer-hero-turned-British-loyalist, Jan Smuts”259 who brought a significant number of 
experienced Boers with him. To cope with the new threat, a multidirectional attack, Von 
Lettow immediately changed his approach and started to focus on strategic defense once 
again.  He did not send out his small forces on raids anymore, but went back to his initial 
strategy. The concept was to hold up the enemy as long as possible while causing 
maximum damage, and then withdrawing before being outflanked. The strategy seemed 
to be working with varying effectiveness against different enemies. While it could 
completely stop the advance of the Portuguese, in the case of the Boer units, it only 
slowed their maneuvers and increased their casualties. The fighting continued “week after 
week, month after month.”260    
Throughout the next two years, the British kept pushing Von Lettow southward. 
He “resisted, falling back slowly, inflicting as much damage as he could and delaying the 
seemingly inevitable loss of the colony for as long as possible.”261 At this time, he also 
had to “fight” with Governor Schnee as well, who called for a surrender, but Von Lettow 
ignored his civilian superior’s request. In October 1917, the British commander Major 
General Jacobus van Deventer262 thought that the German forces were close to the end 
and only one more push was needed to destroy them. At the Mahiwa River, Van 
Deventer attacked Von Lettow’s forces with about 6,000 troops. By contrast with the 
previous operational pattern, this time the Germans decided to stay and fight. The 
several-days’-long battle ended with Von Lettow’s victory, but he paid a high price for it 
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by losing about a third of his forces. The British thought that they had finally beaten Von 
Lettow, but he again shifted his strategy and mounted a strategic offense. 
The German forces initially moved away from the enemy by invading Portugal’s 
Mozambique colony. There they gained sufficient supplies and ammunition by defeating 
a 1,500-man-strong Portuguese unit. With pursuers on his tail, Von Lettow continued his 
offensive in Mozambique during the next nine months. Eventually he decided to move 
back into German East Africa and reentered the colony with his troops. There he attacked 
British depots and small-unit columns, and started to return his force closely to complete 
fitness.263 “Von Lettow kept up the pressure right until the end of the war in November 
1918.”264 On 13 November 1918, two days after the Armistice was signed in France, 
when encamped with his forces at the Chambezi River, Lettow-Vorbeck was handed a 
telegram by a British messenger stating that the war was over. After two days of thinking 
and trying to confirm the news, Von Lettow finally agreed to surrender, and as General 
Van Deventer requested, he led his undefeated forces to Abercorn and formally 
surrendered on 23 November 1918.265   
B. IRREGULAR STRATEGY 
By looking at the geographical location, the size of the area he wanted to defend, 
and the limited number of his forces, Von Lettow quickly understood that the classical 
German strategy, which was followed by Frederick the Great during the Seven Years’ 
War,266 would not work in German East Africa. He realized that it was impossible to 
defend the colony by following conventional strategy, since it was threatened from the  
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land and from the sea. “The Colony could not be ensured even by purely defensive 
tactics, since the total length of land frontier and coast-line was about equal to that of 
Germany.”267  
This conclusion was further reinforced by the fact that his communication was 
almost completely cut with the fatherland from the beginning of the war, and that because 
of the high demands of the European theater and the great risk posed by the Royal Navy, 
the colonial forces could not expect any reinforcement. Von Lettow, based on his 
experiences gained during the counterinsurgent campaigns between 1904 and 1905 
against the rebellious Herero and Nama tribes in South-West Africa, and also from 
interacting with Boer veterans while he was in South Africa to receive medical 
treatment,268 came up with an irregular approach.  
He took his conventionally organized and trained forces and turned them into an 
irregular force. At the beginning of the conflict, Von Lettow broke his forces into small, 
company-size elements containing 100 to 150 Askaris and several German officers and 
created a network of defense nests by placing them in the key ports and along the 
frontiers of the colony. “The idea was that each small detachment could fight an initial 
holding action when it came under attack; other nearby companies of Schutztruppe would 
then come in support as needed. They would be like the antibodies of the human immune 
system.”269 This system proved its effectiveness both in the ports and inland. At the 
battle of Tanga, the British amphibious force, though eight times larger than the 
defenders, was forced to withdraw. In another case, the town of Jasin was temporarily 
taken by the British, but “swarming”270 German units quickly drove them off and retook 
the town. These company-size units proved their effectiveness, but they also sustained 
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high casualties and lost a large amount of materiel. One seventh of the original officer 
corps died and as Von Lettow stated, “the expenditure of 200,000 rounds also proved that 
with the means at my disposal I could at the most fight three more actions of this 
nature.”271 Von Lettow realized that his forces could not sustain such losses in a long war 
as they had during their initial operations and that he needed to rethink his approach to 
economize his forces for a long war.  
Von Lettow explained “the need to strike great blows only quite exceptionally, 
and to restrict myself principally to guerrilla warfare, was evidently imperative.”272 
Based on this view, he subdivided his units even further, into detachments of eight to ten 
men, Europeans and Askaris, in order to conduct raids behind enemy lines. These small 
units “rode round the rear of the enemy’s camps, which had been pushed up as far as the 
Longido, and attacked their communications.”273 Since Von Lettow’s swarming units 
appeared in so many places and they “went farther and deeper, creating increasingly 
annoying disruptions,”274 they actually made the British believe that they were facing a 
much larger enemy then they really were. Through his irregular strategy, Von Lettow 
forced the British to assume a defensive posture and stay there for almost the entire year 
of 1915, which allowed him to keep the initiative throughout this period. But the 
beginning of 1916 brought fundamental changes in the British strategy.  
The introduction of a large number of fresh British troops, the Portuguese 
decision to join the war, and the appointment of General Smuts to command the British 
forces forced Von Lettow to think through his strategy again. He was able to adapt to the 
changed situation once more and went back to his original concept. He reorganized his 
forces once again into company-sized units and dispersed them in the same manner as at 
the beginning of the war. The concept was the same as in 1914; the companies were to 
fight holding actions as long as practicable, than withdraw when necessary. Although at 
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that time the loss of the colony seemed inevitable, through this irregular approach Von 
Lettow and his forces were able to fight an enemy, which by that time had become 
numerically and technologically far superior, for an additional two years. Towards the 
end of 1917, Von Lettow’s handful of soldiers was chased by about 150,000 Allied 
troops, who were supported by nearly a quarter-million African porters.275 By this time, 
the British thought that they finally cornered the German forces, but Von Lettow proved 
his genius in irregular operations. Instead of fighting a positional defense, he switched to 
the strategic offensive. He maneuvered his forces into Mozambique, moving away from 
the main enemy forces and gaining supplies from defeated small enemy detachments. 
Throughout the next year, his pursuers could not catch Von Lettow, who even managed 
to refit his forces almost to their original level; and in the fall of 1918, he shifted his 
offensive back to German East Africa. The British thought many times during the war 
that they were close to defeating Von Lettow and his forces, but the Schutztruppe kept 
conducting effective operations until the last day of the war.276 
C. ORGANIZATION AND LEADERSHIP 
Von Lettow’s forces started the war with their organization designed for 
conventional war. The defense forces “consisted of 216 Europeans and 2,540 Askari.”277 
In addition to that, there were two ships available, “the company of the Königsberg, 
322 men, and of the Möwe, 102 men.”278 The organizational framework of the East 
German colonial land forces was the company. The available troops were organized into 
fourteen companies, each of them consisting of 160 men organized into three platoons of 
50 troops, including two machine-gun teams. Every company had 250 carriers attached as 
well as several native fighters, called Ruga-Ruga.279 Each of these companies was named 
after its garrison’s location. During the war, the number of these units varied from fifteen 
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to 30. In addition to the original companies, some Schützenkompagnies or rifle 
companies, were organized as well, which initially consisted of only white settlers, but as 
the conflict progressed, became racially mixed. The total number of the companies never 
exceeded 60.280 The size of these units greatly varied through the war, based on the 
number of casualties suffered and recruits gained.  
His initial conventional company organization served Von Lettow’s irregular 
defensive strategy well. These were cohesive units, mostly trained to fight only at the 
company level, and that was what Von Lettow initially needed the most. He stated that “it 
was impossible to employ them in large formations, or to train the senior officers in this 
respect. It was evident that in war the movement and leading in battle of forces greater 
than a company would be attended with great difficulty and friction.”281 However, the 
companies suited the initial concept of operation, of one company conducting holding 
actions with others swarming around the enemy as needed or conducting raids against the 
British in their own territory. But the relatively heavy losses both in human lives and 
materiel, forced Von Lettow to rethink his strategy at the beginning of 1915.  
Nevertheless, the guiding principle of his approach remained to mount an 
effective defense while constantly sustaining raids in the British territories. “It was in any 
case impossible to act with larger forces.”282 The restrictions imposed by the terrain also 
required a shift in the organization of the German forces. “A company even was too large 
a force to send across this desert, and if, after several days of marching, it really had 
reached some point on the railway, it would have had to come back again, because it 
could not be supplied.”283 In order to meet his objectives, Von Lettow further subdivided 
his forces and created a large number of small, eight-to-ten-man detachments containing 
Europeans and Askaris. These units were able to move fast and light and caused great 
damage behind enemy lines. These operations served multiple purposes: they gathered 
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information about the enemy, seized supplies, and inflicted as many casualties as they 
could. As a result of their effectiveness, the British assumed a defensive posture and 
remained in it throughout 1915. The introduction of a large number of Allied troops at the 
beginning of 1916 forced the Germans to go back to their original company-based 
organization, which they used during the rest of the war. 
The impossible-looking challenge of defending the colony, and the limitations 
created by the initial setup of the defense forces of German East Africa, required a leader 
with exceptional abilities. And while the Germans needed all of their experienced 
commanders back in Europe, they decided to send “The German army’s most 
experienced colonial warfare officer,”284 Paul Emil Von Lettow-Vorbeck to prepare the 
defense of the colony. As his actions later proved, he was the right man for the job. Von 
Lettow’s experience came from counterinsurgent operations in China during the Boxer 
Rebellion in 1900 and in South-West Africa against the Herero and the Nama tribes in 
1904–1905. From 1909 to 1913, he was also in charge of a German marine unit, “the 
closet thing the Germans had at the time to troops ready to fight in irregular settings.”285 
Brian Gardner, in his book German East, The Story of the First World War in East 
Africa, noted about Von Lettow that “by 1914 he had enjoyed a more varied experience 
than probably any other German officer, having taken part in naval maneuvers in large 
and small ships, bush fighting, combat in China and a great deal of mixed staff and 
regimental duties.”286 These experiences allowed him to be able to think not only 
conventionally, but, when the situation required, in irregular terms as well.  
Before the beginning of the war, Von Lettow personally traveled around the 
colony to gain knowledge of the area and inspect his forces. After recognizing that no 
conventional strategy could possibly work against an enemy invasion, he started to think 
of other creative ways to defend the colony with available resources. He had the ability to 
look at the situation with an open mind and find the right answer for the challenges he 
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faced. Von Lettow was flexible throughout the entire war, tailoring his operations and his 
forces’ organization as the situation required. However he had to fight not only against 
the Allied forces, but many times against his civilian superior, Governor Schnee. Von 
Lettow was convinced that German East Africa could be a key contributor in the war. He 
trusted in the fighting quality of his forces and based his whole irregular approach on “the 
native African troops, whose language he spoke and whose culture he respected.”287 Von 
Lettow was not only a strategic thinker, but took part in the fighting as well. He led by 
example; sometimes he went out as a member of a small detachment to conduct raids 
behind enemy lines, which once almost led to his capture by British counter-patrols. 
Though he was a great strategist and fighter, he could not succeed without his 
subordinate leaders, who understood his vision and were able from the start to lead their 
companies, and later, their small detachments, in whatever was needed. His European 
officers, including “Otto, Köhl, Müller, Spangenburg, von Ruckteschell, Kemper and von 
Scherbening,”288 and his favorite subordinate, Captain Tafel, who first figured out and 
trained the German forces in how to camouflage their head-dress by using grass and 
leaves,289 had a significant role in the success of Von Lettow’s irregular approach. Their 
ability to fight without direct orders from higher headquarters and take the initiative 
whenever an opportunity presented itself made it possible for Von Lettow to be “the only 
German commander to have occupied British soil in the Great War”290 and to have 
remained undefeated.  
D. INTERNAL FACTORS 
The first significant internal factor that needs to be considered is two handicaps 
with which the defense forces of German East Africa started the war. Both of these 
disadvantages originated from the fact that the units were originally designed to fight 
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native warfare. First, most of the Askari units were equipped with an “old 1871 pattern 
rifle, using smoky powder.”291 Though this was not considered a disadvantage in battles 
against native fighters, who used spears, it quickly became an issue against an enemy 
who fought with modern armaments. “The man using smokeless powder remains 
invisible, while the cloud of smoke betrays the enemy with rapidity and certainty.”292 
The second handicap also came from the loose character of war against natives, where 
“careful and thorough musketry training in the modern sense had hitherto been 
unnecessary.”293 The same was true for training with machine guns as well. At the 
beginning of the war, the first problem could not be solved and it stayed a problem 
through the entire conflict, in the absence of resupply from the fatherland. But the second 
one was resolved quickly through vigorous training. The importance of rifle 
marksmanship and the advantages of the machine gun were quickly understood among 
the troops and mastered by capitalizing on the Askaris’ “sharp eyesight, which enabled 
them to observe their fire and correct their aim accordingly.”294 These developments 
proved their importance from the first days of the conflict. 
The next important internal factor in the success of Von Lettow’s forces was the 
tactics used. During the initial phase of the war, German irregular tactics in the 
countryside were based on one unit’s holding action while other nearby companies 
maneuvered around the enemy formation in order to flank them. While Von Lettow’s 
forces fought these battles, they continuously learned from their experiences and tried to 
incorporate their lessons learned into their tactics and to figure out better task 
organization for the fight. The battle at Tanga provides an example of this: the German 
companies were further broken into small combat teams built around individual machine 
gun and sniper nests that fired for a while, then moved to new locations.295 The skillful  
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positioning of these machine-gun crews and fire teams at key points, and their 
maneuvering capabilities, were the foundation of success, not only during the initial 
engagements, but until the end of the war.   
Although these company-level operations were successful, when Von Lettow 
changed his strategy in 1915, it brought significant changes in German tactics as well. 
The introduction of small detachments raiding behind enemy lines led to classic guerrilla 
tactics. These operations initially were very difficult, since the war in Africa was fought 
without reliable maps, but as Von Lettow’s forces became more trained and experienced, 
their operations were more and more successful.296 The German raiders’ main goal was 
to inflict as much damage as they could and to seize the enemy’s supplies.  Von Lettow’s 
units delivered serious blows to the Uganda and Magad railways and engaged in 
lightning attacks against British troop columns, small outposts, supply depots, and 
communication sites. The small detachments “destroyed bridges, surprised guards posted 
on the railways, mined the permanent way and carried out raids of all kinds on the land 
communications between the railways and the enemy’s camps.”297 Von Lettow’s 
irregulars many times conducted ambushes as well, by using classic hit-and-run tactics. 
“From their ambush they opened fire on the enemy at thirty yards’ range, captured 
prisoners and booty, and then disappeared again in the boundless desert.”298 These units 
understood the importance of the ability to withdraw quickly to avoid the enemy’s 
counter-patrols. For the wounded or for those who became ill, this meant that they could 
not be carried with the unit.  
Even the blacks understood that, and cases did occur in which a wounded 
Askari, well knowing that he was lost without hope, and a prey to the  
numerous lions, did not complain when he had to be left in the bush, but 
of his own accord gave his comrades his rifle and ammunition, so that they 
at least might be saved.299  
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To further improve their destructive abilities and intelligence-gathering capabilities, the 
Germans established “a system of fighting patrols.”300 These units usually had twenty to 
thirty Askaris and one or two machine guns and were sent out to look for the enemy and 
provoke an engagement, like a modern “movement to contact mission.” As Von Lettow 
explained concerning the importance of these operations, “the self-reliance and enterprise 
of both Europeans and natives was so great that it would be difficult to find a force 
imbued with a better spirit.”301  
The last key internal factor was the role of intelligence. Since from almost the 
first day of the war, German East Africa’s communications were completely cut off from 
the fatherland, the defense forces did not have any incoming intelligence provided by 
their higher command. Von Lettow barely had any idea what was going on in the 
European theater and he was aware that he could not expect any support from his 
superiors in intelligence gathering. He and his commanders had a hard time conducting 
proper intelligence preparation of the battlefield for their operations, since at the 
beginning they did not have sufficient knowledge of the area and there were no reliable 
maps available.302 The main issues were with some places having multiple names and the 
unreliability of depicted distances, since what was “five miles on a map could mean 
anything from two to twenty-five miles.”303 These created confusion among the German 
officers, but British maps were even less reliable. Based on these facts, both sides could 
use only the information they collected from locals or gathered during their own 
operations.  
The use of natives was sometimes even more confusing than the maps. Many 
times, the supposedly loyal natives provided incorrect directions and led their masters 
into an ambush by the other side.304  Even in those cases when the natives wanted to 
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help, their language differences and the problem with places having alternative names, 
led to great confusion. Von Lettow and his commanders preferred to gather intelligence 
first hand. During the war, the use of scouts and reconnaissance patrols was the primary 
means of information gathering, instead of reliance on the local population. The German 
units’ knowledge of the terrain improved with every mission, and with this, Von Lettow’s 
situational awareness increased as well, which many times allowed him to defeat his 
opponents. 
E. EXTERNAL FACTORS 
German East Africa was “mostly covered by dense bush, with no roads and only 
two railways, and either sweltering under a tropical sun or swept by torrential rain which 
makes the friable soil impassable to wheeled traffic; a country with occasional wide and 
swampy areas intercepted with arid areas where water is often more precious than 
gold.”305 These physical features favored Von Lettow’s irregular strategy over the 
European-style frontal assaults preferred by the British. The German forces used the 
dense bushes and the limited avenues of approach, as natural obstacles restricted and 
channelized the movement of their opponents, which many times drew them directly into 
the deadly fire of the German machine-gun teams and artillery.306 At the same time, Von 
Lettow’s forces used the terrain to hide their own maneuvers and get as close to their 
targets as possible and then melt back to the countryside. “In the thick bush, the  
combatants came upon each other at such close quarters and so unexpectedly, that our 
Askari sometimes literally jumped over their prone adversaries and so got behind them 
again.”307  
Beyond the challenges of the terrain, the weather of the colony also had 
significant effects on the operations of both sides. Malaria, the worst illness in the region, 
caused tens of thousands of deaths among the soldiers and carriers, and the heat, in 
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combination with the limited water resupply, also killed many. As Von Lettow explained, 
“fatigue and thirst in the burning sun were so great that several men died of thirst, and 
even Europeans drank urine.”308 While these harsh conditions affected both sides, they 
were more to the favor of Von Lettow’s irregulars than the Allied conventional units. 
One reason was that the Askaris and the German officers who had already lived in Africa 
before the war began were much more resistant to local illnesses and the effects of the 
climate than the freshly introduced Royal troops who were coming from different parts of 
the British Empire.309 It was also easier for Von Lettow’s units to conduct operations 
under these conditions, since they demanded much less logistical support than the large 
formations of the Allied forces. While the British needed a huge amount of food, water, 
and additional supplies, for the German units “a bit of game or a small quantity of booty 
afforded a considerable reserve of rations.”310 Von Lettow’s units could resupply 
themselves from the field, but the British forces were too large to do so. The overall 
financial cost of waging the war against Von Lettow is estimated around 70 million 
pounds, but some comments count the overall Allied expenses at around 300 million  
pounds.311 Besides the huge investment, by the final days of the conflict Von Lettow 
surrendered to a starving enemy and he was the one who provided food and medicine to 
the victors.312   
Beyond the physical features of the colony and its climate, the population of 
German East Africa had a key role in the conflict as well. As mentioned, the civilian role 
in intelligence gathering was limited; but they still contributed significantly to the success 
of the Germans’ irregular strategy by operating an effective economy in German-held 
areas. With directions from the military leadership, the population established an 
effective support system for the military. “Old books giving information about forgotten 
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techniques of hand spinning and weaving were hunted up. Soon spinning wheels and 
looms were constructed; women at home and in private workshops were spinning by 
hand.”313 Farmers produced motor fuel from coconut, made sausages, and smoked meat, 
and jam and fruit juice were also produced.  “Boots were made from the skins of cattle 
and game.”314 As a medicine, the so-called “Lettow schnapps” was made from wood 
bark and “those who were dosed with this draft swore its effects were worse than malaria 
itself.”315 Civilians with special skills were engaged in special projects. “Skilled artificers 
and armourers were constantly engaged with the factory engineers in the manufacture of 
suitable apparatus for blowing up the railways.”316 These engineers also managed to 
recover the SMS Königsberg’s317 main guns after she was scuttled and turned them into 
effective field-artillery pieces. These contributions were vital, since Von Lettow’s forces 
were cut off from outside resupply from the beginning of the war. Sometimes a single 
ship, like one that reached the colony’s shore in April 1915 and was run aground to avoid 
capture,318 broke through the British blockade, but these rare cases did not have real 
effects on the final outcome of the conflict. Von Lettow and his forces fought their war in 
German East Africa over four years with little outside support and even mostly without 
any communication with the outside world against an enemy with inexhaustible 
resupplies. 
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The initial hope that the war was not going to be taken to Africa quickly 
disappeared, since the strategic interest of the European countries called for action in 
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their colonies as well. German East Africa started the First World War as a colony of 
Germany. Its communication and supply lines were quickly cut off from the fatherland 
and the colony was forced to fight independently as a small state against an inexhaustible 
enemy. At the beginning of the conflict, German East Africa had its own defense forces 
in place, consisting of conventionally organized and trained units. However the colony’s 
size and location made it impossible to defend by conventional defensive strategy.  
Knowing this, the British expected a short campaign and a quick victory against the 
German colony, but they underestimated several key factors that made it possible for the 
war in German East Africa to last four years and cost the British Empire “more money 
and three times as many lives, if deaths from disease involving porters as well as 
combatants are included, than did the whole South African War [The Boer War].”319 
From the outset, the commander of the German forces, Paul Emil Von Lettow-
Vorbeck, did not even try to wage a conventional war. Instead he quickly introduced an 
irregular approach with which the British could not deal for a long time. It seemed a risky 
step, but since he built his irregular force around an already existing, professional 
military organization, it provided much more advantage than disadvantage. Von Lettow 
could fight an irregular war because he had been exposed to such an operational 
environment and this knowledge proved vital to his success. His company-level 
swarming strategy not only prevented the naval and land invasion of German East Africa, 
but allowed him to take the initiative. The switch to small-unit offensive operations 
achieved a remarkable result, since it forced the British to turn to a defensive strategy and 
to hold on to their own territory. This approach also forced the British to introduce and 
sustain a large force in Africa, which was one of Von Lettow’s major strategic goals. His 
irregular approach provided a framework for the German defenders in which they could 
switch between strategic defense and offense as needed, frustrating the enemy. Many 
times, when the British believed that their victory was imminent, the war took a new and 
troubling turn. 
                                                 
319 Gardner, German East, 194. 
 90 
Second, irregular tactics were better suited to the physical environment of German 
East Africa than the European style of warfare. The rough terrain and weather provided 
operational advantages for the small, swift-moving German units, while it caused serious 
difficulties for the Allied troops, who maneuvered in large masses. The thick bushes, the 
dry and hot desert, and the swamps were force multipliers for Von Lettow’s forces, used 
as natural obstacles to block the enemy’s movement and as cover and concealment to 
hide the irregulars’ maneuvers. Climate and disease also favored the local irregulars and 
had a serious negative effect on the combat readiness of the arriving British troops, 
killing tens of thousands of them. 
The third critical factor in the success of the irregulars was their ability to switch 
among unit organizations and tactics, based on the requirements of the strategic 
environment. The German forces deployed company-size elements in positional defense 
with the objective to hold, while other swarming elements were ready to outflank the 
enemy. When the situation changed, these same units were broken down into eight-to-
ten-man elements and delivered striking blows against the enemy, gaining intelligence 
and resupplies. After the introduction of fresh British imperial troops, the German 
military units were once again reorganized and went back to company-size operations. 
While Von Lettow’s forces went through this process, they continuously learned from 
their previous operations and adopted these lessons into their next moves. This process 
and the transformation of the German units were made possible by decentralized 
leadership and exceptional small-unit leaders who could fight based on simple 
understanding of Von Lettow’s strategic intent, but without direct orders.      
Last but not least, the Germans’ ability to resupply themselves without relying on 
outside support was a key factor in the success of the irregular approach. The British 
enjoyed open resupply lines through the sea, but they had to feed and dress a large army. 
The Germans had the advantage of needing to resupply only a small force. “The total 
numbers enrolled in the Force during the war were about 3,000 Europeans and 11,000 
Askaris. These figures include all non-combatants, such as those employed on police 
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duty, medical personnel, supply and maintenance services, etc.”320 Von Lettow’s forces 
could sustain themselves from the field, captured booty, and effective management of the 
economy in German-held areas. An indicator of the efficiency of the German resupply 
system was that, when Von Lettow’s forces reentered German East Africa in the fall of 
1918 from Mozambique, they were almost “returning to near complete fitness”;321 and 
when they later surrendered, they shared their rations with the starving Allied units that 
pursued them. After seeing this, Von Lettow was curious “how many milliards it cost to 
try and crush our diminutive force the English themselves will presumably someday tell 
us. We, on the other hand, could probably have continued the war for years to come.”322 
The war in German East Africa provides some valuable insights for the theory 
advanced in this thesis. The German defense forces were originally organized and trained 
to fight traditional war, but it was clear from the start that no conventional defensive 
strategy could have succeeded. In other words, if they had chosen to fight a conventional 
war, the chances of success would have been close to zero. Second, this case highlights 
the importance of prior knowledge and experience in irregular warfare if one choses to 
fight such a war. Based on his previous exposure to irregular operational environments, 
Von Lettow designed a strategy that not only offered a higher chance of success, but, in 
fact, left the German forces undefeated. Third, the organizational framework for the 
irregular strategy was the preexisting defense forces, which enabled the colonial forces to 
skip the painful phase of force buildup. Von Lettow simply made his units abandon 
conventional tactics and start engaging in irregular war. The existing structure made it 
possible to switch swiftly among task organizations. The cohesive units, existing small-
unit procedures, and depth of military skills in general made his forces much more 
effective than an ad hoc, population-based insurgency would have been. Although the 
German units did recruit new members during the war, their integration was much easier 
because of the existing system. Though Von Lettow and his political counterpart, 
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Governor Schnee, had serious differences about the way the war should proceed, the 
German commander managed to keep the overall strategy in his own hands and integrate  
every effort of the colony in support of his irregular approach. Although Germany lost 
World War I, it is safe to conclude that this far-off struggle between the “direct” and the 
“indirect” strategies in German East Africa could well have ended with the victory of the 















VI. THE YUGOSLAV PARTISANS  
A. BACKGROUND 
On 1 September 1939, Nazi Germany invaded Poland and the Second World War 
began. Following a quick victory over its eastern neighbor, Germany started to look at its 
western borders. On 10 May 1940, German forces attacked Belgium, the Netherlands, 
Luxemburg, and France. The first three small states were overrun within a few days, 
while France held out a little more than a month. The unstoppable advance of German 
armored units, the evacuation of the British expeditionary forces at Dunkirk, and an 
Italian invasion on 10 June 1940 forced France to surrender on 22 June 1940. The victory 
over France and the British inability to counter the Germans on the Continent allowed the 
Nazis to conquer much of Europe during the following year.323  
On 6 April 1941, as a “response” to a coup in Belgrade earlier that year, German 
forces, supported by some Italian, Bulgarian, and Hungarian units, invaded Yugoslavia. 
The country held strategic importance for Nazi Germany since it provided the 
“geographical link with Greece and Bulgaria, ultimately with the resources of the Middle 
East and North Africa.”324 The Axis powers defeated the Royal Yugoslav Army in 
eleven days and received its unconditional surrender on 17 April 1941. The country was 
quickly partitioned among its occupiers and puppet governments were introduced in 
many former Yugoslav areas. The quick defeat of their defense forces, the loss of 
national pride, and atrocities against civilians by the foreign invaders “stunned many 
Yugoslavians.”325 Resistance movements started to organize all over the country, but  
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most actively “in Bosnia, Montenegro, and parts of Serbia.”326 Unfortunately, these 
movements initially were not only fighting against the occupiers, but against each other 
as well.  
One of the resistance forces was “the Pan-Serb, monarchical group of a former 
Colonel, called Draja Mihailovitch.”327 He and his followers, who were mainly officers 
of the defeated Yugoslav army, were called “Chetniks” based on a former Serb 
nationalist movement, which fought against the Turks during previous wars. This group, 
backed by the Royal Yugoslav government in exile with the initial support of Churchill’s 
cabinet, “gained momentum during the early summer of 1941,”328 but showed no real 
willingness to decisively engage the occupying forces. “Cut off from help, and sometimes 
even from contact with the outside world, aware that the war would be long, and 
convinced that the Germans would lose, Mihailovich sought to conserve his forces and 
the lives of his countrymen for a better day.”329 According to the Chetnik point of view, 
it was better “to wait for the Germans to be weakened and to save one’s forces until that 
moment arrived and a fatal stroke could be delivered.”330 Mihailovich also thought that 
after the end of the war, the other resistance group, the communist “partisans,” would try 
to take power by force. To prevent this from happening became his and his organization’s 
primary goal.331 
The communist partisans led by Josip Broz, commonly known as Tito, also 
wanted to “isolate and destroy their rivals.”332 But their main goal was to liberate 
Yugoslavia from the invading forces. Although during a short period after the surrender 
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of the country, the Yugoslav communists did not conduct any attacks on the occupying 
forces, their strategy dramatically changed with Operation Barbarossa, the German 
offensive against Soviet Union on 22 June 1941. Following the news of the invasion of 
the Soviet Union, the politburo of the Yugoslav Central Committee met and made the 
decision that “the time for the uprising had come.”333 Tito himself wrote a “proclamation 
to the peoples of Yugoslavia to rise in revolt against the German, Italian, Hungarian, and 
Bulgarian invaders.” During the same night, the secretly printed proclamation was 
distributed through couriers to all parts of the country and the Yugoslav partisan war 
began. 
The initial revolt, which was mainly characterized by low-level sabotage actions 
and burning propaganda newspapers,334 was easily suppressed by German forces and 
their Yugoslav collaborators, but the setback was not serious enough to constitute a lethal 
blow against the partisans. On 16 September 1941, Tito left Belgrade and “went to the 
mountains to assume leadership of a more intensive struggle.”335  Tito’s roughly fifteen 
thousand fighters conducted so many harassing operations against the occupying forces, 
including attacks on railways, logistics convoys, isolated garrisons, etc., that the Germans 
finally found them serious enough to launch a major offensive against the partisans. In 
November 1941, three German divisions were deployed to clear Serbia. As a result of 
these counterinsurgent operations, the partisans were forced to withdraw to Bosnia-
Herzegovina.336 Though they escaped, they could not rest for long, because another 
offensive, launched by Italians and their Croatian collaborators, drove them further south 
to Montenegro.337 In this seemingly hopeless situation, Tito introduced a new idea to turn 
the war around. He ordered the majority of his forces to move north and “mounted a 
wide-ranging offensive with small combat formations.”338 Since the northward 
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maneuvering units were also recruiting, the occupiers soon faced an even more 
distributed and more effective insurgency then before.  
The Germans reacted by increasing their forces in Yugoslavia to over one 
hundred thousand339 and launched numerous “encirclement operations and annihilation 
campaigns”340 against Tito’s forces. During these operations, thousands of partisans died 
and even Tito suffered injuries. But the Germans “could only deal with parts of the 
insurgency at any one time.”341 When they left an area, the resistance grew back 
immediately, sometimes stronger than before. This situation further worsened for the 
Germans with the surrender of the Italian forces in 1943, from whom the partisans 
acquired a large amount of weapons and supplies. At the end of 1943, the German High 
Command started to take the Yugoslav case even more seriously, because they evaluated 
the presence of Tito’s forces’ as creating a possible gateway for an Allied landing in the 
Balkans.342 As a result of this threat, two additional operations were launched against the 
partisans, but they once again managed to escape destruction. In May 1944, the Germans, 
using only battalion-size elite units, conducted their last offensive against the insurgents. 
“Operation Rösselsprung” (Knight’s Move) was a serious blow and almost ended with 
the capture of Tito. About six-thousand partisans were killed in this operation, but it did 
not achieve its goals, since “by that time the Allies were in a position to provide more 
effective air support”343 to Tito’s forces and the Germans were forced to withdraw.   
After the failure of the last German offensive, the partisans, through the support 
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intelligence efforts”344 to Tito, started to push Germans to the North. In October 1944, 
the partisans and some Russian armored units liberated Belgrade and in April 1945, the 
last German soldier left Yugoslavia.345  
B. IRREGULAR STRATEGY 
With the quick defeat of their conventional defense forces, without possible help 
from the Allied powers, and with the limited actions of the impotent and self-seeking 
Chetniks, the only hope for the Yugoslavs against the Axis occupiers were Tito and his 
partisans. As Walter Laqueur explains in his book, Guerrilla Warfare: A Historical and 
Critical Study, “to the Russians, the creation of partisan units was an auxiliary weapon of 
the regular army to carry out certain tasks behind enemy lines; to the Yugoslavs the 
partisans were the army.”346 Since this communist-based resistance movement initially 
lacked proper organization, training, armored vehicles, and sufficient weapons systems to 
wage a conventional war, the only strategy that seemed feasible for them was to conduct 
irregular war against the invaders.  
At the beginning of the partisan struggle, the Axis forces were successful, forcing 
the partisans to withdraw to the south as far as Montenegro’s impassable mountains 
where “the rough terrain made it hard for the enemy forces to get at them, but it was even 
harder for the insurgents to strike back from the remote mountain fastnesses.”347 
Although before this event the partisans conducted numerous guerrilla-type, low-level 
operations, this crisis was the point when Tito formed the partisans’ irregular strategy. 
“Tito had realized that the strength of the partisan movement lay in its dispersal, that the 
establishment of one compact front would be more than dangerous.”348 His new approach 
combined numerous already deployed tactics and procedures, including guerrilla tactics, 
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unit reorganization, high levels of mobility, and dispersion, with the concept of, as John 
Arquilla names it in his book, Insurgents, Raiders and Bandits: How Masters of Irregular 
Warfare Have Shaped Our World, “the strategic swarm.” 
As the foundation of this new approach, Tito directed his commanders to divide 
and disperse their forces and attack to the north. Tito’s companion Vladimir Dedijer 
explains the brilliance in this move when he notes:  
The enemy did not expect our offensive. Tito selected his line of advance 
in a masterful fashion, the demarcation line of the occupation zone of the 
Italian and German army. While the enemy generals were making up their 
minds who should attack and where, and who would stop the advance of 
the brigades, town after town fell, garrisons surrendered, and hundreds of 
new fighting men joined the proletarian brigades.349 
During their maneuvers, the partisan units conducted effective recruitment among 
the population, which dramatically increased the number of insurgents. Although there 
were plenty of people who wanted to fight the invaders, the partisans sometimes 
“deliberately drew down German punishments on the populace in order to obtain more 
recruits.”350 When the swarming units appeared all over Yugoslavia, the Axis forces 
faced the fact that instead of successfully cleaning out the partisans, the insurgency was 
erupting in numerous places at the same time. The wide dispersion of partisan forces and 
their continuously increasing number made it impossible for the occupiers to deal with 
them decisively. “When counterinsurgent forces moved to deal with a threat emanating 
from another area, the seemingly hacked-off limb of the resistance in the province they 
had just come from grew back, often stronger than before.”351 As a support of this 
strategy to maintain their local advantages and to weaken the Axis ability to counter 
them, the partisans systematically hunted down and killed Yugoslav collaborators, 
especially police officers.352 With these actions, they not only sent a strong message to 
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the general public and possible future collaborators, but also took away the Axis powers’ 
“insider” support. This was significant, since the Axis forces tried numerous things to 
counter Tito’s brilliant approach. They conducted not only conventional offensive 
operations against the partisans, but introduced numerous tested methods, including 
General Kitchener’s idea of combining blockhouses and sweeping units from the Boer 
War and the use of “pseudo-gangs.”353 “The overall effectiveness of these units was 
enhanced by their employment of local collaborators who could speak correct dialect and 
help carry off the deception that these hunter–killers were just fellow fighters from 
another nearby units.”354 Although these methods showed some success, there was one 
more part of Tito’s strategy that effectively countered them: the partisans’ ability to share 
their information and increasing knowledge of “how to outfox the hunters.”355 Tito’s 
irregular approach was the main reason that “Yugoslavia is one of the few cases in 
history in which a partisan movement liberated a country and seized power largely 
without outside help.”356 
C. ORGANIZATION AND LEADERSHIP 
The Yugoslav Communist Party, as an illegal organization before the war, had 
extensive knowledge in organizing and operating underground. Tito himself built and led 
a network of secret cells before the war, which “would prove highly useful during the 
years of resistance to the Nazis.”357 In addition to this, many of these cell members had 
operational experience, since several hundred of them fought in the Spanish Civil War.358 
Initially these cells and the communist party members formed the core of the resistance 
and the partisan movement was built around them. On 27 June 1941, in order to form the 
strategy for the armed struggle and to direct the partisan forces, the politburo of the 
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Yugoslav Central Committee established the general headquarters of the National 
Liberation Partisan Detachments, or G.H.Q. This organization “included all the members 
of the Politburo of the Central Committee and was subsequently expanded to include 
certain military leaders.”359 In September 1941, partisan commanders from all territories 
of Yugoslavia met in a small village called Stolica and decided to establish a G.H.Q. in 
every province of Yugoslavia to facilitate effective coordination among different partisan 
units. 360 The already existing G.H.Q. became the supreme headquarters, led by Tito. 
This organization provided the essential unity of leadership for the partisan movement to 
be successful. In November 1942, the supreme headquarters was also replaced by an even 
more integrated command and control element when the Anti-Fascist Council of 
Yugoslavia was established. 
When Tito took operational command, the partisan movement numbered about 
fifteen-thousand fighters.361 The partisan units “were organized on a regional basis, 
taking as a unit designation the name of their leader or of the area, or of such 
geographical features as forests or mountains.”362 Initially the basic units were the so-
called “odreds” or groups, which later became partisan brigades. Some of these units 
stayed locally deployed throughout the entire war, but some brigades were also organized 
as mobile units, deployed wherever they were needed to reinforce local groups. As the 
war continued and the partisans become stronger and their numbers increased, more 
conventional military designations, including division and corps, appeared as well. 
However these designations most of the time were not real indications of the strength of 
these units. They were frequently used to deceive the Axis forces about the actual size of 
the partisan units they were facing. Many times the organization of the insurgent units 
greatly differed, based on their casualties or the effectiveness of their recruitment. In 
general, the number of partisan fighters in a brigade seldom exceeded a few hundred.363 
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By the fall of 1942, the number of partisan fighters “increased to over 150,000 fighting 
men, divided into two corps with nine divisions, 36 brigades, and 70 separate battalions 
in 70 detachments.”364  
Although the establishment of high-level headquarters and conventional unit 
designations suggest centralized command and control, the opposite was true for the 
partisan movement. To be able to effectively control this irregular force and achieve 
success, the partisan movement needed exceptional leaders with the ability to act on their 
own initiative based on broad strategic frameworks. As was mentioned earlier, the main 
figure behind the partisan strategy was Tito: a man who was, as Walter Laqueur explains, 
“a great political and military leader, imperturbable, a man of iron will, a true believer yet 
not a fanatic.” Tito also had significant conventional military experience from serving in 
the Austro–Hungarian Army during the First World War. “He distinguished himself in 
battle and was soon promoted to sergeant major, the youngest in the Austro–Hungarian 
Army.”365 In 1915, Tito was wounded and became a prisoner of war in Russia. He gained 
more operational experience following his release; during the Bolshevik revolution, he 
fought in the Russian Civil War on the Red side. Tito returned to Yugoslavia in 1920 and 
started to build an underground network of communist cells all over the country.366 
Before the Second World War, Tito proved that as a political leader, he was a great 
organizer and had the ability to influence people. He continued to act along this line 
during the war, since he effectively suppressed the Chetniks while further expanding the 
communist party’s influence. His biggest political achievement was to unify the various 
Yugoslav minorities to fight against a common enemy. As a military leader, he also 
possessed some crucial abilities. He was not caught in a “cognition trap” formed by his 
previous experiences in fighting a conventional war. Tito could also learn from the 
serious reverses he had many times suffered. He was able to form a “new concept of 
operations that would ultimately defeat smart, tough, and more numerous foes.”367 His 
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achievements were even admired by his enemies. Heinrich Himmler said about him in 
1944, when Tito was appointed marshal of Yugoslavia, that “I wish we had in Germany a 
few dozen Titos, a man with such a strong heart and such good nerves; he has really 
earned the title of marshal.”368  
Whatever Tito’s role in the successful struggle of the partisans, he could not have 
achieved all this success without the support of his subordinate leaders. Initially, as a 
rule, local party officials assumed the leadership of the partisan detachments. These 
leaders had a wide variety of military skills, but some were very agile and able to 
significantly contribute to the success of the irregular strategy. Tito’s best commanders 
included “a Kardelj, and a Djilas, a Ribar and a Popovic, willing to accept his authority, 
yet able to act independently.”369 They were so capable of independent action serving the 
overall strategic goals that all Tito had to do during a major strategic briefing was point to 
one of his subordinates then point to the map, and they knew what to do.370  
D. INTERNAL FACTORS 
The Yugoslav partisans used a wide range of irregular tactics during their struggle 
against the Nazi occupiers. Their operational methods varied from individual action to 
division-level maneuvers, depending on the period of the war and the resources available. 
At the beginning of the resistance, the small, two-to-three member, partisan detachments 
conducted newspaper burnings to counter German propaganda and attacked single Axis 
soldiers and vehicles and Yugoslav police stations, with the aim of seizing weapons and 
harassing the invaders. Since during the initial period of the war the biggest issue for the 
partisans was a weapons shortage, they conducted these operations with axes, homemade 
weapons, or sometimes unloaded sport rifles. For example, in Kragujevac, a partisan 
detachment including 600 fighters “obtained its first six army rifles by disarming a police 
                                                 
368 Bradley F. Smith and Agnes Peterson, Heinrich Himmler Geheimreden 1933 bis 1945 (Propyläen 
Verlag, 1974), 242. 
369 Laqueur, Guerrilla Warfare, 216. 
370 Arquilla, Insurgents, Raiders and Bandits, 204. 
 103 
post.”371  The Kraljevo detachment got its first submachine gun when a local peasant 
struck a German motorcyclist soldier with an ax while he was riding through town.372 
Throughout the entire war, the enemy was the primary source for partisan resupply. They 
obtained weapons from individual soldiers or from entire enemy units, such as the ten 
Italian divisions that left the war in 1943.373  
The issue of weapons was very significant, since the “training of the guerrillas 
centered about the use of rifles and light automatic weapons, the laying of mines, and the 
preparation of demolitions.”374 Those partisans who previously served in the military 
received two-week training, while those who had no previous military experience 
received a four-to-six-week basic training. “The intensity of training depended to a large 
extent on the ability of the local commander and the need for the troops in operations.”375 
The partisans’ training also emphasized the importance of stealth, long night marches, 
and the paramount role of dispersion, security, and the avoidance of battle in open areas. 
The insurgents built their tactics around these principles. The most frequently used 
irregular tactics were sabotage, raid, and ambush, but when there was an opportunity, the 
partisans were also capable of massing large formations, for example during operations 
aimed at liberating towns. Most of the time, the irregular actions were deployed in 
combination with propaganda activities as well.  
The sabotage operations “were seldom executed on the spur of the moment, or 
because of a chance opportunity. As a rule they were carried out according to a plan 
based upon long observation. The guerrillas were intent always on making sure that the 
risk involved was not disproportionate to the chances of success.”376 The main targets of 
the sabotage operations were “airfields, railway stations, public-utility installations, 
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ammunition and fuel depots, and motor pools.”377 The goals behind these attacks were 
not only to cause casualties, but to create effective distractions among the Axis forces. 
“Roads were mined and blocked, particularly at bends or winding curves. The mines and 
obstacles were placed at points which could not be bypassed.”378 The sabotage actions 
were “designed to cripple transportation and communications and cause casualties, these 
tactics also tied down engineer personnel who might have been put to other tasks or made 
available for assignment to active fronts.”379 These operations were often conducted in 
conjunction with raids.  
The raids were aimed at destroying enemy units while seizing their supplies. 
Raids were conducted only after a long observation of the surroundings of the target  
and gaining detailed knowledge of its defense, avenues of approach, and escape routes. 
As a rule partisans attacked at night; in the morning after roads and 
railways had been searched for mines; or during the last hours of the day, 
so that in case of failure darkness would make pursuit impossible and 
there would be no way for systematic countermeasures to be taken the 
same day.380  
These operations were well planned and so “timed that the attackers would be well away 
before the arrival of any relief: mobile units would retire to prearranged hiding places, 
and the militiamen would return to their homes and regular occupations.”381 If the 
partisans’ location was discovered, they tried to avoid battle. They hid their weapons and 
any insignia demonstrating their involvement in insurgent activity and tried to escape by 
pretending to be refugees, only to regroup somewhere else to resume fighting later.382 As 
in raiding, the partisans frequently used ambushes. 
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The targets of the ambushes mainly consisted of small enemy detachments, 
enemy supply convoys, and trains, including hospital and ambulance convoys as well.383 
“Ambushes, for the most part, were laid at defiles, road bends, valleys, dense forests, 
places where the nature of the terrain subdued the noise of battle, and places where it 
would be difficult for the attacked troops to deploy for action, or escape.”384 The 
partisans used ambushes not only for offensive purposes; many times the German 
reconnaissance patrols looking for partisan hideouts were drawn into a “protective” 
ambush designed to trap the approaching enemy. 
While the tactics of the partisan detachments in themselves were very effective, it 
was Tito’s strategic-swarm concept that integrated them into a war-winning strategy. As 
Vladimir Dedijer explains: 
Such detachments could, when need arose, be welded into powerful shock 
units for the purpose of waging a battle that they had been compelled to 
accept, or could disperse and strike suddenly at the enemy and at definite 
objectives, only to disappear again from the area of the attack. The 
essential point was to keep the manpower as intact as possible while 
dealing the greatest possible blows to the enemy. The enemy should be 
compelled to strike into a vacuum.385 
All the above-described tactics were effectively combined with propaganda 
operations, which had three main goals: undermining the invaders’ morale, informing the 
population about the existence of the resistance, and increasing the self-confidence and 
morale of the partisans. These operations included the burning of German newspapers, 
distribution of leaflets, placement of anti-German posters, etc.  As an example of these 
efforts, only two weeks after the beginning of the occupation, the Axis forces found 
posters in Belgrade saying, “Germans! We give you solemn warning. Leave Yugoslavia. 
Death to all Fascists! Liberty to the People!”386 This type of propaganda had a serious 
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effect on the morale of the Yugoslavs. “They whispered the slogan to one another in the 
streets, in the stores, in the shops, in the factories. They shouted it in their homes. It gave 
them courage just to hear it, just to repeat it.”387  
The high morale of the partisans increased their fighting spirit. “With rare 
exceptions, the partisans proved to be exceedingly tenacious, completely fearless, 
uncomplaining fighters.”388 But it was not only high morale that increased their 
effectiveness. Discipline was also strictly enforced within the insurgent detachments. The 
partisans were “with lesser crimes punished by public admonition, loss of rank, relief 
from command, or prohibition from bearing arms for a specified period of time. Serious 
offenses, such as treason and cowardice, were punished by death, the execution being 
carried out by the offender’s immediate superior.”389 Beyond the irregular tactics, 
guerrilla training, high morale, and strict discipline, there was one more important 
internal factor to consider.  
As in every irregular struggle throughout history, intelligence served as a 
backbone for the partisans’ operations. As was mentioned earlier, the partisans seldom 
conducted operations without sufficient information gathering.  “A well-organized 
observation and spying system, based on through knowledge of the locality and the 
people, reached throughout the country. Its contacts extended even to the staff of the 
occupation forces and the offices of the police and administrative agencies. There were 
partisan agents among all classes of the population”390 Throughout the war, the invaders, 
too, had significant numbers of collaborators with knowledge of the local terrain and 
language. But the partisans’ effective hunting–killing operations and the population’s 
attitude towards the collaborators allowed the Nazis only temporary advantages, such as 
from their pseudo-gangs, which were quickly countered. Because “women or persons 
who were employed by the occupation forces as drivers, interpreters, office workers, and 
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cleaning personnel” were collecting and reporting information for the partisans, the 
irregulars had a significant information advantage over their Nazi adversaries. 
E. EXTERNAL FACTORS 
Anthony James Joes, in his book Guerrilla Warfare: A Historical, Biographical, 
and Bibliographical Sourcebook, captures the significance of these factors in one single 
sentence. “Yugoslavia was a close-to-ideal setting for guerrilla war, with a population 
inured to hardship and combat, having a tradition of resistance to invaders, living in a 
land of rugged mountains, wild ravines, and thick forests, and with few rail lines or good 
roads.”391 For effective irregular warfare, the most significant physical feature of 
Yugoslavia was its wild terrain, which mostly favored the partisans and their strategy 
over the mechanized, conventional Axis forces. “The brushy mountain country, craggy 
peaks, and roadless forest areas offer irregular troops numerous places to hide, 
opportunity to shift forces unseen even from the air, and locations for ambush.”392 The 
partisans could exploit the terrain during their maneuvers in both their defensive and 
offensive operations. “Forests, ravines, and caves protected them against attack from the 
air and made it easy for them to assemble and shift their forces without being observed. It 
was easy for them to block passes and forest paths.”393 At the same time the terrain 
features offered the insurgents “opportunities for enfilading attacks, ambush, raids and 
quick disappearance.”394 
Besides knowledge and effective military exploitation of the physical terrain, 
another significant external factor was the social terrain surrounding the resistance 
movement. The partisans, and especially Tito, managed to unify the wide variety of 
Yugoslav minorities against a common enemy. As with their colleagues throughout the 
entire history of irregular struggles, the Yugoslav partisans depended on the population as 
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well. The effects of the Yugoslav civilians’ attitudes towards the occupying forces and 
the countrywide intelligence service enabled the insurgents to conduct their operations 
based on nearly real-time, reliable information coming from all classes of the population. 
But the civilians not only provided information, they also supported the resistance with 
food and shelter. Hardly accessible mountain villages often served as hideouts for 
partisans during severe winter weather conditions. During these periods, the villagers 
provided food for the fighters as well. However, villages were seldom used as safe 
havens, since the partisans preferred distant mountain areas, isolated valleys, and swampy 
areas to establish their camps, to avoid exposing their location to possible collaborators in 
the villages.395 Sometimes, they had no other choice, to avoid total destruction, other than 
to withdraw to these near-impassable mountains. An example of this was the Axis 
offensive against the partisans in the fall of 1941, when they were pushed back as far as 
the mountains of Montenegro. Even though remote areas served the irregular strategy 
best, the partisans also used liberated towns as temporary strongholds, including Livno, 
Imotski, and Uzice, which was a location for the supreme headquarters for two months in 
1941.396 There was one more location worth mentioning in this case: the island of Bari, 
where Tito briefly escaped after an almost-successful German airborne raid on his camp 
in May 1944.397 
As a final external factor, one must also take a look at the role of outside support 
in this irregular struggle. Generally speaking, one of the most remarkable things about the 
achievements of the Yugoslav partisans was that they succeeded with very limited 
outside support against a superior enemy. Their supposedly most important supporters, 
namely, their Russian communist comrades, initially were not able and later were not 
interested in helping the insurgents. The Russians “provided advice of doubtful value, but 
nothing else.”398  When Tito asked his comrades whether he could expect any 
ammunition in the near future, they replied: “You unfortunately cannot expect to get 
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either ammunition or automatic weapons from here at an early date. The principal reason 
is the impossibility of getting them to you.”399 Even the redirection of Russian forces 
toward the end of the war was not really aimed to support Tito, but, as in other Eastern-
European countries, to set the conditions for Stalin’s future plans. On the other hand, the 
British and other Western allies initially supported the Chetniks and only switched their 
support to the partisans when they emerged as the primary resistance force in Yugoslavia. 
The British only established their permanent emissaries in 1943, to coordinate the 
necessary support activities. The Allied forces’ material supply and their operational 
support, especially that provided by the Allied air force, eased the job of the Yugoslav 
forces. But outside help did not have decisive effects.  
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
At the beginning of the Second World War, Yugoslavia had a conventionally 
organized, trained, and equipped military force. It never stood a chance of defending the 
country against a numerically and technologically superior enemy. The Nazi forces 
needed only eleven days to crush the entire Yugoslav Royal Army and force its 
unconditional surrender. Although these occupying forces easily and quickly dealt with 
the conventional forces of Yugoslavia, they failed to find an effective solution against 
Tito’s irregular forces over more than three years of sustained efforts. 
One could argue that after the surrender of the Royal Army, the best Axis forces 
were pulled out from Yugoslavia and were sent to other fronts. But those that remained 
were often still victorious veterans of several campaigns. It is also questionable what 
would have happened if Yugoslavia had been the only adversary for the Nazi war 
machine. Even if these statements are valid, there are still numerous facts supporting the 
future strategic value of the partisans’ achievements and the clear success of Tito’s 
irregular strategy. Without providing a full list, on the Nazis’ side, these facts included 
their initial numerical, technological, and air superiority. On the partisans’ side there was 
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a lack of outside support, arms, and unified efforts. The odds were clearly against the 
partisans; they succeeded because of several key conditions. 
First, as in the previous cases, the Yugoslav resistance movement also had a 
preexisting organizational framework. In this case, it was not based on a militia system or 
the former conventional military, but on a previously banned, underground political party 
with countrywide reach and significant membership. It already had an established 
leadership and organizational structure. Besides those who fought in the Spanish Civil 
War, the majority did not have military experience, but had high levels of experience in 
organizing and working in complete secrecy.    
Another key condition was that, besides some collaborators, who occur in any 
occupied country, Tito and the communist party succeeded in unifying a country with 
many ethnic groups against a common enemy. This unity provided an enormous 
advantage over the occupying forces. If one agrees that the population is the backbone of 
an insurgency’s success, it is especially true in the case of the Yugoslav resistance. The 
population played numerous key roles in this struggle. The intelligence system, which 
contained supporters from every class of Yugoslavia’s population, enabled the partisans 
to base their operations on reliable, real-time information and evade pursuing forces. The 
food and shelter provided by the civilians were many times key to the survival of entire 
partisan units. The resistance not only received food, shelter, and recruits from the 
population, but, with its high morale and resistance to the continuous Nazi brutality, it 
motivated the partisans to keep fighting. 
Next, Tito’s irregular strategy and his strategic swarm masterfully exploited the 
physical features of Yugoslavia. The partisans, based on their foot- and horse-mobility, 
were capable of using the terrain as a force multiplier while the same terrain seriously 
decreased the effectiveness of the motorized and mechanized Axis units. In many cases, 
because of the effective use of the terrain by the insurgents, the equipment and tactics the 
Nazis used so successfully during the fight against the conventional Yugoslav army 
became serious impediments to fighting the irregulars. 
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It was also a key to the success of the irregular strategy that the partisan leaders, 
especially Tito, possessed some key capabilities. Although Tito held numerous briefings 
and determined strategic level goals, he delegated authority to his subordinates to make 
decisions about how to operate. The partisan commanders were capable of taking the 
initiative whenever it was necessary to support the overall irregular strategy. The other 
key capability was their open-mindedness and ability to adapt. They learned both from 
their successes and failures, and when the Nazis introduced new tactics, including a Boer 
War-type network of strong points paired with ranger-type sweeping units, or the 
employment of pseudo-gangs, partisan leaders were always able to adjust and counter 
them effectively.400 
Last but not least, the partisans’ tactics had a huge impact on their success. 
Thorough planning and selective targeting avoided unnecessary loss of fighters while 
inflicting maximum damage on the enemy. Though the partisans intended to inflict as 
many casualties as possible on the Nazis, they also realized the high importance of sheer 
disruption. Their targets were specifically chosen to create as much chaos as possible. 
Attacks on railway stations, public-utility installations, and fuel depots created conditions 
for the occupiers that required them to commit more resources to protecting these 
installations than has been supposed necessary. This became more and more challenging 
toward the end of the war, when every piece of equipment and every single German 
soldier were needed on many fronts. 
The Yugoslav partisans’ struggle highlights some additional factors with regard to 
the topic of this research. In this case, a country began a war with an already existing, 
conventionally organized, trained, and equipped army, which surrendered after eleven 
days. After the country’s complete defeat and occupation, a previously existing (but not 
military) organization, already operating underground, took over the mission to fight 
against the invaders. This organization, without any significant outside support, in the 
shadow of the enemy forces’ numerical and technological superiority—and based only on 
its existing organizational framework and leadership—managed to build up substantial 
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irregular forces. These forces, by capitalizing on a brilliant irregular strategy, effectively 
resisted the war machine that had conquered so much of Europe, North Africa, and, 
temporarily, a huge part of the Soviet Union. The war between the direct and indirect 














VII. THE FIRST RUSSO–CHECHEN WAR 
A. BACKGROUND 
Russia has been trying to extend and maintain its control over Chechnya, a small, 
landlocked country in the Caucasus, for a couple of centuries. As a result of aggressive 
Russian policy, the Chechens have been struggling to keep their independence since the 
early 19th century. Because of the enormous differences between large and powerful 
Russia, and small and weak Chechnya, the conflict has been characterized as an irregular 
struggle from the beginning.  
The first significant clash occurred in 1816, when General Alexei Ermolov’s 
imperial forces entered the region with the objective of subduing the Chechens and 
establishing a permanent Russian presence in the area. However, the initial imperial 
operations failed, due to fierce Chechen resistance. The peace did not last long, and war 
resumed in 1829. This time, the conflict lasted about 30 years and ended with the defeat 
of the Chechen forces, led by Imam Shamil.401 Though the eventual Russian victory was 
complete, the Chechens’ desire for independence never waned. A “significant portion of 
the [Chechen] population rallied to rebel leadership as each generation brought a new 
burst of resistance to Russian domination.”402 Because of this mindset, the Russians had 
to face an almost continuous uprising against their rule and they “never felt secure about 
their control of the Caucasus.”403  
The next major Chechen uprising, led by Sheikh Najmuddin, took place in 1917, 
during the Bolshevik Revolution. The Chechens saw the chaotic events in Russia as an 
opportunity to gain autonomy. They were successful at the beginning, but after the 
Bolsheviks gained control over Russia, they soon suppressed Chechen resistance as well. 
The following decades brought continuous revolts against Bolshevik rule, culminating in 
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Stalin’s brutal action in 1937, during which about 14,000 Chechens were arrested and 
exiled or executed.404 The devastation of the Chechens by the Russians went further 
towards the end of the Second World War, when Stalin ordered the deportation of 
approximately 400,000 Chechens to Central Asia “in retaliation for what he viewed as 
their treachery.”405  About 40 percent of those who were exiled died en route to their new 
homes, and those who survived were not allowed to return until 1956 when, a few years 
after Stalin’s death, Khrushchev “pardoned” the Chechens.406 Although this was a 
significant act from the Soviet Union, the relationship between the Russians and the 
Chechens did not really change. Khrushchev restored the “traditional” Russian order by 
force and introduced a reintegration policy that “set a time bomb ticking in the 
Caucasus.”407  As John Arquilla explains in his book, Insurgents, Raiders and Bandits: 
How Masters of Irregular Warfare Have Shaped Our World: “in the last three decades of 
the Cold War, Chechen nationalism did not die, but rather waited for its moment, like a 
tree in winter waiting for spring. That spring came with the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union in 1991.”408 
As many times before, the Chechens, now led by a former Soviet air-force officer, 
General Dzhokhar Dudayev, sensed the opportunity presented by events. On 6 September 
1991, they dissolved the local pro-Soviet government and started to create the conditions 
necessary to declare independence. During the following months, Dudayev consolidated 
his power and soon was elected the first president of the Independent Chechen 
Republic.409 As a response to the events in Chechnya, the Russian president, Boris 
Yeltsin, initially sent some internal troops to restore order, but they were quickly forced 
to withdraw when the Chechen forces surrounded their airplanes at Khankala airbase.  
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Following this embarrassment, the Russians turned to covert operations in an 
effort to overthrow Dudayev. During the following years, the Russians’ covert effort was 
made possible by the fierce fighting between Dudayev’s supporters and numerous 
opposition groups. The Russians initially provided financial support and military 
equipment for these groups, but since they did not manage to make enough progress, the 
Russians went on supplying service members as well to support anti-Dudayev operations. 
Russian involvement became public after one of the opposition groups, the Provisional 
Council, failed in its attempt to seize Grozny on 29 November 1994. At this point, 
Yeltsin decided to launch a full-scale offensive against Chechnya. 
The Russians expected a quick victory. Their strategy was formed around the 
quick occupation of the Chechen capital and other key urban areas. Since the minister of 
defense, General Pavel Grachev did not expect any serious resistance; his plan was to 
conclude the war within fifteen days. 410 But when Russian troops entered Chechnya on 
11 December 1994, they quickly realized that their timeline had to be changed. The 
Russians obtained air superiority by destroying the Chechens’ 266 aircraft, but when they 
maneuvered through the Caucasus, they met an unexpectedly strong resistance from the 
local population, which inflicted casualties and seriously slowed their advance.411 They 
finally reached Grozny on 26 December 1994 and, following several days of 
indiscriminate bombing of the city, on New Year’s Eve started a siege. They entered 
Grozny in “three armored columns in herringbone formations”412 and soon found 
themselves fighting against hundreds of small, highly trained, and well organized enemy 
units who were following a swarming-based irregular strategy, formed by the Chechen 
military’s chief of staff, a former Russian artillery officer, Aslan Maskhadov. The 
Chechen defenders, who were a few thousand fighters in all and vastly outnumbered by 
the invaders, quickly defeated the initial Russian attacks and caused a large number of 
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casualties.413 For example, the 131
st
 “Maikop” Motor Rifle Brigade was completely 
destroyed at Grozny’s central railway station.414 After this initial success, despite the fact 
that the Russians poured thousands of additional troops into the fight, the Chechens were 
able to hold Grozny through fierce irregular, urban combat for one more month. But even 
when the Chechens decided to give up the city, the war was not lost. Since Russian forces 
never managed to completely seal off the capital, the small irregular teams could leave 
the city to continue their fight in the rough mountainous regions.  
Following the seizure of Grozny, the Russian forces started to expand their 
control over the rural areas. They systematically advanced from village to village to 
defeat the resistance. To counter these operations, the Chechen irregulars conducted 
holding actions as long as practicable, and then moved away from the enemy while 
executing continuous harassing operations against Russian troop columns and logistic 
nodes. By May 1995, Russian forces controlled the major towns in Chechnya and the 
fight was taken to the mountain villages. This period was characterized by the inability of 
either side to decisively engage the other. Typically, the Chechens inflicted damage on 
Russian forces while they were maneuvering into position to surround a mountain 
village. The Russians shelled the village until there was no return fire from the Chechen 
rebels, and then moved in. The Chechens redeployed to the next village and attacked the 
next moving Russian columns. In this situation, the Chechens needed to do “something 
very dramatic in order to arrest further Russian progress on the ground in Chechnya.”415 
The Chechen leaders agreed to introduce terrorism into the repertoire of their irregular 
means. 
On 14 June 1995, a small Chechen unit, containing about 100 fighters and led by 
Shamil Basayev, infiltrated into Russia using Russian military uniforms and equipment. 
The Chechen detachment raided the town of Budennovsk with the main objective of 
taking as many hostages as possible and, through them, to force a Russian withdrawal 
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from Chechnya. During the operation, the Chechen raiders captured the town’s hospital 
and held about 1,500 hostages. The Russians launched multiple attacks to recapture the 
hospital and liberate the hostages, but all of them failed, and finally the Chechens 
managed to negotiate a free passage back to Chechnya. The success of this operation 
forced the Russians to start engaging in negotiations and brought a brief cease-fire 
between the sides.416 On 30 July 1995, both parties signed an agreement to stop military 
operations and the Russians promised a phased withdrawal from Chechnya. Elections 
were planned for the end of the year.417  However, the increasing number of violations of 
this agreement on both sides during the fall, including an assassination attempt on a 
senior Russian officer, General Anatoliy Romanov, quickly dismissed the dream of a 
long-lasting peace.  
On 9 January 1996, the Chechens launched another raid, this time attacking the 
town of Kizlyar in the Republic of Dagestan.  About 200 Chechens, led by Salman 
Radujev, primarily targeted the local airfield to destroy Russian planes and cargo. But 
when they arrived at the airfield, they realized that only a few airplanes and limited cargo 
were there.418 The Russians responded quickly and effectively, which forced the 
Chechens to withdraw. Radujev led his men with a couple of busloads of hostages to the 
southwest toward the Chechen border, but they were trapped by the Russian forces at the 
village of Pervomaiskoye. Radujev’s forces entrenched themselves and continued to fight 
the Russians for three days, finally exfiltrating shortly before the Russians completely 
destroyed the village.419 The mass media covered the events in Pervomaiskoye and 
“reported the excessive military and civilian casualties, causing a general public 
condemnation of the Yeltsin government’s conduct of war.”420 However, in this sensitive 
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situation, the Russians scored a separate success by killing the Chechen president with a 
rocket, after triangulating his position by tracking his satellite phone. Nevertheless, the 
Chechens soon took over the initiative.421  
The loss of their president did not weaken the Chechens’ fighting spirit. 
Maskhadov quickly ordered a countrywide offensive against the Russians. The Chechens 
attacked in the rural areas and mountains and shook up the Russian invaders. The 
Maskhadov offensive’s main objective was Grozny. Hundreds of small Chechen units 
infiltrated back into the capital and “after more than two weeks of fighting that turned 
Grozny into a smaller-scale Stalingrad,”422 the Russians entered negotiations with 
Maskhadov. The negotiation, and with it the war, ended in August 1996 when both sides 
signed a peace agreement in Khasavyurt. 
B. IRREGULAR STRATEGY 
As Robert M. Cassidy observes, “nonetheless, however much Russia had fallen 
from superpower status and however much Russian military power was degraded, the 
Russian forces that invaded Chechnya still exhibited the military strategic preferences of 
a great power.”423 The results of the initial operations, including the quick and complete 
destruction of the Chechen air force made it clear that no conventional defensive strategy 
would have provided a significant chance for success for the Chechens against the 
Russian military. This recognition produced a unique irregular defensive approach, 
designed by Aslan Maskhadov, which allowed the Chechens to fight effectively against a 
superior enemy. 
During the initial phase of the war, including the defense of Grozny in 1995, 
Maskhadov formed his strategy around urban combat, waged by hundreds of small and 
dispersed swarming fire teams. In Grozny, the Chechens started to give a taste of their 
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understanding of irregular warfare, by not relying solely on traditional small-scale 
ambushes and hit-and-run guerrilla tactics, but by attacking larger Russian elements with 
the aim of destroying entire formations. They introduced a “maneuverable defense” by 
holding on to a position one day then disappearing on the next to maneuver into new 
positions, which made it close to impossible for the Russians to annihilate the defenders.  
“The lack of fixed defenses and the mobility of the small groups of fighters were in fact 
their strength.”424 President Dudayev explained the essence of this strategy by saying, 
“strike and withdraw, strike and withdraw… exhaust them until they die of fear and 
horror.”425 These tactics were very effective, and through them the Chechens could hold 
on to the capital for a month while inflicting enormous losses on their enemy. But 
because the Russians poured several thousand more troops into the fight and changed 
some of their tactics, the Chechens were forced to withdraw from Grozny to the 
countryside. 
Heavy losses during the defense of the capital forced Maskhadov to further 
modify his approach to fit rural areas and small Chechen towns. He introduced “an 
indirect strategy of attrition in which he avoided general actions against the Russian main 
efforts but instead concentrated what forces he had against weak enemy outposts and 
piecemeal detachments.”426 During this phase of the war, the Chechen strategy was 
focused on two major objectives. First, they had to keep the struggle alive by preserving 
their forces and exhausting the Russians with raids and other harassing operations. As 
one of the Chechen battle groups’ deputy commanders, Khamzat Aslambekov, explained, 
they did not have too many choices at that time: “There is no winning. We know that. If 
we are fighting, we are winning. If we are not, we have lost. The Russians can kill us and 
destroy this land. Then they will win. But we will make it very painful for them.”427 The 
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Russians played into the hands of the Chechen strategy by falling into the same trap as 
many counterinsurgent forces before them did, by trying to control the country 
throughout the extensive use of small outposts.428  
Once dispersed, their outposts had never been numerous enough really to 
control the country, because partisan raids on the smaller posts had 
compelled them to consolidate into fewer and fewer garrisons. But the 
garrisons were too few and too small to check the partisans’ operations 
throughout the countryside.429  
The second main objective of the Chechen strategy during this time was to break 
the Russian leadership’s will to fight and to force the withdrawal of Russian troops from 
Chechen territory. During the entire war, the Chechens based their information strategy 
on the theme of a free nation being oppressed by an aggressor, Russia. They allowed 
journalists to be present in hot spots and provided first-hand access to information in 
order to influence public opinion. Chechen leadership encouraged the journalists to report 
about the brutality of Russian tactics and to describe the suffering of Chechen 
civilians.430 “The rebels were very open to press interest, granting interviews and 
generally making themselves available to domestic and foreign journalists.”431 To further 
influence public opinion, besides waging continuous small-scale attacks on the Russian 
troops, the Chechens also introduced psychological operations supported by terrorism as 
another form of their irregular approach. Both Basayev’s raid on Budennovsk and 
Radujev’s attack on Kizlyar were designed to stop further Russian military progress in 
Chechnya and targeted the will of the Russian public and politicians. These actions were 
successful not only because most of the raiding force got back home safely after 
negotiations, but because the events were covered by the Russian mass media. In this 
                                                 
428 This concept worked well in Anbar Province in Iraq during 2007 and 2008, but only because in 
this case the American forces managed to gain the support of the local population and turned them against 
the local Al-Qaeda fighters.  
429 Cassidy, Russia in Afghanistan and Chechnya, 16. 
430 John Arquilla and Theodore Karasik, “Chechnya: A Glimpse of Future Conflict,” Studies in 
Conflict and Terrorism, Volume 22, Number 3, 1 July 1999, 217, accessed March 05, 2012, 
http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/routledg/uter/1999/00000022/00000003/art00003. 
431 Oliker, Russia’s Chechen Wars 1994–2000, 22. 
 121 
regard, Basayev’s raid was more successful than Radujev’s operation, since as a result of 
the first event, a cease-fire agreement was signed, promising phased Russian troop 
withdrawals and elections at the end of 1995. But these never happened, and the war soon 
resumed with full intensity. 
Following the death of President Dudayev in April 1996, Maskhadov ordered a 
countrywide offensive against the Russian troops, “a campaign that looked much like Vo 
Nguyen Giap’s 1968 Tet offensive.”432 Several thousand Chechen fighters organized into 
small fire teams attacked the Russian forces in rural and urban areas simultaneously, all 
over the country. The major objective of this offensive was Grozny. The Chechen 
fighters, split into around a hundred small units, infiltrated the capital and for the next 
two weeks engaged 12,000 Russian troops in fierce fighting. This seems to have been 
enough for the Russian leadership, and especially for President Yeltsin, since he sent his 
advisor on security affairs, Alexander Lebed, a former army general and Afghanistan 
veteran, to negotiate the conditions for peace with Maskhadov. Since the Russians were 
willing to meet the most important Chechen request, to withdraw their forces from 
Chechnya, an agreement was soon reached and the fighting ended.433 
C. ORGANIZATION AND LEADERSHIP 
The Chechen military forces in 1991, according to Major General Sokolov, the 
commander of the Russian north Caucasian military district at that time, consisted of 
62,000 fighters in the national guard and an additional 30,000 in the militia.434 By 1994, 
these forces were augmented with Shamil Basayev’s 350 men from the Abkhazian 
battalion, 250 men under the command of Ruslan Galayev, an artillery detachment with 
30 artillery pieces, an armored unit containing fifteen tanks, and the Chechen ministry of 
the interior’s force, consisting of 200 fighters.435  Despite the fact that shortly after their 
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independence the Chechens planned to build a conventional military in order to prove the 
capabilities of their country, at the beginning of the war their organization was 
remarkably flat, taking a “network” form of organization.436 This irregular organization 
was a result of two factors. First, Aslan Maskhadov recognized that an open, 
conventional war against Russia would end in disaster for Chechnya and he encouraged 
the subdivision and dispersion of the Chechen forces. The second factor was that 
throughout history, the organization of the Chechen forces had a direct link to the social 
structure of Chechnya. This structure was based on clan formations. As Theodore 
Karasik explains this phenomenon: 
Chechen clans, called taip, identify member descent from a common 
ancestor twelve generations removed. A particular taip might consist of 
two to three villages of 400 to 600 people each and supply 600 fighters. 
For combat purposes, these groups are broken down into units of 150 and 
further subdivided into squads of about 20 for combat operations that 
work one-week shifts, one after the other.437 
Despite serious feuds occurred among the taips, this type of social structure, with its 
unifying power against a common enemy, connectivity, and durability provided an ideal 
framework for the irregular war that the Chechens fought between 1994 and 1996 against 
Russia.  
As Olga Oliker explains, “Russian and Chechen sources agree that nonstandard 
squads were the basis of the rebel force.”438 These squads consisted of fifteen to twenty 
fighters subdivided into fire-team-sized cells. Each fighter within these small elements 
was armed with different kinds of weapon systems, including RPG-7s, RPG-18s, 
machine guns, and Dragunov sniper rifles, to increase unit effectiveness. Usually several 
fighting cells were deployed as “hunter–killer teams” against armored targets. “The 
sniper and machine gunner pin down Russian supporting infantry, while the antitank 
gunner engages the armored target. Normally, five or six hunter–killer teams attack an 
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armored vehicle in unison and can force serious delays in Russian actions.”439 These 
small elements eventually could form a larger unit, consisting of 25 men, including 
ammunition bearers, medics, and supply personnel. If it was operationally necessary, 
three of these 25-man units could be further combined into a 75-man element, which was 
augmented with a highly mobile mortar crew.  These units played a key role in urban 
combat, since the Chechens usually divided the cities into quadrants and a 75-man 
element was responsible for the defense of an individual quadrant.440 Besides the use of 
these units, the Chechens also deployed individual snipers or small sniper teams to inflict 
as many casualties as possible and create fear among the Russian troops. Olga Oliker 
noted that “Chechen snipers, whether operating alone or as part of an ambush group, 
nightly terrified Russian soldiers, who dubbed them ghosts.”441 The snipers were so 
effective that, in one instance, out of an entire Russian battalion only ten soldiers and one 
staff officer survived their accurate fire.442  
These organizational elements provided unique flexibility for the rebels. Their 
organizational simplicity and durability allowed the widely dispersed small units to 
conduct self-coordinated attacks, but also gave them the ability to reorganize into larger 
formations when needed.  Still, the effective organizational characteristics of the Chechen 
forces would have not been enough for success. To capitalize on these characteristics, 
capable military leaders were also much needed.  
At the strategic level, the Chechen leaders had to understand the traditional 
Chechen fighting organization and form a strategy that would capitalize on its advantages 
to create a chance against a numerically and technologically superior enemy. The 
president of Chechnya, Dzhokhar Dudayev, and the chief of staff of the Chechen 
military, Aslan Maskhadov were such leaders. Both of them were trained and educated in 
the Russian military. The president previously served in the Russian air force as a general 
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officer, while the latter was an artillery colonel. Dudayev was more involved in the 
political aspects of the struggle, while Maskhadov was primarily responsible for the 
defensive military strategy of Chechnya.443 Based on his prior military experience, 
Maskhadov understood the strengths and weaknesses of both sides. He could form a 
strategy that not only exploited Russian weaknesses, but also made the most of Chechen 
strengths. He tested his approach during the initial skirmishing between Dudayev’s 
supporters and the pro-Moscow movements between 1992 and 1994. His vision of 
commander’s-intent-based operations, which relied on highly decentralized execution 
and small-unit level coordination, proved to be very effective not only during this initial 
conflict, but throughout the entire war against the Russians. As his motto said, “less 
centralization, more coordination.”444 He continuously learned from engagements and 
developed his irregular approach. Maskhadov was capable of facing reality and fought 
only when it was practicable. His main goal was to keep the struggle alive while he tried 
to shape the battlefield through harassing raids, terrorist acts, and other irregular means to 
set the conditions to take over the initiative. When the time arrived, he launched an 
offensive against the Russian forces, which: 
provides either evidence of one of history’s most exceptional military 
miracles or a persuasive example of the inherent superiority of a small, 
swarming irregular force against a traditionally organized opponent. In 
either case, a true master of the battlefield emerged to carry it off.445 
Maskhadov’s strategy could only work if he had capable subordinate leaders with 
the ability to act along the lines of his irregular strategy. Since his entire strategy was 
based on hundreds of small elements capable of acting by themselves or as a part of 
slightly larger formations, the question of small-unit leadership was crucial to the success 
of the Chechen struggle. These leaders indeed possessed those capabilities and were the 
backbone of the Chechen strategy’s success.  They not only led their fire-team-sized units 
into battle, but were able to coordinate for larger-scale attacks to increase their 
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effectiveness and maximize Russian casualties. Stasys Knezys and Romanas Sedlickas 
described the effectiveness of the small Chechen elements and their leaders in more detail 
by stating that:  
During the repulsion of the assault [in Grozny] the Chechen forces 
operated almost independently. Many small groups of Chechen fighters in 
the city also found themselves appropriate places in the city’s defenses. 
Everyone’s basic purpose was, after all, the same: to destroy the enemy. 
These mobile, completely independent groups chose their targets 
themselves and, being always on the move, created for the Russian units 
the appearance of a unified attack. The coordination among the leaders of 
the Chechen fighter groups was, however, exceptional. Even without 
centralized command, they succeeded in fighting their opponent all over 
the city simultaneously.446 
These small units were very effective in the capital and they did not disappear after they 
had to give up Grozny. After fleeing the capital by multiple routes toward the 
mountainous areas, the Chechen leadership was able to reestablish the fighting network 
in a short time. The leaders continued to learn and adapt during the entire war, which 
allowed them to extend their control all over those rural areas that were not physically 
occupied by the Russians.  
D. INTERNAL FACTORS 
One of the significant internal factors that led to the success of the Chechens was 
the high level of pre-conflict military training among their fighters. The centuries-old 
armed struggle against Russia, in combination with Chechnya’s militant society, provided 
an excellent foundation for a civil-militia based, irregular force, but the Chechen fighters 
had much more training and experience to capitalize on. By 1991, the major part of the 
Chechen male population had gone through military training in Russia and of those “who 
were not veterans of the Soviet/Russian armed forces, a good number may have trained 
abroad, for instance in Azerbaijan, Pakistan, or Turkey.”447 Since the Russians trained 
the Chechens from the tactical to the strategic level, they were not only capable of 
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operating their weapons and conducting missions effectively, they also knew the 
Russians’ order of battle, the capabilities of their military systems, and their tactics in 
different operational environments. The Russians even played into the hands of the 
Chechens by training, arming, and deploying the Abkhaz battalion, a Chechen-based unit 
deployed in the First Georgian Abkhaz War. The personnel of this unit were rotated on a 
regular basis, which gave thousands of Chechens training and operational experience in 
fierce urban combat before the Russo–Chechen War. Additionally, a large number of 
Chechen fighters received training in “mountain guerrilla fighting,” based on the Russian 
experience in the Soviet–Afghan War. The Chechens were also trained in night 
operations, which, especially at the early stage of the war, provided a huge advantage 
over the Russian forces.448 
This pre-conflict training made the Chechen forces very effective, but they never 
stopped training during the war. They continuously evaluated the lessons from 
engagements and made significant efforts to come up with new procedures to fight the 
Russians more effectively. As Arquilla and Karasik explain, 
these groups “commuted” from their homes to the field of battle. While 
home, they would share, through story-telling sessions, their latest 
experiences with other units of the taip, offering advice about how to fight 
the Russians, as well as technical tips about such matters altering grenade 
launchers with saws to provide them with more velocity.449  
Concerning tactics used by the Chechens during the war, one can say that they 
utilized every imaginable and seemingly unimaginable way to fight their opponents. The 
tactical foundation of the Chechen irregular struggle was the swarm. By mastering this 
concept, the Chechens were able to effectively confront larger conventional formations. 
Small mobile teams defeated large armored formations through turning the strength of 
these weapon systems into weaknesses. 
They learned to hit the front and rear vehicles of Russian convoys first, in 
order to immobilize the convoy, then struck at close range with sawed-off 
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RPGs—shorter barrels made for greater velocity—that had napalm 
charges attached, starting fire inside and often blowing up the invaders’ 
tanks.450  
As a result of these tactics, the Chechens destroyed a couple of dozen Russian tanks 
during the first month of the fighting in Grozny. The use of sniping and the deployment 
of mines and improvised, explosive devices also proved to be a very effective tactic in the 
rebel repertoire. They were successful not only because they caused a large number of 
casualties and terrified the Russian soldiers, but because the reaction to these types of 
attacks slowed the Russian forces down, which made them vulnerable to swarming. 
Chechen tactics did not pose a threat to the Russian ground units only; the rebels 
were very successful in destroying air assets, including attack and cargo helicopters, as 
well. As Karasik explains: 
Chechen mobile air defense weapons are controlled by radio and change 
positions constantly, hampering the Russians’ ability to detect and destroy 
them. The Chechen forces also lure Russian air assets into specially 
prepared “kill zones.” Chechen forces jam Russian radio transmissions 
and use radio direction finding equipment to hunt and kill Russian 
controllers that guide Russian forces to targets. When Chechens knock 
down Russian helicopters, they swarm their small combat teams to 
Russian landing zones hitting them with machine gun, sniper and RPG 
fire.451 
The Chechen forces also used deception and psychological warfare on many 
occasions. The Chechen fighters got through Russian checkpoints by wearing Russian 
uniforms or appearing as refugees using forged documents. Other times they “disguised 
themselves as Red Cross workers, donning the identifying armbands. They also passed 
themselves off as civilians and offered to guide Russian forces through the city, instead 
leading them into ambushes.”452  
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Since at the initial stage of the war the Russians mainly used open radio channels, 
the Chechen irregulars were also able to transmit misleading radio messages and 
conflicting orders, which caused great confusion among the Russian troops. The 
Chechens’ psychological operations had two main objectives. The first was to terrify the 
Russian soldiers and weaken their fighting spirit. The second was to influence the 
Russian public and, through them, the Russian leadership. In order to reach these goals, 
the Chechens employed different operational measures from “hanging Russian wounded 
and dead upside down in the windows of defended positions, forcing the Russians to fire 
at their comrades in order to engage rebels”453 to conducting terrorist attacks deep into 
Russia. The rebels also used mobile television and radio platforms to communicate their 
messages while jamming the Russian efforts to transmit in Chechnya. The Chechens 
influenced public opinion by allowing a large number of international journalists to be 
present in Grozny and other hot spots. Sometimes the Chechens manipulated events to 
further support their agenda. As Oliker explains,  
the few tanks the rebels had were dug into multistory buildings in the 
center of the city. When the Chechens fired from these positions, Russian 
returned fire inevitably hit civilian housing, schools, hospitals, and 
daycare centers. When the cameras recorded and sent these images home, 
the Russians looked especially heartless, and the Chechens appeared even 
more the victims.454  
The last significant internal factor influencing the outcome of the First Russo–
Chechen War was the information advantage possessed by the rebels. Since a large 
portion of the Chechens had trained in the Russian army, they knew the enemy’s tactics, 
techniques, and procedures. The Chechens knew the capabilities and the limitations of the 
Russian weapons systems and, through this knowledge, how to counter them. “Knowing 
to avoid the reactive armor at the front of the Russian tanks (which a number of the T-72s 
and T-80s went into battle without), the rebels focused their fire on the top, rear, and 
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sides. They also knew how to attack vulnerable APCs such as the BMP-1.”455 Simply 
put, the rebels could think with the Russian mind, which gave them an enormous 
advantage. The use of open-channel radio communication on the Russian side also 
provided a significant advantage, since the Chechens could hear and, since all of them 
spoke Russian, understand everything the Russians said. Based on this intelligence, the 
rebels could easily prepare their operations, since Russian maneuvers were an open book. 
And of course, the civilian-population based, human-intelligence network also played a 
key role by providing accurate and timely information for the rebels about Russian 
locations and movements. 
E. EXTERNAL FACTORS 
The first important external factor in this case is the fact that, initially, the 
Chechens not only tailored their irregular strategy to the rough natural terrain and severe 
weather conditions of Chechnya, but they created an “urban terrain” that best supported 
their swarming strategy. “The Chechens simply applied their mastery at the art of forest 
warfare, so evident in the 18th and 19th centuries, to the urban forests in Grozny and 
other cities.”456 The Chechens had prepared for the Russian invasion for a long time and 
turned the country into a fortified battlefield to decrease the effectiveness of Russian 
weapons while increasing the lethality of their own. They many times locked down the 
first floors of buildings by blocking the doors, or booby-trapped the entrance around their 
ambush sites, to prevent the Russians from taking cover. The Chechens made use of the 
sewer systems as concealed avenues of approach and escape. Based on their experiences 
in the Russian military, they could foresee possible assembly areas for ground forces and 
landing sites for Russian helicopters and could make preparations to increase the 
effectiveness of future attacks on those sites. “Moreover, the rebels had reinforced the 
basements and subbasements from which they fought, turning them into bunkers. Vaulted 
and sloped add-on roofs reduced the effects of Russian RPO-A Shmel flamethrowers and 
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other systems.”457 Later, as the fight moved to mountainous areas of the country, the 
Chechens used physical features to their advantage, exploiting the limited number of 
roads and mountain passes as areas where they could lay effective ambushes against 
Russian armored convoys. The weather also had a significant influence on military 
operations, because the Russians knew surprisingly little about the Chechen climate. 
Especially the winter months had a significant effect on both the Russian soldiers and 
their equipment. Many of them did not have proper clothing, and their vehicles were not 
prepared for functioning in a hard winter environment. Russian drivers frequently stayed 
in their vehicles with running engines, with which not only gave away their locations, but 
also burned a large amount of fuel.458 The severe weather, including snow, low cloud 
cover, and fog, which is common in the mountains of Chechnya even during the summer 
months, was a key natural asset at the rebels’ disposal. It sometimes restricted the 
Russian air force’s support of ground troops and conduct of aerial reconnaissance, which 
provided temporal and local advantages for the rebels.459 
The next significant external factor was the social terrain on both sides. On one 
hand, the intervention in Chechnya was not a popular decision in Russia. Not only was 
society divided on the question, but Russian leadership was as well. Some high ranking 
military leaders, including the deputy minister of defense, Boris Gromov, even went so 
far as to oppose the invasion. Others, like Colonel General Aleksey Mityukin, the 
commander of the northern Caucasus military district, refused to take command of the 
invading forces.460 This division among Russian leadership played into the hands of the 
Chechen irregulars, who formed their psychological warfare strategy around it.  
The social terrain had another significant aspect that influenced the outcome of 
the conflict. As Faurby and Magnusson explain, “The Russian leaders had no 
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understanding of Chechen society. They had no understanding of the popular support for 
Chechen independence. They did not understand that as soon as Russian troops crossed 
into the republic, the majority of Chechens would put their internal disagreements aside 
and fight under Dudayev as their symbol of national independence.”461 At the beginning 
of the invasion, even those Chechens who earlier opposed Dudayev immediately joined 
him in order to defend their independence. Without any indigenous allies, the Russians 
had no basis for any kind of cultural sensitivity or for a “local” force not seen by the 
civilian population as invaders. Simply put, the Russians had no chance to normalize the 
security situation through an ally. Furthermore, the Russians’ continuous harassment of 
Chechen civilians and their indiscriminate aerial and artillery bombardments, which had 
no serious military effects on the rebel forces, deepened the anti-Russian mindset, which 
led to the majority of the taips being willing to provide fighters, supplies, and safe havens 
for the irregular forces. Since the Russians only controlled the rural areas temporarily, the 
support of the local taips allowed the Chechens to rest and to refit their forces before 
sending them back into the fight. Since the Russians could never properly seal the 
borders of Chechnya, the rebels could also sneak to surrounding countries for medical 
treatment, weapons, and ammunitions, or to conduct raids deep into Russia. 
The last external factor worth considering is the international environment in 
which the conflict occurred. Russian leadership was divided over the issue of Chechnya; 
from the rest of the world’s point of view, including the American, it seemed 
straightforward. Only five years after the end of the Cold War, neither Washington nor 
other Western countries were willing to jeopardize their improving relationships with 
Russia over the issue of Chechnya.  As President Clinton stated at a press conference in 
August 1994, his administration saw the events in Chechnya as an internal affair of 
Russia, which he hoped would be solved quickly and with minimal violence. This 
announcement “sent the message that the United States had no intention of involving 
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itself in the conflict,”462 which quickly made the Chechens realize that they could not 
hope for involvement by the U.S. or other Western nations, unlike their covert support 
during the Russo–Afghan War. As a result of this, the Chechens fought a two-year war 
against a superior enemy without any significant outside support.  
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The centuries-old struggle between Russia and Chechnya arrived at a new chapter 
in the winter of 1994. After a couple of years of failed covert efforts, the Russian 
leadership, as it had so many times before, decided to use full-scale military intervention 
to restore law and order in, as they saw it, a rogue region. Russia deployed an 
overwhelming conventional military power against the small republic, but after less than 
two years of war, her forces were defeated and forced to withdraw from Chechnya. This 
unexpected and remarkable success of a small state against a highly superior enemy was 
a result of the Chechens’ understanding that they could not fight a war against the 
Russians on conventional terms, as any conventional strategy would have led to certain 
defeat. Based on this understanding, they chose to follow a swarming-based, irregular 
strategy, which proved to be highly effective and resulted in victory. There were several 
key factors that contributed to the success of the Chechen strategy.  
First, the Chechen passion for independence, paired with national pride, brought 
the people of Chechnya together against the Russians. While the aggressor failed to get 
significant and legitimate indigenous support, Dudayev even managed to ally with his 
former opposition, who lined up on his side once the Russians crossed the border of their 
beloved country. His success in creating a single national will to resist a common outside 
enemy led to strong popular support for the rebels throughout the entire war. This support 
ensured continuous information superiority and human and material resupply for the 
rebels, which were key contributors for their success. 
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Second, large number of Chechen fighters, from the enlisted level to general 
officers, had gone through training in the Soviet/Russian military and many of them had 
previous combat experience, which an ad-hoc civilian militia would not commonly have 
had. From the first days of the war, these fighters were capable of effectively fighting, not 
only at the individual level, but at the unit level as well. They had the ability to 
understand irregular strategy and what the commander’s intent required from them in best 
serving that strategy. As a result of their training, the rebels also knew Russian doctrine. 
They knew the Russian organizations, maneuver formations, unit-level tactics, and the 
strength and weaknesses of their weapon systems. The majority of the Chechens spoke 
Russian, and because of this, they could understand everything the Russians were 
communicating through their channels, which gave them a huge information advantage, 
allowing them to intercept radio messages and broadcast conflicting orders, which many 
times created not only chaos among the Russian troops, but high levels of casualties as 
the Russians were directed into Chechen ambushes. 
The third key factor was the perfect symbiosis of the Chechen forces’ network 
type organization, their weapons’ “combined arms” effect at the small-unit level, and the 
tactics used by the irregular forces. The flat and decentralized organization was properly 
designed to fit the requirements of their irregular strategy and to exploit all the above-
mentioned Chechen advantages. Their hundreds of small units had the ability to operate 
individually or, when the situation required joining forces temporarily, for specific 
operations. Their flexibility and lethality were increased by their combination of different 
weapon systems, which were employed with high effectiveness against carefully selected 
targets. Though the Chechens many times used traditional guerrilla-type, hit-and-run 
operations, they also took a step further by effectively integrating, in time and space, 
deliberate attacks on larger Russian formations, psychological warfare, and terrorism. 
The combination of these three factors presented military challenges that the Russian 
conventional strategy could not deal with.  
Fourth, the Chechens knew and understood better the military applications of the 
physical features of their country. While designing their irregular strategy, they not only 
counted on the advantages of the terrain and weather, but made some serious pre-conflict 
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preparations to create a “manmade wilderness” in their urban areas. The main goal of this 
infrastructure preparation was to enhance the effectiveness of irregular operations while 
taking away the strength of the Russian conventional forces. 
The First Russo–Chechen War was chosen as a case study in this project because 
it provides one of the closest real-world examples of the theory of this thesis. Though the 
Chechen forces were not trained specifically for irregular warfare, they possessed most of 
the key elements of a proposed professional, irregular, homeland-defense force. Though 
after gaining their independence, the Chechen leadership considered establishing a 
conventional homeland-defense force, they quickly realized that that would never give 
them a chance for success against their possible future enemy, the numerically and 
technically superior Russian military. To be able to deal with the Russian threat, Chechen 
leaders introduced an irregular homeland-defense strategy. To have even a slight chance 
of success, the Chechens needed to unify the nation in support of an irregular strategy, 
which they did. Their new approach required a fundamentally different military 
organization and a much wider variety of tactics than the conventional mindset would 
have suggested. The Chechens organized their defensive forces into hundreds of small, 
independent units characterized by decentralized command and control and high 
organizational flexibility. The majority of the rebel fighters had pre-conflict military 
training and many had combat experience, which made them more effective than an ad-
hoc civil militia would have been. Beyond their training, the rebels had an extensive 
knowledge of the enemy’s doctrine and weapon systems. The Chechens also conducted 
significant infrastructural preparations prior to the war to further support the effectiveness 
of their operations. As a result of the effective integration and employment of all these 
factors, this far-off struggle between direct and indirect strategies ended with the 
remarkable victory of the small state, which is the reason why the First Russo–Chechen 
War “will be studied for ages by all military professionals.”463 
All this said, it is important to note that the Russians returned to Chechnya in 
1999 to reassert their control. Before this second war, they made significantly different 
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preparations by training and restructuring their forces for irregular war.464 During the 
two-year conflict, Russian forces operated in small teams and used some of the 
Chechens’ irregular methods against them. Their success in the second war, however, 
does not invalidate the irregular strategy. Instead, the Russians’ improvements along 
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VIII. THE SECOND LEBANESE WAR 
A. BACKGROUND 
Following the quick defeat of Arab forces by Israel during the Six-Day War in 
1967, Palestinian militants frequently launched cross-border operations from southern 
Lebanon into the northern parts of Israel. Many Arabs believed that “guerrilla 
action...could ‘redeem the honor of the Arabs’, which the regular armies had so 
disgracefully lost.”465 As an eventual response to these attacks, Israel briefly invaded 
Lebanon in 1978 and returned again in 1982, in Operation Peace for Galilee. The second 
time, Israel kept its forces in Lebanon until 2000, in order to destroy Arab militant 
groups. Although Israeli forces managed to expel the Palestine Liberation Organization 
(the group mainly responsible for attacks on Israel) from Lebanon their departure led to 
the establishment of a new, Shi`a-based militant group, Hezbollah, which means “party 
of God.” This extremist organization, inspired by Ayatollah Khomeini, the leader of the 
1979 Iranian revolution, enjoyed the support of Iran; and meanwhile, Syria declared war 
against Israel. Hezbollah`s initial objectives consisted of four major elements: continuous 
struggle against Israel until its destruction, forcing the withdrawal of foreign troops from 
Lebanon,466 the liberation of Jerusalem, and the establishment of an Islamic state in 
Lebanon.467 
Besides low-level harassing attacks against Israeli forces, Hezbollah`s early years 
were mainly characterized by terrorist acts. The organization used a wide variety of 
methods in an effect to reach its objectives, including vehicle-borne suicide attacks, most 
notably those on the American embassy, United States Marine Corps barracks, and 
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French paratrooper barracks in Beirut in 1983. In these attacks, Hezbollah killed 
241 American servicemen and 58 French soldiers, while wounding an additional several 
hundred people. Beyond these suicide operations, the organization also kidnapped at least 
51 foreign citizens between 1983 and 1986, including a French journalist, Roger Auque, 
and hijacked numerous airplanes.468 Hezbollah quickly succeeded in forcing the 
withdrawal of French and American troops from Lebanese soil, and in 2000 Israel was 
pressured into moving its forces out of Lebanon as well. The permanent removal of the 
PLO and the Amal movement`s loss of a popular base469 contributed to the fact that, by 
this time, Hezbollah was carrying out 90 percent of the operations against Israel and 
many Arabs believed that it became the “the sole party to conduct the struggle against 
Israel.”470 This enabled Hezbollah to “become the dominant military and political force 
in Lebanon.”471 The organization`s influence was especially strong in the southern part of 
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Following Israel`s withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000, Hezbollah, with the support 
of Iran, transformed itself into a social, media, and political organization while further 
developing its military capabilities. Between 2000 and 2006, Hezbollah trained thousands 
of fighters in various methods of irregular warfare, imported thousands of short- and 
long-range missiles, and built a well-fortified defense line in the southern areas to prepare 
for war with Israel. From 2005, Hezbollah introduced a new tactic into its repertoire: the 
kidnapping of Israeli soldiers. However, these operations usually concluded with prisoner 
exchanges between the two parties. The situation changed on 12 July 2006, when 
Hezbollah ambushed an Israeli border patrol, killed three Israeli reservists, and kidnapped 
two soldiers.472 After a failed rescue attempt, during which five more Israeli soldiers 
were killed and a tank destroyed, the Israeli government decided to respond with greater 
force to this event. This decision triggered a 34-day war that not only highlighted several 
problems within the conventionally minded Israeli defense forces, but once again 
demonstrated the power of irregular warfare. 
Even before the official decision was made to go to war, the Israeli air force was 
already extensively deployed.  In the early morning of July 13, it attacked and destroyed 
about 50 of Hezbollah`s known long-range missile sites within 34 minutes. The Israeli 
Air Force also targeted “Hezbollah observation posts along the border, Hezbollah 
compounds in the Dahyia section of Beirut, and roads and bridges that Israel believed 
might be used to exfiltrate the abducted soldiers.”473 As a response to these air attacks, 
Hezbollah started to launch rockets into Israel, hitting mainly urban areas. The steady 
flow of these rockets throughout the entire conflict claimed 53 Israeli civilian lives and 
showed the Israeli government that air attacks by themselves could not destroy 
Hezbollah`s offensive capabilities. To deal with the rocket threat, the Israelis started a 
major ground offensive on July 19, but met much tougher resistance than they expected, 
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especially around Marun ar Ras and Bint Jbeil. To protect its launch sites and weapons 
caches, Hezbollah designed a defensive system: 
based on underground tunnels and bunkers, explosives-ridden areas, and 
anti-tank units. This array was intended to confront ground forces to a 
limited extent, to stall ground incursions, and inflict as many casualties as 
possible, which would wear out IDF forces, slow down their progress, and 
allow continued rocket fire.474  
The initial Israeli strategy did not aim at controlling the ground, but only on 
destroying launch sites and missiles. But when its ineffectiveness became clear by July 
31, the “Israeli Cabinet approved ‘Operation Change of Direction 8’, designed to take 
and hold a security zone several kilometers wide along the entire border.”475 Eight 
additional Israeli brigades were deployed, and with these units, the number of Israeli 
forces increased to about 30,000. Within ten days, as a result of this operation, the Israelis 
had a footprint in almost every Lebanese city in the border area, but everywhere they 
penetrated they found fierce Hezbollah defenses and paid a huge price for every 
kilometer taken. In these built-up areas, Hezbollah “integrated effective standoff 
weapons, such as antitank guided missiles (ATGMs), mortars, and short-range rockets, 
with mines and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and competent fighters.”476 This 
presented a complicated challenge for the Israeli forces. Beyond the heavy urban fighting, 
Hezbollah`s rockets continued to fall on Israeli territory, wounding and killing civilians. 
On 12 August, Israel launched an offensive to occupy Lebanese soil up to the Litani 
River. The next two days brought fierce fighting and caused a large number of casualties 
and material loss on both sides. For example, in the Israeli 401
st
 Armored Brigade, eleven 
tanks were hit and twelve of its soldiers killed during their advance through the Saluqi 
Valley, while Hezbollah lost about fifty fighters. 477 On 14 August, both sides agreed to  
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implement a United Nations Security Council ceasefire; and though some low-level 
incidents still occurred during the next couple days, the 34-day war between Israel and 
Hezbollah officially ended. 
B. IRREGULAR STRATEGY 
Hezbollah’s ideology calls for the destruction of Israel, but the leadership of the 
Shi’a organization understood that it was highly unlikely for them to militarily destroy 
Israel or its forces in an open, conventional war. Although the leaders of Hezbollah did 
not anticipate so serious a response from Israel in 2006, they were still prepared for war. 
During the years between 2000 and 2006, Hezbollah planners continuously worked on a 
generic strategy that could be used in any future war against Israel. They knew that in 
case of conflict, Israel could occupy Lebanon again as it did in 1978 and 1982, and they 
could not stop it using conventional ways of defense. Based on this understanding, they 
needed to come up with a strategy that either would deter Israel from an invasion, or in 
case of the failure of deterrence, coerce Israel into halting the offense and withdrawing 
forces from Lebanon.478 The events following the killing of three, and kidnapping of two, 
Israeli soldiers on 12 July 2006 quickly made it clear that the deterrence part failed, so 
Hezbollah needed to put its coercive strategy into motion.  
Hezbollah`s irregular approach was designed around the basic assumption that 
Israeli society was highly sensitive to casualties and would not be able to tolerate “pain.” 
In Hezbollah`s mind, as Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah explained, Israeli society 
was a “brittle post-military society that cannot endure wars anymore and that under 
pressure it can succumb to Arab aggression.”479 To inflict such pain and coerce Israeli 
society, it was paramount to Hezbollah`s strategy to “penetrate well inside Israel’s border 
and not yield to the IDF’s massive precision firepower.”480 Initially, long-range rocket 
systems seemed to be the best solution for Hezbollah to provide the coercive threat. Their 
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locations, deep in Lebanon, placed them beyond the reach of ground attack, but as the 
success of the Israeli air force in the first day of the war demonstrated, their large 
footprints were too vulnerable to airstrikes. Hezbollah quickly recognized that to be 
successful, it had to rely on its shorter-range rocket systems and the capabilities of the 
fortified defensive lines established to protect those systems. Although these rockets 
provided much less threatening than long-range ones, they were “smaller, easier to 
conceal, vastly greater in number, and potentially much less vulnerable to aerial 
preemption.”481 Hezbollah realized that a complete denial of Israeli ground forces from 
the short-range rockets’ launch sites would be impossible. But as a key requirement of 
success, they needed to buy time. As Biddle and Friedman explain, it was necessary:  
to prevent the Israelis from getting quick access to the key launch areas on 
the scale needed to search the terrain exhaustively and uproot concealed 
rocket launchers before enough pressure could be built on the Israeli 
government to yield the issue at stake.  This operational requirement could 
not be met with classical guerrilla tactics, which allow enemy forces into 
the country but gradually penalize them for their presence with hit-and-run 
casualty infliction.482 
Based on this mindset, and understanding they could not stop the Israelis by employing a 
conventional defense, Hezbollah planners designed a ground-defense system that could 
buy time and allow “ongoing rocket fire in the meantime to inflict mounting coercive 
pain on Israeli society.”483 To increase the effectiveness of the missiles, Hezbollah units 
assigned to protect the rocket systems were organized into small, highly mobile and 
decentralized elements, which used swarming as their main operational method. 
Hezbollah`s fighters were well trained and most of them were veterans from the earlier 
eighteen-year (1982–2000) struggle against Israel. They were equipped with a wide range 
of weapon systems, including machine guns, anti-tank missiles, mortars, and sniper rifles,  
to increase effectiveness. Beyond all these factors, Hezbollah put a high emphasis on the 
preparation of engagement areas and kill zones along possible avenues of approach. 
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“Mines and IEDs were expertly placed in depth throughout the southern defensive sector 
in order to stop Israeli mechanized forces and enable Hezbollah to mass both direct and 
indirect fires on their halted columns.”484 This defense system provided effective 
protection for rocket units and inflicted great casualties on the Israeli forces. Ron Tira, an 
Israeli air force officer, explained how the Israeli military leadership saw the essence of 
Hezbollah’s strategy by stating: 
Hezbollah designed a war in which presumably Israel could only choose 
which soft underbelly to expose: the one whereby it avoids a ground 
operation and exposes its home front vulnerability, or the one whereby it 
enters Lebanon and sustains the loss of soldiers in ongoing ground-based 
attrition with a guerrilla organization. Hezbollah’s brilliant trap apparently 
left Israel with two undesirable options.485  
Hezbollah also integrated effective media exploitation and psychological warfare 
into its irregular strategy to influence multiple audiences, including the organization`s 
own followers, other Arab governments, and their populations. Israel’s military forces 
and morale were targeted as well, in the hope of encouraging withdrawal from Lebanon. 
Finally, Hezbollah strove to convince the outside world to stop supporting Israel. 
Hezbollah used the mass media, including its own television station, called al-Manar, 
and the Internet, as key weapons against Israel. It could do so because during this 
conflict, so much information became available to the media that it changed journalism’s 
role in future conflicts. As Marvin Kalb explained “once upon a time, such information 
was the stuff of military intelligence acquired with considerable efforts and risk; now it 
has become the stuff of everyday journalism. The camera and the computer have become 
weapons of war.”486 He added that the Internet in 2006 “helped produce the first really 
‘live’ war in history.”487 As a key part of its media exploitation, Hezbollah used reporters 
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of al-Manar as embedded assets to capture footage of the fighting and manipulate it as 
they saw it fit for overall strategic goals. Later, this footage were broadcast in the region 
by al-Manar and Hezbollah`s website and were also made available for foreign networks, 
including al-Jazeera and CNN.   
Beyond the use of this footage, Hezbollah was also successful in making the 
Israeli forces believe that it had the capability to intercept their secret, frequency-hopping 
radio communications. However, research conducted after the war showed that this was 
another brilliant psychological warfare operation from Hezbollah. As David Fulghum 
explained in his article, Doubt as a Weapon:  
What they’re really doing is a very good psychological operations…one of 
the things you want to do is instill doubt. Hezbollah makes the 
pronouncement that they can read encrypted radios. They wanted the  
IDF troops to believe they weren’t as invulnerable as they thought. It ran 
like wildfire through the U.S. troops as well. What you’re witnessing  
is unsophisticated technology exploited by sophisticated information 
operations. They scored big time in the psychological warfare department 
the enemy is figuring out ways to use the information age against us.488 
The effective integration of all these factors enabled a small, state-within-a-state-like 
organization to effectively defend against a numerically and technologically superior 
enemy and force its withdrawal from Lebanese soil. 
C. ORGANIZATION AND LEADERSHIP 
By 2006, after decades of continual structural transformation, Hezbollah 
developed an organizational form that enabled it to be one of the significant ruling 
powers in Lebanon and to take on the characteristics of a “state” in the southern part of 
the country. At that time, Hezbollah`s organization resembled that of a political party, but 
it had its own military capabilities as well. The organization was, and currently is, led by 
the Supreme Shura Council, which consists of seventeen members. “The Supreme Shura 
Council is the highest authority in the party and is charged with legislative, executive, 
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judicial, political, and military affairs and with the overall administration of the party.”489 
Hezbollah`s daily operations are directed by the Secretary General, Sayyed Hassan 
Nasrallah and his deputy, Naim Qassem. Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, who has been the 
leader of Hezbollah since 1992, is a proved guerrilla commander, a powerful leader, and 
skilled propagandist committed to Israel’s destruction and the establishment of an 
Islamist state in Lebanon.490 He is seen by his followers as a messianic figure with more 
power than any Lebanese political official. He is also a member of the executive 
committee of Hezbollah. This committee consists of four districts, including Beirut, the 
southern suburbs, the south, and the Biq`a Valley, each with leaders of their own, and 
five additional members who are chosen by the Supreme Shura. Directly subordinated to 
the executive committee one can find the politburo, with fifteen members who do not 
have decision-making authority; rather they coordinate and supervise the activities of the 
three sub-elements: the enforcement, recruitment, and propaganda; holy reconstruction; 
and security organs.  During the 2006 conflict, all these sub-elements played a key role in 
Hezbollah’s success. The first had “a vital role in the reinforcement of Hezbollah’s 
doctrines and contributed extensively to the mobilization of hundreds of young Shi’ites to 
the cause of Hezbollah.”491 The second provided “support services to members, new 
recruits, and supporters of Hezbollah. These services range from medical care to financial 
aid, housing, and public utilities.”492 The security organ had two main tasks: protecting 
the key leaders of Hezbollah and running effective intelligence gathering and counter-
intelligence operations against Israeli intelligence services. All these sub-elements played 
an important supportive rule in the 2006 conflict, but the most important organizational 
unit was the fourth sub-element, the combat organ. As Nizar A. Hamzeh observes, this 
element originally consisted of two parts:  
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the Islamic Resistance (al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyyah), and the Islamic 
Holy War (al-Jihad al-Islami). While the first one is in charge of suicide 
attacks against Western and Israeli targets, the second one led more 
conventional attacks against Israeli troops in the south.493  
In the Second Lebanese War, Hezbollah mainly relied on the Islamic holy war section. 
Based on Israeli intelligence estimates at that time, Hezbollah had about 10,000 fighters 
available, but they deployed about 3,000 of them, from the Nasser Brigade, south of the 
Litani River along Israel`s northern borders. Besides the conventional unit designation, 
none of the structural elements of this unit followed conventional military organizational 
principles.  
Hezbollah units were organized into three major groups: short-range rocket crews, 
medium-range rocket crews, and light-infantry units.  The first rocket teams were foot-
and-bicycle mobile units consisting of lookouts, rocket transporters, and launching teams. 
After the lookouts declared an area clear, a second team transported the rockets to the 
launch site then left. Seconds later, the firing team arrived and launched the rocket. The 
medium-range rocket teams had larger weapon systems that required some type of 
transportation. The Fajr and extended-range Katyushas “were to be fired from vehicle-
mounted launchers, often a pickup truck or the ubiquitous small flatbed farm trucks of the 
region.”494 Those fighters who were assigned to defend the rockets operated in small 
decentralized cells organized into direct and indirect fire teams. These small units were 
capable of conducting either hit-and-run attacks or positional defense by effectively 
massing direct and indirect fire on the advancing Israeli columns. Although all these 
organizational elements operated in a highly decentralized manner, as Biddle and 
Friedman explain:  
Hezbollah exercised a degree of hierarchical, differentiated command and 
control over subunits operating in key areas during the campaign, making 
apparent decisions to favor some sectors over others, hold in some places 
but yield in others, counterattack in some locations but with draw 
elsewhere. A formal chain of command operated from designated and 
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well-equipped command posts; used real-time communications systems 
including landline cables and encrypted radio; issued orders; changed 
plans; and moved some elite units over considerable distances from 
rearward reserve areas to reinforce the key battle for the communications 
network in the central sector.495 
Hezbollah understood that the Israeli forces would follow a direct strategy, which would 
be based on the need to “achieve effects” on Hezbollah`s system. To prevent this and to 
take away the advantages of the Israeli precision-weapon systems Hezbollah created a 
“network of autonomous cells with little inter-cell systemic interaction,”496 which 
minimized their footprint and appearance time while providing maximum operational 
effectiveness. As Penny L. Mellies states: 
Hezbollah acted as a ‘distributed network’ of small cells and units acting 
with considerable independence, and capable of rapidly adapting to local 
conditions rather than having to react faster than the IDF’s decision cycle, 
they could largely ignore it, waiting out Israeli attacks, staying in 
positions, reinfiltrating or reemerging from cover, and choosing the time 
to attack or ambush.497 
D. INTERNAL FACTORS 
One of the major internal factors that led to the success of Hezbollah in the 
Second Lebanese War was the high level of pre-conflict training and combat experience 
of its fighters in irregular-warfare methods. The eighteen-year struggle against Israel not 
only allowed Hezbollah to gain significant combat experience, but provided an 
opportunity to figure out the Israeli forces’ doctrine and operational procedures. Based on 
their knowledge and understanding of the enemy, Hezbollah developed an effective 
counter strategy and focused the training of its forces on the irregular character of the 
future war they expected to wage against Israel. Between 2000 and 2006, most of the 
Nasser Brigade received training in Iran and Syria, designed to provide the highest 
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chance of success for Hezbollah’s irregular approach. It included operating different 
weapon systems, conducting day and night operations, integrating direct and indirect 
fires, use of mines, and constructing of improvised, explosive devices.498 One of the 
examples of the effective integration of pre-conflict experience and training was the 
capability of short-range rocket units to set up a launch site and fire a rocket within 
28 seconds, during which time they could prevent Israeli forces from conducting an 
attack on the site.499  
The next significant internal factor that made Hezbollah`s resistance so effective 
was the type of tactics it used during the war. Hezbollah employed not only a unique 
combination of traditional guerrilla type hit-and-run tactics and swarming, but like the 
Chechens showed remarkable ability and willingness to engage in long firefights both in 
defense and on offense against larger Israeli formations. As Penny L. Mellies observes, 
Hezbollah tactics included “indirect fire attacks, primarily with rocket and mortar; direct 
fire attacks (anti-armor and surface-to-air fire), employed explosives, IEDs/explosively-
formed penetrator (EFP) and mines, and conducted raids, ambushes and kidnappings.”500 
In offense, Hezbollah relied heavily on its indirect fire capabilities and ambushes. The 
rockets` concealment in urban areas and well-prepared caches and the ability of units to 
set up launch sites quickly, fire rockets, and melt back into the “terrain” without 
detection, provided significant operational advantages to Hezbollah.  Ambushes, 
especially those conducted with guided anti-tank missiles, on advancing Israeli troop 
columns, were very effective as well. In the already mentioned example of the Israeli 
401
st  
 Brigade, eleven tanks were hit and twelve soldiers killed by Hezbollah’s fire during 
an ambush.501 Tough attacks on the advancing Israeli troops were frequent. Many times 
Hezbollah would: 
allow IDF troops to pass its fighters hiding in “nature reserves” and other 
places, and then continue surface-to-surface rocket fire into Israel and 
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guerilla operations against rearguard forces. Thus, any Israeli movement 
deep into Lebanese territory had to include a thorough sweep to secure all 
the built-up and open areas taken by the IDF.502  
As Matt M. Matthews notes “Hezbollah’s tactical proficiency bewildered the IDF. 
Hezbollah was not simply hunkering down and defending terrain but was using its small-
arms, mortars, rockets, and antitank weapons to successfully maneuver against the 
IDF.”503 
On defense, Hezbollah used its prepared and well-concealed strong points and 
fortified defensive positions with high effectiveness. As a unique difference from 
traditional guerrilla tactics, Hezbollah fighters, most of them wearing clearly identifiable 
military uniforms, did not avoid long-lasting firefights in an effort to preserve their 
forces. It happened on numerous occasions that firefights lasting several hours took place 
between the parties while Hezbollah fighters tried to hold key positions. An example of 
such an engagement happened at the Shaked outpost. “A dug-in Hezbollah defensive 
position remained in place on a critical hillcrest near the Israeli border between Avivim 
and Marun ar Ras, exchanging fire with IDF tanks and infantry for more than 12 hours 
before finally being destroyed in place by Israeli fire.”504 The other unique factor of 
Hezbollah’s fighting style was that its fighters continued to engage Israeli forces at close 
range and in many cases they did not even try to break contact or withdraw, as guerrillas 
would have done. Hezbollah’s units occasionally also conducted squad and platoon size 
counterattacks as well. In one case, between fifteen and 30 fighters assaulted an Israeli 
company position with the objective of recapturing Hill 951. In another case, about 
60 Hezbollah members attacked an Israeli position on Hill 850. In both operations, the 
attackers were divided into two major, conventional-style elements: a main effort, 
assaulting the hill, and a supporting effort, providing guided anti-tank missile and mortar 
support from at least two directions.505 
                                                 
502 Tira, “Breaking the Amoeba’s Bones.” 
503 Farquhar, Back to Basics, 15. 
504 Biddle and Friedman, The 2006 Lebanon Campaign and the Future of the Warfare, 35. 
505 Biddle and Friedman, The 2006 Lebanon Campaign and the Future of the Warfare, 39. 
 150 
These above described kinetic tactics were effectively integrated with information 
operations (IO). Hezbollah employed experts in “psychological warfare and propaganda, 
operating its own television, radio, and internet sites and collaborating with supporting 
media.”506 Hezbollah’s information-warfare strategy was focused on highlighting the 
vulnerabilities of Israeli society and military forces while continuously presenting its own 
battlefield successes, the suffering of Lebanese people, and the collateral damage caused 
by Israeli operations. “Hezbollah accomplished this by performing sophisticated editing 
and photo and video manipulation, presenting a skewed picture of the war’s progress.”507 
The most shocking media exploitation conducted by Hezbollah took place on July 14, 
2006 when Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah appeared on al-Manar and presented a 
“live countdown” to a missile strike conducted against the INS Hanit. As the two C-802 
anti-ship missiles were launched, “he confidently suggested that viewers in Beirut look 
toward the west for a spectacular sight. The timing of the broadcast was impeccable and 
serving as a lethal theatrical drum roll.”508 This was just one of the numerous examples 
of how Hezbollah used information operations as a combat multiplier. 
The effectiveness of Hezbollah kinetic tactics and information operations were 
enabled by the ability to sustain a reliable communication system throughout the entire 
conflict. It had “excellent, diverse, and hard-to-target C2 capabilities included fiber-optic 
landlines, cell phones, secure radio, messengers, the internet and the al-Manar television 
station.”509 The extent of Hezbollah`s communication capabilities became clear in the 
implementation of the ceasefire. As Crooke and Perry explain, the fact that the 
organization`s leaders easily enforced the agreement on their unit commanders proved 
that:  
Hezbollah’s communication’s capabilities had survived Israel’s air 
onslaught, that the Hezbollah leadership was in touch with its commanders 
on the ground, and that those commanders were able to maintain a robust 
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communications network despite Israeli interdiction. More simply, 
Hezbollah’s ability to cease fire meant that Israel’s goal of separating 
Hezbollah fighters from their command structure (considered a necessity 
by modern armies in waging a war on a sophisticated technological 
battlefield) had failed.510  
The last internal factor that had a significant influence on the end results of the 
Second Lebanese War was the role of intelligence. During the conflict, Hezbollah had 
significant advantages in this area, based on the unique integration of the knowledge of 
the Israeli forces` procedures and three additional factors: Hezbollah`s military deception 
operations, its counter-intelligence operations before the war, and its tight operational 
security within. As part of its deception strategy, Hezbollah presented numerous 
“dummy” bunkers and launch sites to provide a “target-reach” battlefield for the 
conventionally minded Israeli military leadership. Several bunkers were “constructed in 
the open and often under the eyes of Israeli drone vehicles or under the observation of 
Lebanese citizens with close ties to the Israelis.”511 Meanwhile it built its real fortified 
positions, which were expertly camouflaged, in areas that were hidden even from the 
Lebanese population. The effectiveness of Hezbollah`s deception was further increased 
by its ability to turn many Israeli agents, and through them to feed false information back 
into the Israeli intelligence system. Thus when the attacking Israeli forces entered 
Lebanon, most of their intelligence was false and they paid a huge price for it.512 As one 
of the Israeli soldiers explained “we expected a tent and three Kalashnikovs—that was 
the intelligence we were given. Instead, we found a hydraulic steel door leading to a well-
equipped network of tunnels.”513 Finally, Hezbollah’s ability to control information 
internally provided a significant advantage and restricted Israeli intelligence access to 
critical operational information. As Crooke and Perry write, 
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For security reasons, no single commander knew the location of each 
bunker and each distinct Hezbollah militia unit was assigned access to 
three bunkers only - a primary munitions bunker and two reserve bunkers, 
in case the primary bunker was destroyed… The security protocols for the 
marshaling of troops were diligently maintained. No single Hezbollah 
member had knowledge of the militia’s entire bunker structure.514 
The mutually supporting combination of these intelligence functions and their 
integration into Hezbollah`s overall strategy was an important enabler for final success.  
E. EXTERNAL FACTORS 
The effective use of natural terrain and its augmentation with well built and 
concealed defensive positions were key elements in Hezbollah`s strategy. The defenders 
recognized and exploited those areas of south Lebanon that had military usefulness and 
possible advantages over the attackers. Urban areas, having important road junctions and 
operationally key terrain features, were fortified and heavily defended, while, for 
example, the southwestern part of Lebanon had much less defensible terrain and was 
defended only temporarily and with lighter forces. As Biddle and Friedman state: 
villages near the border with Israel were systematically better prepared for 
defense and more strongly manned than those in the interior. Supplies and 
ammunition were stockpiled in locations commanding key terrain; other 
positions appear to have received little logistical prepositioning.515  
For its short- and medium-range rocket systems, Hezbollah built launch sites “into the 
ground, using pneumatic lifts to raise and lower the launchers from underground shelters. 
Many were launched from trucks positioned as standalone launchers. Firing teams sought 
protection in nearby bunkers and caves to hide from IDF counter-battery attacks.”516 
Crooke and Perry find that “the most important command bunkers and weapons-arsenal 
bunkers were dug deeply into Lebanon’s rocky hills—to a depth of 40 meters. Nearly 
600 separate ammunition and weapons bunkers were strategically placed in the region 
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south of the Litani.”517 All the above described pre-conflict battlefield-preparation efforts 
conducted by Hezbollah effectively supported its strategy during the conflict and served 
as an important force multiplier against a numerically and technologically superior 
enemy. As Penny L. Mellies states, “Hezbollah’s ability to exploit virtually any built up 
area and familiar terrain as fortresses or ambush sites at least partially compensated for 
IDF armor, air mobility, superior firepower, and sensors.”518 
Beyond the natural and manmade terrain, the social environment also played a 
key role in the conflict.  In the previous cases, as a significant part of the irregular 
struggle, the fighting usually took place in close proximity to the civilian population, 
which enabled the rebel forces to melt back into the civilian society after their operations, 
thus to avoid detection. Hezbollah enjoyed strong popular support in south Lebanon, 
especially among the Shi`a population, but it did not use civilian society as a “hiding 
place” in a significant way during the Second Lebanese War. It is also important to note 
that Hezbollah did not extend its defensive infrastructure to those areas populated mainly 
by Christians. The lack of a supportive population in those areas made it impossible to 
keep Hezbollah`s war preparations hidden from Israeli intelligence. Hezbollah was 
blamed for using civilians as human shields, and did indeed use residential buildings to 
hide fighting positions and rocket-launch sites, but the vast majority of civilians were 
evacuated from the area in the wake of the conflict. Furthermore, Hezbollah fighters, with 
few exceptions, wore clearly distinguishable military uniforms and so tried to melt into 
the civilian population only on rare occasions. As Biddle and Friedman explained, 
The key battlefields in the land campaign south of the Litani River were 
mostly devoid of civilians, and IDF participants consistently report little or 
no meaningful intermingling of Hezbollah fighters and noncombatants. 
Nor is there any systematic reporting of Hezbollah using civilians in the 
combat zone as shields. The fighting in southern Lebanon was chiefly 
urban, in the built-up areas of the small to medium-size villages and towns 
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typical of the region. But it was not significantly intermingled with a 
civilian population that had fled by the time the ground fighting began. 519 
The last significant external factor that played a key role in the success of 
Hezbollah`s irregular strategy was the international environment in which the conflict 
took place. During the preparation for conflict, Hezbollah received significant support 
from three countries. Between 2000 and 2006, Iran and Syria provided financial support 
for infrastructure preparation, supplied Hezbollah with a large amount of modern Iranian, 
Russian, and Chinese weapon systems, and provided training for thousands of Hezbollah 
fighters. Iranian Revolutionary Guard officers and North Korean “defensive guerrilla 
warfare” experts participated in designing and building Hezbollah’s defensive system. As 
Matt M. Matthews states,  
all the underground facilities [Hezbollah’s], including arms dumps, food 
stocks, dispensaries for the wounded, were put in place primarily in 2003–
2004 under the supervision of North Korean instructors. Evidence would 
further suggest that the Iranian Revolutionary Guard was also heavily 
involved in the construction effort.520  
During the actual conflict, Iran continued to supply Hezbollah with rockets and other 
weapons, and also provided significant intelligence support as well. Some sources even 
suggest that Hezbollah`s Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah took refuge and 
commanded the entire war from the Iranian Embassy in Beirut.521  
Not surprisingly, Israel`s traditional allies, including the United States, the United 
Kingdom, and Germany, supported Israel`s right to defend itself and the U.S. even 
authorized the immediate shipment of precision-guided bombs to increase the 
effectiveness of Israeli forces,522 which ironically further strengthened the IDF`s 
proponents of the conventional solution to the conflict and played right into Hezbollah`s 
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hands. Several Arab countries, including Egypt and Jordan, also heavily criticized 
Hezbollah`s actions and called on the U.N. to interfere to stop the fighting. Initially this 
request did not find any support within the Security Council, since the U.S. and UK 
trusted that Israel would win and hoped for a final blow to be delivered against 
Hezbollah. But it soon became evident that Hezbollah would not be defeated quickly and 
easily. This recognition finally led to the unanimous approval of U.N. Security Council 
Resolution 1701, which ended the 34-day war between Hezbollah and Israel. 
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
In 2000, after eighteen years of transformation and adaptation, Hezbollah drove 
Israel from southern Lebanon and became a state within a state. The organization not 
only functioned as a political entity and provided social services to Lebanon`s population, 
but acted as a state would have done in preparing to prevent future Israeli occupation. 
Before the conflict started, Hezbollah, with the help of foreign sponsors, spent six years 
preparing its forces in South Lebanon for war. And though it came as a surprise, the war 
found Hezbollah better prepared and able to fight more effectively than anyone would 
have thought. During its preparation, Hezbollah designed a unique strategy that best fitted 
its ideology, goals, operational environment, and available resources, and proved to be 
successful against Israel. There were several key factors that contributed to the 
unexpected success of Hezbollah during the war. 
Since Hezbollah had fought against Israel for eighteen years, its planners and 
fighters thoroughly knew their enemy’s thinking, procedures, capabilities of their 
weapons systems, etc. Based on this knowledge, Hezbollah built a military force before 
the war that best supported its strategy. This military force was specifically structured and 
trained for irregular warfare, and was not an ad hoc raised force, organized after a 
conventional defeat. The essence of the organization of Hezbollah’s forces were 
explained by Anthony H. Cordesman in his book, Lessons of the 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah 
War, as follows: 
Hezbollah further organized its fighters into small, self-sufficient teams 
capable of operating independently and without direction from high 
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authority for long periods of time. Although an elaborate system of radio 
call signs, a closed cellular phone system, and two-way radios allowed 
these teams to stay in touch with their higher units, a great level of 
wartime decision-making leeway was given to the junior ranks, largely 
mitigating the need for such communications….As for its counterparts in 
Chechnya, Iraq, and Afghanistan, Hezbollah’s looser structure may have 
worked to its distinct advantage during the 2006 war, allowing units the 
flexibility necessary for quick reaction and adjustment to Israeli 
offensives.523 
Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah also explained Hezbollah`s “new model” army by 
stating “it was not a regular army but was not a guerrilla in the traditional sense either. It 
was something in between.”524  
To further increase the effectiveness of this new model army, Hezbollah 
conducted extensive infrastructure preparation in south Lebanon. The construction and 
sophisticated concealment of fortified positions, tunnel systems, and large caches of 
hidden, pre-positioned weapons, in combination with the unique integration of 
conventional tactics and irregular methods, completely threw the Israeli forces off 
balance and severely reduced their technological and numerical advantages. Hezbollah`s 
strategy focused on defense, but its uniqueness and effectiveness enabled it to seize and 
hold the initiative at times throughout the entire war. As Andrew Exum stated, “this was 
a very good lesson in asymmetric warfare. This was not Israel imposing its battle on 
Hezbollah but Hezbollah imposing its battle on Israel.”525 But not only were the physical 
environment prepared and the kinetic operations effectively integrated, the successful use 
of psychological warfare and media exploitation were also key elements.  
Hezbollah properly recognized the military value of the media and entered the 
war with an already functioning system. Through its own television station, its web site, 
and the use of embedded reporters, Hezbollah retained its ability during the entire conflict 
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to formulate and communicate its agenda to the proper target audiences, which had a 
significant impact on the end results of the conflict.   
Finally, the information advantage possessed by Hezbollah also played a 
paramount role in the outcome of the conflict. Hezbollah`s advantages could be found in 
four major areas.  First, it had an extensive knowledge on Israeli military doctrine, while 
Israel operated on the bases of wrong assumptions by expecting the same type of fighting 
from Hezbollah as it had before. Second, through “turned” agents, Hezbollah managed to 
feed the Israelis false information. Third, by expertly concealing its positions and using 
many dummy bunkers, Hezbollah misled Israeli intelligence, especially its aerial 
platforms, regarding its defensive structures. Fourth, the ability to sustain extreme 
information security within the organization denied the Israelis access to key information 
during the conflict. All these elements acted as force multipliers for the irregulars, since 
they not only helped hide their operations, but also exposed the invading Israeli forces to 
counterattack. 
The Second Lebanese War was chosen as a case study in this project because 
Hezbollah’s strategy, force structure, training, infrastructure preparation, and type of 
operations provide the closest real-world example of the proposed theory of this thesis.  
As a result of Hezbollah`s effective combination of ancient irregular methods, 
innovations and skillful use of modern technology, the Second Lebanese War ended up as 
a struggle between direct and indirect strategies, with the unexpected success of the small 
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IX. THE WAY AHEAD 
The years following the end of the Cold War’s bipolar world order have led to a 
situation in which an ever-growing asymmetry has arisen in the military capabilities of 
many countries. Some major states, with greater ambitions and more economic power, 
have managed to gain remarkable advantages in conventional warfighting capabilities 
over smaller states. The weaker countries, to try to keep up with the large states, have 
continued to pursue the principle of “sameness” in the “competition in the arts and the 
instruments of force,”526 and have responded by implementing one or a combination of 
the four traditional ways of forming a defense strategy. The analysis of these 
conventional warfare-focused frameworks in this project highlights several of their 
disadvantages. In the case of imitating major powers, small states trying to sustain large 
but uneconomical and obsolete military forces, were shown to be wasting resources and 
opportunities. These small states play right into the hands of their future adversaries by 
trying to fight on their adversaries’ conventional terms. Alternatively, by joining alliances 
to overcome their conventional disadvantages, small countries become dependent on 
others for many facets of defense and continually run the risk of abandonment or 
entrapment by their allies. Neutrality, a third alternative, can be successful only if the 
enemy accepts and abides by that status. Finally, to acquire WMD may pay off well, but 
in the current international environment, its success seems highly unlikely, and even the 
smallest sign of the intention to develop such a capability can lead to much international 
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This thesis does not suggest that these methods never work for small states; 
however, this research intended to explore the possibility of another, more advantageous, 
way of homeland defense.  By changing the focus from the idea of pursuing “sameness” 
to embracing “asymmetry,” this project affirms the validity of establishing a professional 
irregular force and implementing an irregular strategy for the homeland defense of small 
states.  The work was done on the assumption that an irregular approach could not only 
avoid the disadvantages of the four traditional frameworks, but provide a higher chance 
of success to a small state warring against a numerically and technologically superior 
enemy. Through longitudinal and cross-sectional analysis of six historical cases, 
including successful and failed irregular struggles, this project identified several key 
factors that make it reasonable for small states to consider such a strategy and build a 
professional irregular force. 
One of the common characteristics that emerged from the cases presented in this 
thesis was that the technological and numerical advantages of the large states were 
overwhelming and the small states either lacked sufficient force to fight on the enemies’ 
terms or they had already been defeated in conventional battle by their stronger foes. The 
recognition of enemy strength in conventional warfighting capabilities and the small 
states` limitations led to the implementation of irregular defensive strategies in all cases. 
While in the first four cases this approach arose from necessity during the war, in the last 
two cases the irregular strategy was formed long before the conflicts started. As the 
analysis demonstrated, the earlier a small state decided to implement an irregular 
strategy, the less pain it had to endure in building a substantial force and the supporting 
infrastructure for waging an irregular war. Generals Greene and von Lettow used their 
conventional forces to wage an irregular war. Though their soldiers had limited irregular-
warfare experience, they had been trained for conventional war and their logistical 
system was designed to support such fighting, which was a serious disadvantage at the 
beginning of the wars. The Boers made a tragic mistake when they initially tried to 
employ their irregularly organized and trained forces in a conventional war. This was a 
great example of the point that mastery at the tactical and operational levels in irregular 
warfare is paramount—but by itself insufficient to ensure final victory. It is necessary to 
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have a clear, overarching irregular strategy that integrates and directs these lower-level 
capabilities and directs them toward the common higher goals. The Yugoslav partisan 
movement was built on an underground political organization that initially did not have a 
strategy or military force. Tito formed his irregular approach and his force during the 
actual fighting. In the cases of both the Chechens and Hezbollah, there was an existing 
irregular strategy with sufficient irregular force and supporting infrastructure. This 
enabled both small states to fight unexpectedly successful defensive wars against two of 
the strongest militaries in the world. In sum, all the small states studied turned to irregular 
warfare sooner or later, but they paid a lower price and were more successful if they 
switched before the war. Beyond the proper timing of the implementation of an irregular 
strategy, this research reveals several additional conditions worth thinking about for small 
states considering such an approach. 
First, the case analyses highlight the necessity of a firm and unified political will 
among the small country`s leaders in favor of an irregular strategy and professional 
irregular defense force. Political unity is required because an irregular strategy is a 
nontraditional way of defending a country, and in the case of a war, this approach can 
mean the initial loss of territorial sovereignty, letting invaders into the country without 
fighting, and waging a protracted war with much suffering inflicted upon civilians. This 
reality might be hard to sell to politicians and civil society. The understanding and 
support of the population is crucial for the success of an irregular strategy. Those small 
states that had the ability to unify their populations, whether based on powerful notions of 
nationalism, as in the case of the Americans, Yugoslavs, and Chechens, or on religion-
based bonds like Hezbollah’s, have the highest chance of successfully employing an 
irregular strategy against a superior enemy. As the analyzed conflicts demonstrate, if the 
population does not accept the invaders` rule and resists in every possible way while the 
small state`s forces launch irregular operations on a continuous basis against the invaders, 
the situation becomes close to impossible for the large state to sustain its control over the 
occupied territories. 
Second, to implement an irregular warfare strategy successfully, there must be 
capable and willing military leaders from the highest to lowest levels who understand and 
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accept the necessary changes in the existing conventional force structure, training system, 
and military culture as a whole. As the research shows, pre-conflict military training 
increases the effectiveness of every individual soldier and unit and also creates significant 
bias toward the conventional military culture in which they were raised. In all cases, it 
took unique individuals and unconventional thinking to pursue irregular strategies. The 
irregular-minded leaders studied had to fight their conventional-minded peers continually 
to implement their ideas. To avoid such conflict, small states considering an irregular 
strategy must conduct a drastic reorganization of their forces, including the firing of hard-
core conventional leaders and replacement with open-minded commanders at all levels. 
Small states also have to create a training and education system that, while keeping some 
aspects of conventional warfare training, focuses on irregular warfare methods, especially 
on the essence of swarming. 
Third, rough natural physical terrain and severe weather conditions have been 
crucial factors in waging many irregular wars, and those countries having such features 
were at an advantage, since these features by themselves could take away many 
conventional military advantages. However, those small states with fewer mountains and 
less wilderness can still consider implementing irregular warfare strategies. The Chechen 
and Lebanese cases provide supporting evidence of this. Though the physical terrain and 
weather played a key role in these cases, they also showed that with proper pre-conflict 
preparation and effective integration into the overall strategy, manmade features can be 
as important as natural ones. Most of today`s countries experience a continuous growth of 
urban areas, which provides more advantageous terrain for them against conventional 
forces than they could imagine. Those small states with extended urban areas can create 
the most difficult battlefield for conventional attackers and the most advantageous for 
irregular defenders, through proper infrastructure preparation.  
Fourth, as a paramount condition of a successful irregular defense strategy for 
small states, the analyzed cases highlight the importance of self-reliance and self-
sustainment. Besides Hezbollah, all small states studied here fought against their 
conventional enemies without any significant outside support. The irregulars were 
successful by living off the land individually or in small units, and by creating an 
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effective support system during the conflict, or building one before the war. While the 
large conventional formations required large amounts of resupply, the small irregular 
units could sustain themselves from small rations. The issue of self-sustainment was a 
crucial problem for both sides in every conflict, but since long and exposed supply lines 
are very vulnerable, they became a decisive disadvantage for the conventional side. 
Based on this understanding, any small state considering the implementation of an 
irregular strategy should be able to wage a war without significant outside support. The 
preparation of supporting infrastructure, including hideouts, hospitals, hidden approach 
routes, tunnel and bunker systems, weapon and ammunition caches etc., can be crucial to 
the successful conduct of an irregular war. 
Finally, this research revealed the importance of knowing the enemy as much as 
possible while protecting the irregular force`s own information from discovery. In the 
presented cases, the irregular fighters capitalized on their extensive knowledge of the 
enemy. For example, Francis Marion, Aslan Maskhadov, Tito, and several of their small-
unit leaders had all previously served in the military forces of their future enemies. That 
service gave them detailed knowledge of their enemies’ operational methods and the 
capabilities and limitations of their weapon systems. Similarly, the Boers and Hezbollah 
had knowledge of their adversaries through previous conflicts with them and made efforts 
to capitalize on the lessons from those earlier engagements. This kind of knowledge can 
be built easily today as well, since every country follows almost the same general 
principles of traditional war and their conventional military doctrine is widely available 
for study on the Internet. This could be one more reason for considering the introduction 
of an irregular defensive strategy. It would provide a significant advantage over highly 
predictable conventional units, since there is no such thing as an irregular doctrine or a 
common list of irregular warfare methods, which provides a unique unpredictability for 
irregular forces. The effectiveness of this element can be further increased by strict 
control and protection of information regarding the irregular strategy. The Chechens’ 




seem to be the best frameworks for information security. Those small states with similar 
conditions could add one more force multiplier to their irregular strategy if they were to 
implement such an approach. 
Although this summary suggests a strong motivation for small states to consider 
creating a professional, irregular defense force and homeland-defense strategy, the 
conduct of country-specific research in the following topics would further emphasize the 
utility of the proposed theory: 
 
1. Is a professional irregular defense force cheaper than a conventional 
military, or not? 
 
2. What size professional, irregular defense force could be sustained from the 
same budget used by the current conventional military? 
 
3. Can a small state combine any of the four traditional defense frameworks 
in conjunction with a professional, irregular defense force and an irregular 
defense strategy? 
 
4. How should a professional, irregular defense force be organized, trained, 
equipped, and sustained? 
 
5. How long would it take to transform an existing conventional military 
culture and organization into a professional, irregular defense force? 
 
Considering the differences among countries concerning their military 
capabilities, it is clear that in case of invasion, many small states will not be able to resist 
by means of conventional warfare. Even though, irregular warfare is as old as man and 
has been present in every conflict since the beginning of war, it has never been 
considered a state-level, grand strategy to win a war. Even the United States, the most 
powerful conventional military power, does not consider it a valid possibility. As John 
Arquilla notes in his book, Insurgents, Raiders and Bandits: How Masters of Irregular 
Warfare Have Shaped Our World, a Pentagon document issued in 2007 on irregular 
warfare still “reflects a curious lack of attention to the idea that irregular warfare may be 
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employed by a standing military in a general conflict.”527 The geostrategic environment 
of today might be the setting in which to change this view. History teaches that those 
small states that are searching for self-reliant, effective homeland defense should stop 
pursuing the “sameness” path that leads to certain defeat. Instead they should innovate by 
starting to “harvest from the edges of strategic thought”528—particularly thought about 
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